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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to provide more insights into our understanding of 
several‎ issues‎ pertaining‎ to‎ the‎ evolution‎ of‎ a‎ firms’‎ investment‎ – cash flow 
sensitivity (ICFS hereafter), the evolution of a firms’‎research‎and development 
(R&D) ICFS and the‎ determinants‎ of‎ a‎ firms’‎ R&D‎ investment‎ over‎ total‎
investment1 (R&D/TINV) ratio. This thesis uses non-financial US and UK publicly 
listed firms. Our work consists of a number of important and original aspects that 
potentially contribute to the literature on capital market imperfections.  
The study of the ICFS comprises one of the largest literatures in corporate 
finance, yet little is known about the ICFS trend over time, and the literature has 
largely ignored that firms invest simultaneously in two types of investment 
(capital and R&D) and there is some substitutability between them, thus the two 
decisions need to be studied together.  
Initially we show that over time the ICFS: (i) declines for physical 
investment, (ii) is negative and increases for R&D, and (iii) is negative and 
fluctuates around the same level during the pre-crisis period and positive during 
the financial crisis period for R&D/TINV ratio. We argue that these findings can 
largely be explained by the changing composition of investment and the rising 
share of the firms with persistent negative cash flows. Secondly, substantial 
differences are found between the a priori subsamples of financially constrained 
and unconstrained group of firms and between US and UK firms as well as 
between pre-crisis and financial crisis periods.  
                                            
1
 Total investment is defined as a sum of physical investment plus R&D investment.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
  
2 
 
The aim of this study is to provide more insights into our understanding of 
firms’ investment decisions, research and development (R&D hereafter) 
investment decisions and R&D investment-total investment ratio (R&D/TINV 
hereafter) decisions. Non -financial US and UK publicly listed firms are employed 
in this thesis. Specifically, 4076 US firms and 1382 UK firms are taken into 
account. The main firm characteristics employed in this thesis are cash flows, 
Tobin’s‎Q,‎cash‎holdings,‎ leverage,‎equity‎and‎debt‎ issues, size and dividend 
payments.  
Corporate investment is broadly accepted as a vital driver of economic 
growth and business cycles. Financing investment with costly external resources 
can have critical impacts on the economy. Financial frictions, through their 
influence on investment, can slow economic growth and develop business 
cycles (Aghion et al., 1999). For all measures, understanding the relationship 
between firms’‎investments‎and‎their‎financing‎over‎time‎is‎important.‎ 
Given that the irrelevance proposition of financial structure to a firm’s 
value introduced by Modigliani and Miller (1958) holds, firms’‎ investment‎
decisions are independent of financial decisions. Under the assumption of 
perfect capital markets, there is no wedge between the cost of internal and 
external funds and external finances provide a perfect substitute for internal 
capital. The availability of internal capital does not affect investment and growth. 
All firms can acquire from investors the essential capital to carry out all 
value-increasing investment opportunities without paying an extra premium. 
Their responses to changes in the cost of capital or tax-based investment 
incentives differ only due to differences in the investment demand (Fazzari et al., 
1988). Put differently, firms decide how much to invest on the basis of their 
growth opportunities solely, regardless of the sources of capital. Therefore, the 
capital expenditures of a firm are completely a function of its investment 
opportunities where the supply of capital is infinitely elastic. This entails an 
insignificant relationship between investment expenditures and internal funds.   
In contrary, under the assumption of imperfect capital markets, internal 
and external finances are no longer perfect substitutes. Due to the imperfections 
of capital market the cost of external finances is relatively higher than the cost of 
internal finances. Firms are not necessarily able to undertake all the 
value-increasing investment opportunities available to them anymore. The 
difference between the costs of internal and external funds is usually explained 
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as the consequence of the premium on external finances that arise from 
contracting and information frictions and from agency conflicts between insiders 
and outside investors. Thus, the cost of external finance is argued to be a 
function of the extent to which firms are subject to capital market imperfections. 
Implicitly, firms that suffer from a shortage of internal funds and are affected by 
the severe informational and agency problems at the same time will be subject to 
limited access to external finance, this situation will force them to give up some 
profitable investment opportunities. Firms are not necessarily able to take all 
value-increasing investment opportunities anymore. These firms are recognized 
as financially constrained and the availability of internal funds for them becomes 
crucial for investment.  
As shown by the models of Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) for the debt market and of Greenwald et al., (1984), Myers (1984) 
and Myers and Majluf (1984) for the equity market, outside investors do not have 
as much information about a company as its managers. Even if managers are 
considered to be acting in the interests of current shareholders, for investors it is 
very costly, and in some cases even impossible, to assess a firms quality for 
investment purposes. Thus, the cost of capital raises with agency and 
asymmetric information problems, and in effect, firms in need of external funds to 
invest will forego some positive net present value (NPV henceforth) projects 
(debt or equity rationing). In situations like this the firms’‎ ability‎ to‎ invest‎ is‎
constrained since firms are forced to base their expenditures, not merely on the 
quality of the growth opportunities, but also on the availability of capital. 
Consequently this leads some firms to lower their future growth and show a 
decline in operating performance, this effectively reduces the firm value because 
even if these firms have attractive growth opportunities they do not have access 
to fund that allow them to make the optimal number of investments in all their 
growth opportunities. Consequently, the greater the capital market 
imperfections, the stronger the sensitivity of investment to internal resources.  
However, since the seminal work by Fazzari et al., (1988), the investment 
research has attempted to document how investment cash flow sensitivity 
changes as the costs of external finance increase by focusing its attention mostly 
on the identification of different groups of firms that are more (or less) likely to 
face higher costs of capital, (see Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Bond and 
Meghir, 1994; Hoshi et al., 1991; Chirinko and Schaller, 1995; and Elston, 1998). 
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Firms’‎cash flow has been used to proxy internal funds in an attempt to examine 
whether the investment sensitivity to cash flow is a useful measure of financial 
constraints. 
All these theories lay the grounds for the research we conduct in this 
thesis. Specifically we study the firms’‎investment‎and‎financing‎behavior under 
the influence of financing frictions. This thesis is structured as three related 
analytical chapters that can each be treated separately but which also share 
some common links. Each of the three analytical chapters addresses a particular 
aspect of firms’‎investment‎decisions.‎However,‎the‎two important aspects of this 
study, which the analytical chapters are based on, are as follows 1) capital 
market imperfections make investment decisions difficult; and 2) measures of 
financial constraints may be wrong. 
The first analytical chapter of this thesis analyses the sensitivity of 
corporate investment to internal cash flow for UK firms over time. This chapter 
also studies the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the issue of the 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow for firms with different levels of financial 
constraint. 
There are two schools of thought in the literature regarding investment – 
cash flow sensitivity. The first one originated by Fazzari et al. (1988) considers 
investment to be more sensitive to cash flows for financially constrained firms. 
The second one initiated by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argues the opposite that 
investment is more sensitive to cash flow for unconstrained firms. With both 
theories in mind, chapter two presents a detailed and systematic analysis of the 
corporate investment cash flow sensitivities (ICFS) over the period 1980 to 2009 
for a large sample of non-financial UK listed firms. Then, based on the 
hypothesis that the sensitivity of investment expenditures of financially 
constrained firms to the availability of internal funds is higher than that of 
unconstrained firms, it puts forward several firm characteristics such as size, age 
to identify financially constrained firms over time.  
In our first analytical chapter we attempt to shed light on two important 
questions. The first question relates to how ICFS changes over time whereas the 
second question is concerned with how this sensitivity depends on the degree of 
financing constraints faced by the firm over time. Although the relationship 
between investment and cash flow has found a prominent place in the literature 
on corporate finance and the importance of the link has been extensively 
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investigated by many studies, little is known about the stability of the ICFS over 
time. Exceptions are the studies carried out recently on the US listed firms 
samples by Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), Agca and Mozumdar (2008), 
Brown and Petersen (2009), Chen and Chen (2012) and Kim (2010). Motivated 
by their recent research on this topic, the first analytical chapter of this thesis 
uses data for UK firms, divided into three subperiods: 2009-2000, 1999-1990 
and 1989-1980 to investigate over time the extent to which the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow differs for firms facing different degrees of different 
financial constraints. Our understanding of the relationship between investment 
and internal cash flow is improved by employing very broad panel data in terms 
of its time length and number of firms, especially when we examine the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity during the recent financial crisis. 
Our second analytical chapter investigates corporate R&D investment 
behavior over time in the US and UK using data divided into two subperiods: 
1990-1999 and 2000-2010.2 Two strands have appeared in the literature in 
terms‎of‎the‎influence‎of‎the‎severity‎of‎financing‎constraints’‎on‎R&D‎investment‎
versus physical investment. On the one hand, it has been argued by many 
researchers that financing constraints apply to R&D investment possibly more 
critically than to capital expenditures. Carreira and Silva (2010) state that the 
existence of financial constraints appears to be particularly severe for firms that 
decide to invest in R&D because of the high risks associated with the investment 
(typically longer term projects with uncertain outcomes). On the other hand Bond 
et al. (2003) amongst others, argues that innovative firms are not likely to face 
financial‎ constraints‎ as‎ they‎ are‎ “deep‎ pocket”‎ firms,‎ i.e.‎ they‎ engage‎ in‎
innovation activity when they have plenty of internal financial resources to do so. 
Therefore, the main question of this paper is whether the existence of financial 
constraints for firms actively investing in research and development projects is 
more severe than for firms intensively investing in physical capital and, if so, the 
implications for R&D investment. To answer this question firms are divided 
according to the measure of the intensity of R&D investment as well as the 
industry they belong to, namely high-tech versus non high-tech industries. Also 
the relationship between finance and R&D investment over a period of time that 
                                            
2
  We limited the sample period to only two subperiods because the data availability for UK firms 
over the firms subperiod was very poor.  
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includes a financial crisis period for panels of US and UK listed firms is 
examined.  
The analysis of this chapter also contributes to the literature by 
investigating the role of cash reserves, stock and debt issues in determining the 
corporate R&D investment expenditures, while controlling for potential market 
imperfections. In addition, we conduct a comparison between the boom period 
and the financial crisis period to determine whether the relationship between the 
R&D investment and cash flows changes during these two extreme market 
conditions. Finally, our investigation builds on previous work by trying to 
distinguish different investment behavior of companies with persistently negative 
cash flows over time. The empirical literature has consistently documented that 
such firms have a negative investment to cash flow relationship. Failure to 
account for such investment behaviour will result in inaccurate estimates of the 
sensitivity of R&D investment to cash flow. 
In the third analytical chapter we argue that where firms invest 
simultaneously in two types of investment (capital and R&D) and there is some 
substitutability between them, the two investment decisions need to be studied 
together. To support our argument we study how the R&D/TINV, where the total 
investment is a sum of R&D investment and capital investment, should react to 
variations in net worth for firms that deal with financial constraints. To the 
author’s‎ knowledge‎ there‎ is‎no‎other‎ study‎ investigating‎ the‎ impact‎of‎ capital‎
market imperfections on the R&D/TINV ratio. Our approach tests how sensitive 
the R&D/TINV ratio is to firm-specific characteristics, and how capital market 
imperfections can impact firms' decisions with respect to the R&D/TINV ratio. 
Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to analyze how sensitive the 
R&D/TINV ratio is to firm-specific characteristics for financially constrained 
high-tech firms.  
The third analytical chapter contributes to the literature in several key 
areas. First, it examines the responsiveness of the R&D/TINV ratio to variations 
in firm-specific characteristics, such as cash flow, cash holdings, leverage and 
equity issues. Second, the behavior of constrained and unconstrained firms 
regarding their decisions on the R&D/TINV ratio is analyzed. Finally, it uses rich 
financial dataset to examine the cash flow sensitivity of the R&D/TINV ratio for a 
sample of US and UK non-financial firms over the period 2000–2011. This data 
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facilitates the comparisons of the US against UK firms, the pre-crisis against 
crisis period as well as providing an overtime analysis. 
To carry out the empirical investigation, this thesis employs cross 
sectional and panel data methodologies that help control for the endogeneity 
problem, which can appear in this context for several reasons (e.g. unobserved 
heterogeneity, reverse causality). Specifically, we use the average 
cross-sectional regression approach put forward by Rajan and Zingales (1995) 
and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation procedure 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We 
believe that with appropriate methodologies employed, our results are consistent 
and robust. In particular, capital investment and R&D investment analyses are 
based on dynamic panel data empirical models, which are estimated using the 
GMM methodology. Such an approach helps control for the potential 
endogeneity problem that is likely to arise if a) the observable and unobservable 
shocks affecting physical or R&D investments can also affect internal funds or 
growth opportunities as well as other firm characteristics used in the capital 
expenditures or R&D investment models, including leverage, cash holdings, debt 
and equity issues and b) the observed relations between capital or R&D 
investment and its determinants reflect the effects of capital or R&D investment 
on the R&D investment rather than vice versa. 
This thesis employs two different data settings, namely the UK and US. 
Several factors make the UK and US particularly interesting environments to 
study. In terms of corporate ownership structure and institutional and legal 
framework the UK is usually described as being similar to other Anglo-Saxon 
countries. However, there are recognizable corporate governance 
characteristics in the UK, which may have important implications with regard to 
the ICFS of firms, especially over a long period of time. Guarglia (2009) argues 
that the relative lack of corporate bond and commercial paper markets, the 
relative thin and highly regulated banking and equity markets, and the relatively 
small amount of venture capital financing, seem to make the idea of financial 
constraints that affect firm behaviour more plausible in a European context than 
in the US. Hence, this work adds to the debate on the effects of financial 
constraints on R&D investment over time, with a focus on the UK and the US 
rather than just the US. This is an important issue because the controversy 
surrounding the interpretation of the R&D investment cash flow sensitivity is 
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much less developed in the UK than it is in the US. Overall, our results can shed 
light on the differences and similarities between the RD investment and liquidity 
behavior of companies operating in different market-based financial systems.  
This study provides interesting results that extends our understanding of 
the issues investigated. The analyses in Chapter 2 find that the investment cash 
flow sensitivity decreases over time even after controlling for negative cash 
flows, and it becomes weaker over the financial crisis period. The main finding 
though is that the magnitude of the ICFS depends on the sample selection 
criteria, which in turn forms the definition of financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms based on the classification measure. So far, the literature 
seems to lack strict sample selection criteria which may lead to confounding 
results. Based on the assumption that high ICFS correctly reflects that firms are 
financially constrained and e.g., size is the right measure to classify firms into 
financially constrained and unconstrained categories, chapter 2 shows that ICFS 
does not increase monotonically with financial constraints and in fact the pick of 
firms who are so called financially constrained can be easily manipulated. 
Specifically, the distribution of the ICFS over the full sample lacks a systematic 
trend, thus one may pick any subsample and call it e.g., financially constrained 
firms. Owing to the very extensive data of the paper in the sense of time period 
and number of firm year observation we can summarize that the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity depends not only on the specific measure of 
financial‎ constraints,‎ but‎ also‎ on‎ various‎ time‎ periods‎ and‎ various‎ firms’‎
samples. This can to some extent explain the lack of consensus in the literature 
regarding the investment cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial 
constraints. The finding that ICFS declines over time also augments the still alive 
debate between Fazzari et al. (1988) and Kaplan and Zingales (1997). 
Measuring ICFS over time supports our understanding of corporate investment 
behavior. One can learn from this research that the ICFS as a measure of 
financing constraints is not a precise device, but it is affected itself by many other 
conditions, such as, for example, time period, type of considered firms, country 
or market conditions etc.   
The main finding of chapter 3 is a persistently negative relationship 
between cash flow and R&D investment. This negative ICFS is almost 
independent from the measure of cash flow or from dropping or including the 
negative cash flow firm year observations or firms whose sum of cash 
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flow-to-assets ratio over the sample period is negative in the sample. This 
negative association between R&D investment and cash flow exists because the 
importance of cash flow as a source of financing decreases over time, while the 
importance of R&D investment as a form of investment increases over time. This 
negative association between R&D investment and cash flow is much stronger 
for financially constrained firms, which may indicate that these firms finance their 
R&D projects with other available funds. Counterparts firms also show a 
negative relationship between R&D investment and cash flow. However their 
R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity is much weaker and most of the time 
insignificant, suggesting that these firms are more likely to employ cash flow in 
the‎process‎of‎financing‎the‎firms’‎innovations,‎or‎the‎alternative‎understanding,‎
is that they do not require as much financing for R&D because they invest 
relatively less in R&D projects. A similar trend is found for net stock issues 
coefficients, but on a smaller scale.  
When the financial crisis period is considered the ICFS is even more 
negative and significant, whereas cash holdings coefficients are more positive 
and significant according to the OLS regression. In line with GMM results cash 
holding‎of‎the‎full‎sample‎of‎US‎firms’‎impacts‎R&D‎investment‎negatively‎during‎
the crisis.  
Chapter 3 also finds that firms of both countries experience a significant 
share of their financing from net equity issues, however the role of cash holdings 
in funding R&D investment is dominant.   
In terms of comparison between the US and UK firms (e.g., economic 
significance) we observe that the coefficients for the UK firms are much greater 
than for the US firms, implying R&D investment shows a stronger dependence 
on financial variables in the UK than in the US market.  
The findings in Chapter 3 also indicate that R&D investment is an 
important fraction of corporate investment spending for a significant share of 
publicly traded firms. According to the sample of this research the share of R&D 
investment in total investment, measured as the sum of physical and R&D 
investments, is higher than the share of capital investment for US firms since 
1992 and for UK firms since 2001. 
Overall, the results show that R&D investment is affected by financial 
constraints. Lastly this study shows a vast range of differences between R&D 
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firms in the US and UK. The most outstanding one is that US firms appear to be 
more advanced in their R&D investing process.   
Although this thesis considers only three themes from a wide range of 
literature that discusses the impacts of market imperfections on investment 
decisions, the findings in this paper expand our understanding of corporate 
investment decisions by delivering results achieved from new perspectives on 
the topics. We study the physical and R&D ICFS over time and provide evidence 
that helps settle the debate. Studies that test the ICFS focus on an individual 
investment, neglecting the impact of other types of investment, which may lead 
to insufficient evidence about the ICFS. This study, therefore, considers the 
effects of financial factors on both capital and R&D investments decisions in 
order to examine how more and less constrained firms allocate their funds on 
capital and on R&D investment when decisions on both inputs have to be taken 
simultaneously. The findings in this thesis would be helpful to researchers, 
practitioners and policy makers. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity over Time for UK Firms 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The investment - cash flow sensitivity (hereafter ICFS) finds a prominent 
place in the literature on corporate finance and the importance of the link has 
been extensively investigated by many studies3. In recent years, researchers 
have‎intensively‎debated‎the‎extent‎to‎which‎firms’‎investments‎are‎constrained‎
by the availability of finance, and particularly whether a positive and statistically 
significant investment - cash flow sensitivity can be interpreted as an indicator of 
financial constraints (see Schiantarelli, 1995; Hubbard, 1998; and Bond and Van 
Reenen, 2005, for surveys). This debate finds its roots in Fazzari et al., (1988) 
(FHP hereafter) influential paper, which suggests firms with low dividend payout 
ratios (i.e. firms that are more likely to face financial constraints) display a high 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow. Subsequent extensive research confirms 
that a higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow is demonstrated by firms that 
are a priori more likely to face severe financing constraints. When firms 
encounter external financing constraints, investment spending should not solely 
differ with the availability of positive net present value projects, but also with the 
accessibility of internal funds. Accordingly, through comparing the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow across firm samples sorted on the basis of ad hoc 
proxies for financing frictions, the influence of credit market imperfections on 
corporate investment should be easily measured.  
FHP’s‎ (1988)‎ finding of a positive relationship between internally 
generated cash flow and investment (capital expenditures) and also that this 
relationship is strongest for firms that are most likely to have difficulty accessing 
external capital markets has serious implications regarding the efficiency with 
which capital is allocated in the economy. Consequently the paper by FHP 
initiated a number of additional studies which investigated the relationship 
between cash flow and investment.4 FHP (1988) argue that, ceteris paribus, a 
                                            
3
 See, e.g., Fazzari and Athey (1987), Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988, 2000), Devereaux 
and Schiantarelli (1990), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Oliner and Rudebusch (1992), 
Vogt (1994), Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (1997), Kadapakkam, 
Kumar and Riddick (1998), Hadlock (1998), Moyen (2004), Ascioglu, Hegde and McDermott 
(2008), Hovakimian (2009) and Bond and Söderbom (2010) among others. 
4
 Followed‎ research‎ hasn’t‎ focused‎ only‎ on‎ firms’‎ investment‎ behaviour,‎ but‎ also‎ on‎ firms’‎
inventory investment (Carpenter et al., 1994, 1998; Kashyap et al., 1994; Guariglia, 1999, 2000; 
Benito, 2005), their R&D investment (Bond et al., 1999; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002b), their 
employment decisions (Nickell and Nicolitsas, 1999; Sharpe, 1994); and more in general their 
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sensitivity of investment levels to cash flows indicates that the cost of internal 
finance is lower than that of external finance. They suggest this difference might 
arise because external funding imposes additional costs, arising from increased 
agency conflicts, underinvestment incentives, or adverse selection, on firms. 
Moreover, findings of FHP are in line with Myers and Majluf (1984) argument that 
in the presence of asymmetric information firms tend to follow a hierarchy in their 
financing policies in the sense that they prefer internal over informationally 
sensitive external finance. Therefore, for financially constrained firms, the wedge 
between internal and external financing is high, because owing their higher level 
of information asymmetry, they face very costly external financing. Nevertheless, 
financially unconstrained firms do not have much incentive to use their internal 
cash flow as a source of fund, due to their relatively lower level of information 
asymmetry. Hence, for unconstrained firms the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
is not high.  
However, the usefulness of the investment-cash flow sensitivity as a 
proxy of financial constraints has been challenged by KZ (1997) (hereafter KZ) 
theory,‎ which‎ states‎ that‎ “company investment decision does not suggest a 
monotonic association between financing constraints and the sensitivity of 
investment to cash flow, under profit maximizing behavior.”‎Instead‎of‎employing‎
the dividend payout ratio as an indicator of financial constraints like FHP did, KZ 
focused‎on‎other‎criteria.‎They‎ reclassified‎FHP’s‎ low‎dividend‎sub-sample of 
firms‎on‎the‎basis‎of‎information‎contained‎in‎the‎firms’‎annual‎reports‎as‎well‎as‎
managements’‎ statements‎ on‎ liquidity.‎ Consequently,‎ KZ‎ provided‎ empirical 
outcomes contradictory to the results of FHP that more financially constrained 
firms have higher investment—cash flow sensitivities. They concluded that 
higher ICFS cannot be interpreted as evidence that firms are more financially 
constrained.  
The important‎ assumption‎ in‎ the‎ theoretical‎models‎ on‎ firms’‎ financial‎
constraints in the existing literature (e.g., FHP (1988, 2000) and KZ (1997, 
2000)) is that these constraints translate entirely into higher costs of external 
funds. Implicitly, both FHP and KZ assume that firms are able to acquire any 
amount of funds so long as they pay the required price. Therefore, a constrained 
firm indispensably trades off the output from greater investment and the effect of 
                                                                                                                               
growth (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002a). In general, these‎studies‎maintained‎FHP’s‎ (1988)‎
main conclusion. 
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greater investment on the deadweight costs of external finances. In 
consequence,‎ their‎ model’s‎ comparative‎ statics‎ depend‎ on‎ how‎ financial‎
constraints influence both the slope of the marginal (deadweight) cost of external 
funds and the slope of the marginal productivity of investment.  
Whilst there is no theoretical consensus on the relationship between 
investment and cash flow sensitivities, which continues to be an important 
empirical question, there is ample survey evidence and recent results which 
support the intuition that ICFS are indeed a reflection of the extent of financing 
constraints (Love (2003), Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2005)). 
Harrison et al. (2004) explains that most papers which question this methodology 
relate more directly to the Q-model of investment rather than the Euler equation 
model (although some of the criticisms apply to both models). 
Also, although there is no agreement among studies regarding the issue 
of how to interpret the findings in ICFS literature, ICFS regressions remain in 
widespread use as a tool to examine different issues in corporate finance. For 
instance, see Hoshi et al., (1991), the references in Hubbard (1998), Biddle and 
Hilary (2006), Beatty, Liao, and Weber (2007) and Almeida and Campello 
(2007).‎As‎Almeida‎and‎Campello‎(2004)‎point‎out‎ that‎ “a‎number‎of‎ theories‎
explore the interplay between financing frictions and investment to study issues 
ranging from firm organizational design e.g., Gertner et al. (1994) and Stein 
(1997) to optimal hedging and cash policies (Froot et al. (1993) and Almeida et 
al.‎(2003)).”‎ 
Furthermore, in spite of the disagreements on the relative size of ICFS 
across sub-samples, the consensus of prior studies is that ICFS is positive in 
virtually all the sub-samples considered. Stein (2001) asserts that the clearest 
empirical evidence from research on investment is the impact of cash flow on 
investment, i.e. controlling for investment opportunity, and those firms with 
greater cash flow tend to invest more. Moreover, Stein‎also‎states‎that‎“it‎is‎much‎
less‎clear‎what‎the‎precise‎mechanism‎is‎that‎drives‎this‎relationship”.‎Thus this 
study aims to shed some light on the relationship of cash flow and investment. 
Following Brown and Petersen (2009), this study intends to provide further 
analysis of the ICFS by investigating it over time. Trend analysis allows us to plot 
aggregated response data over time. Also, trend analysis can be extremely 
valuable as an early warning indicator of potential problems and issues. "With 
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the past, we can see trajectories into the future - both catastrophic and creative 
projections." John Ralston Saul.  
In spite of the prominence of ICFS literature, there is little evidence to 
indicate the ICFS trend over time. However, there are exceptions of studies 
carried out on the US listed firms samples by Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004), 
Agca and Mozumdar (2008), Brown and Petersen (2009), Chen and Chen 
(2009) and Kim (2010). Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) report a decline in 
ICFS over the 1977-1996 period, particularly for the most constrained firms. The 
authors come up with two explanations for this, namely the improved external 
market efficiency or the increased supply of external funds. Agca and Mozumdar 
(2008) also find that the ICFS has declined over time (1970-2001). Brown and 
Petersen (2009) examine investment-cash flow sensitivity, when using the sum 
of R&D expenditure and capital expenditure of firms as the proxy for investment. 
They show that investment-cash flow sensitivity decline for the time period 
1970–2006. Specifically, they find that the physical investment-cash flow 
sensitivity has declined and largely disappeared but they argue that R&D is an 
important form of investment. If R&D is included in the investment, then the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity is still strong, particularly for firms with positive 
cash flows. Chen and Chen (2009) documented that the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity declines over the 1967–2006 period and almost disappears in recent 
years (2007-2009). They employ the time-series variation of the investment-cash 
flow sensitivity as their identification strategy and they draw a different 
conclusion, e.g., that the sensitivity cannot be a good measure of financial 
constraints.  
Though these papers divide the sample into sub-periods and compare 
investment-cash flow sensitivity of different periods, none of them compare the 
recession and non-recession periods apart from the study of Kim (2010). The 
data period Kim investigates is from 1980 to 2008. He examines whether 
bank-dependent firms experience significant change in investment-cash flow 
sensitivity during the current banking crisis, and compares them with the change 
in investment-cash flow sensitivity for non-bank-dependent firms. In addition, he 
compared the change in investment-cash flow sensitivity of bank-dependent and 
non-bank-dependent firms during the recession in the early 2000s. Kim (2010) 
finds that the bank-dependent firms experience higher increases in 
investment-cash flow sensitivity than non-bank-dependent firms during the IT 
16 
 
bubble burst period in the early 2000s and the subprime mortgage crisis in the 
late 2000s. 
To‎the‎author’s‎knowledge,‎there‎is‎no‎study‎of‎the‎ICFS over time based 
on the UK listed firms. Therefore, firstly, this chapter investigates how the level of 
ICFS for physical investment behaves over time for UK listed firms, and secondly 
it attempts to shed further light on the debate by employing a large panel of 
financial data on UK firms from 1980 till 2009. The primary objective of this 
document is to move the research agenda forward, delivering systematic 
documentation of what has happened to the ICFS over time, which opens new 
avenues for studying the impact of those constraints on firm investment, 
especially when financial crisis is considered. This chapter explores the cash 
flow-investment sensitivity over time during both booming and financial crisis 
times and tries to compare the cash flow-investment sensitivities in different 
periods.  
This paper extends the literature in several ways. Namely, by employing 
the data on UK manufacturing firms with continuous coverage by Datastream for 
the period 1980–2009, it tests the trend of ICFS through time. Contrary to prior 
studies that take into account the US firms, we deliver evidence for the UK 
market. Despite the fact that the UK and the US are seen as functioning 
according‎to‎a‎similar‎“common‎law”‎regulatory‎system‎(La‎Porta‎et.al.,‎1998)5, 
the‎ UK‎ market‎ is‎ substantially‎ different‎ in‎ certain‎ areas.‎ In‎ terms‎ of‎ firms’‎
ownership structure and institutional and legal framework the UK is usually 
described as being similar to other Anglo-Saxon countries. However, there are 
recognizable corporate governance characteristics in the UK, which may have 
important implications with regard to the ICFS of firms, especially over long 
periods of time.  
Similar to work of Chen and Chen (2012) and Kim (2010) this study period 
covers the financial crisis period 2007-2009. This economically significant time 
period provides new input to this area of research. In strong economic 
environments firms are likely to show a problem of free cash flow and are less 
likely to be financially constrained. A weak economy is expected to present the 
                                            
5
 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998) describe for 49 countries the level of 
shareholder-rights protection. On a scale from zero (no protection) to six (high protection), UK 
and US firms receive a score of five. For purpose of a comparison with other 
continental-European countries, France, Germany or the Netherlands get low scores for 
shareholder protection (three, one and two, respectively). 
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opposite as firms are more likely to face a problem of underinvestment and they 
are also more likely to be financially constrained. Thus, our analysis offers a 
comparison of the evidence from a pre-crisis period and a crisis period which we 
expect to have direct implications for the ICFS trend. The crucial questions we 
address here are whether the ICFS shows any trend over time, up to the year of 
financial crisis birth in 2007 in the UK, especially at the onset of a crisis and later 
during the crisis, and consequently what impact, if any, had a financial crisis on 
the tendency of ICFS? This analysis enables us to extend the current research 
and investigate the influence of financial crises on investment through examining 
corporate investment in a period when the financial crisis became a fact in the 
UK. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) claim adverse macroeconomic shocks not only 
interfere with the central function of financial markets but also exacerbate 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. As a result, during a financial 
crisis the hedging role of cash should be more popular because of the ability of 
firms to raise external finance is much smaller, due to an increasing wedge 
between the cost of internal and external funds. Therefore, during financial crisis 
periods, financially constrained firms should save a higher proportion of their 
cash‎flows,‎whilst‎unconstrained‎firm’s‎cash‎flow‎policies‎should‎not‎show‎any‎
systematic changes. The financial crisis period makes this study much more 
interesting‎and‎provides‎clear‎advantages‎for‎future‎research.‎A‎firms’‎viability,‎
profitability and cash flow as well as prevalently reduced the expected return on 
investment opportunities are clearly affected by exogenous shocks coming from 
economic and financial crises. Put differently, financial crisis work as exogenous 
shock affecting both the size of current cash flows as well as the relative 
attractiveness of current investment against the future one.  
Furthermore, investigating ICFS over thirty years period underlines and 
stamps the need to include cash holding and leverage ratio in our model, 
something that has not been done by previous researchers investigating ICFS 
over time6. In the spirit of BP (2009) this study argues that these variables are 
potentially important omitted determinants in most ICFS studies. Since firms 
often make very heavy use of cash holdings or debt to expand investment when 
cash flow is particularly low, failure to account for internal and external finance in 
                                            
6
 Only Brown and Petersen (2009) control for external finances variable impact in their model, but 
they do not include cash holdings. Chen and Chen (2009) includes cash holdings in one of theirs 
models. However, none of these studies include external finances and cash holdings at the same 
time.  
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ICFS regressions can result in a downward omitted variable bias in the estimated 
cash flow coefficient. On the other hand, firms experiencing positive cash flow 
shocks may trade off higher investment for higher cash holdings or lower debt 
levels. Consequently, failure to account for cash holdings and leverage may 
result in an upward omitted variable bias in the estimated cash flow coefficient. 
Hence, another contribution to the literature is that it examines the role of cash 
savings as well as external finance in the form of leverage ratio in the ICFS 
regressions by estimating dynamic investment models that include measures of 
cash savings and leverage. These are potentially important variables that might 
shed some light on the reasons of ICFS changes over time and support 
addressing some concerns that have been raised about interpreting ICFS. As 
also argued in Hubbard (1998) it is important to consider investment and 
financial policy jointly; firms may, for example, accumulate liquidity as a buffer 
against future constraints. Leverage and cash holdings are employed in the 
analysis because usually together with investment they account for a substantial 
fraction of cash flow use. Consequently they may play a substitution role for 
investment‎ in‎ firm’s‎ financial‎ policy,‎meaning‎ investment,‎ cash‎and‎debt‎may 
compete against each other. Firms classified as financially constrained tend to 
hold more cash and that is consistent with the hypothesis that financially 
constrained firms significantly benefit from cash savings. Thus controlling for 
cash holdings is important in the investigation of ICFS over time.  
Moreover, both free cash flow (Jensen, 1986) and asymmetric information 
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) problems are the types of agency conflicts within a firm 
that may be reduced with a help of debt servicing obligations. Corporate debt can 
act as a restriction of costly managerial actions and hence increases firm 
investment. This implies that debt servicing obligations can mitigate the costs of 
the manager-shareholder agency conflicts, especially when privately held debt is 
considered. The leverage ratio of total debt to total assets is included to 
approximate‎ the‎ lender’s‎ incentive‎ to‎monitor.‎ Basically,‎ with‎ the‎ increase‎ of‎
leverage, the risk of default by the company grows too, thus the incentive for the 
lender to monitor the firm. 
This paper also contributes to the literature with respect to the procedure 
of firms been divided into constrained and unconstrained groups. The active 
debate in the existing literature is whether ICFS is higher for financially 
constrained or unconstrained firms or alternatively, whether or not a high ICFS is 
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a‎good‎measure‎of‎ the‎presence‎of‎ firm’s‎ financing‎constraints.‎Thus,‎we‎are‎
intrigued by the attempt to find consistent measures of the degree of financial 
constraints. Since it is necessary to define a prior proxy for financial constraint 
we focus on two measures which firms are usually categorized by, namely size 
and age. For instance, large and mature firms are described as well developed, 
well informed and most importantly financially unconstrained firms. However, the 
practice among researchers is to divide firms according to one or another 
measure – separately. In this paper we intend to combine these measures 
together in order to introduce a more intuitive approach to the firms division. 
However,‎ in‎order‎ to‎create‎robust‎ financial‎constraints’‎measure‎we‎combine‎
size, age with financial variable, namely size growth calculated by sales growth 
ratio.7 8 Many‎empirical‎papers‎use‎sales‎growth‎as‎a‎proxy‎for‎firm’s‎investment‎
opportunities‎(see‎e.g.‎D’Espallier‎et‎al.,‎2008).‎Lamont‎et‎al.‎(2001)‎points‎out‎
the fact that in order to be constrained, a firm needs to have good investment 
opportunities. In line with this approach, we define constrained firms when their 
size and age are below‎ the‎ sample’s‎median‎ and‎ sales‎ growth‎ is‎ above‎ the‎
sample’s‎ median.‎ Unconstrained‎ firms‎ though‎ have‎ size‎ and‎ age‎ above‎ the‎
sample’s‎median‎but‎sales‎growth‎below‎the‎sample’s‎median.‎The‎sample‎of‎
firms with size, age and sales growth below the sample’s‎median‎should‎include‎
firms most likely to be financially distressed. 9  The last sample of firms with size, 
age‎ and‎ sales‎ growth‎ above‎ the‎ sample’s‎median‎ should‎ represent‎ spurious‎
issues. On one hand large and mature firms are classed as unconstrained firms. 
                                            
7
 KZ (1997) reclassified‎ FHP’s‎ low‎ dividend‎ sub-sample of firms on the basis of information 
contained‎in‎the‎firms’‎annual‎reports‎as‎well‎as‎managements’‎statements‎on‎liquidity.‎Also,‎for‎
instance‎KZ‎index‎is‎build‎on‎firm’s‎financial‎data. 
8 Guariglia‎(2008)‎uses‎firms’‎cash‎flow‎and‎coverage‎ratio‎as‎measures‎of‎“internal”‎financial‎
constraints,‎and‎firms’‎size‎and‎age‎as‎proxies‎for‎“external”‎ financial‎constraints‎to‎study‎the 
extent to which the sensitivity of investment to cash flow differs at firms facing different degrees of 
internal and external financial constraints. After combining the internal with the external financial 
constraints, she finds that the dependence of investment on cash flow is strongest for those 
externally financially constrained firms that have a relatively high level of internal funds. 
9
 It is arguable whether the degree of financing constraints is properly measured by the shortfall 
in internal cash flow. FHP (2000) points out that a low-cash flow firm is probably in greater 
financial distress, but not necessarily facing tighter financing constraints. Lamont et al. (2001) 
also considers the distinction between financial distress and financial constraints and in effect 
employs negative real sales growth as a proxy for financial distress. Financing constraints refer 
to the difficulty of raising external financing, or the cost differential between internal and external 
funds. The correlation between financial distress and financial constraints is particularly 
problematic in empirical work. For example, Kaplan and Zingales (2000) argue that financial 
distress is a form of financing constraints, and Povel and Raith (2001) suggest that low cash flow 
is a component of financing constraints.  
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On the other hand, financial constraints literature dictates that firms with high 
growth opportunities are constrained.  
However,‎ this‎ combined‎ measure‎ firms’‎ division‎ into‎ constrained‎ and‎
unconstrained groups may follow the contrasting philosophy that firms are 
unconstrained if their age growth raises positively and fast enough with their size 
growth‎in‎relation‎with‎firms’‎sample,‎but‎constrained‎if‎their‎age‎growth‎does‎not‎
reflect‎ their‎ size‎growth‎ in‎ relation‎with‎ firms’‎ sample.‎Firms‎might‎be mature 
according to their age classification but their size growth over the years was very 
slow in comparison with other firms, indicating that those firms directly or 
indirectly suffered from financial constraints problems, whilst firms whose size 
growth is aligned with age growth are classed as unconstrained firms. In 
agreement with the second approach firms are defined as unconstrained if they 
are mature, large or young, small with high speed of growth, while constrained 
firms are mature, large or young, small with slow speed of size growth.  
The age measure is defined by our data source – Datastream as the 
number of years the firm is listed on the equity market rather than its actual age 
of existence. Firms must pass certain condition in terms of its size before they 
are able to be registered on the equity market therefore that is an appropriate 
filter for firms to be in any of the groups of our classifications. The fact that this 
paper use GMM technique in order to examine the model also support the firms’‎
classification method, in the sense that for a firm to be in the sample it needs to 
be‎at‎least‎four‎years‎old,‎which‎gives‎basis‎for‎the‎judgement‎of‎firm’s‎speed‎of‎
the size growth.   
The research strategy to address all these issues is as follows. We 
discover changes in the ICFS between 1980 and 2009 employing Datastream 
data for non-financial firms, broken up into three ten year subperiods: 
1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 2000-2009. In order to learn about the changes of 
ICFS over time we divide the whole sample into smaller subperiods. These 
subperiods, put together, produce comparisons between decades. Testing for 
the full sample period only, would provide us with single set of coefficients stating 
the associations between variables for the chosen/setup period of time, but not 
over the time. In order to distinguish the financial crisis period, we also employ 
cross sectional analyses for the last decade. Time series analyses provide the 
detail picture of year by year changes as well as ten years rolling regressions.  
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In order to compare our results for the UK with results for the US already 
existing in the literature we assess the sensitivity of physical investment to cash 
flow with the standard pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model. Factors 
affecting the‎firm’s‎investment‎decisions‎change‎overtime.‎Firms‎with‎long‎term‎
investment targets achieve these through an adjustment process. Moreover, it is 
possible that random shocks influence both dependent and explanatory 
variables at the same time. It is likely that the observed investment and its 
potential determinants indicate the effects of investment on the latter rather the 
other way round. To detect for investment target and control for the endogeneity 
issue we use the generalized method of moments (GMM) technique, which also 
overcomes the problems of simultaneity and measurement errors that are known 
to be common in firm-level data. We use panel data because the degrees of 
freedom are increased; there is more variability and reduction in colinearity 
among regressors. These advantages deliver more efficient estimations. 
Unobservable firm heterogeneity is controlled for by panel data. Particularly in 
company financial data it is also difficult to establish exogeneity between the 
regressors and error term. Hence, due to likelihood of endogeneity, the direction 
of causality between variables might be ambiguous. As a result, spurious results 
may come out from employing the contemporaneous observations for both 
dependent variable and its determinants. GMM procedure controls this problem. 
Additionally, it allows us to examine the dynamic nature of the investment 
decision of UK firms. By involving dynamic effects, owning to useful aspects of 
the panel data, as well as controlling for unobservable firm-specific effects and 
firm-invariant time-specific effects, analyses of corporate financial decisions 
have a more appropriate basis. 
The empirical analysis of this paper provides a set of interesting results. 
Our major finding is that there is a substantial decline of ICFS over the thirty year 
period that this paper considers. This finding is confirmed by each analytical 
method employed in this study, namely the year by year analysis, OLS 
estimates, and GMM regressions. This dramatic decrease of ICFS over time 
appears even after controlling for negative cash flows in terms of OLS and GMM 
results. GMM regressions that consist of measures of cash holdings and external 
finances and control for negative cash flow also demonstrate strong decline of 
ICFS. This decline of the ICFS is consistent with previous literature on the 
subject. During the IT bubble burst period in the early 2000s and the credit 
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crunch‎ crisis‎ in‎ the‎ late‎ 2007s‎ firms’‎ growth‎ opportunities‎ have‎ a‎ statistically‎
insignificant impact on investment, while cash flow coefficients become weaker, 
but still statistically significant. In terms of sample division into groups of 
constrained and unconstrained firms, overall, constrained firms investment 
decisions seems to be motivated by both internal funds proxy and proxy for 
growth opportunities, while unconstrained firms investment decisions seems to 
be affected mainly by growth opportunities influence. Furthermore, our 
regression findings also highlight the different roles of cash holdings and 
leverage. Total debt coefficients are negative and rise over time for most groups 
of firms. While cash holding coefficients are positive and also increase over time, 
but most of the times they are insignificant. The economical significance of total 
debt coefficients indicates that the impact of total debt ratio on capital 
expenditures ratio has increased over time, meaning that firms have increased 
their ratio of leverage over time but decreased their investment ratio and in effect 
that suggests that firms have more and more debt dependent types of 
investment.‎The‎coefficients‎of‎cash‎holdings‎indicate‎that‎firm’s‎cash‎holdings‎
may participate in financing investment expenditures rather than compete 
against investment.  
The GMM estimation also suggests that firms have target investment ratio 
and they adjust to the target ratio relatively fast. Therefore, it seems that for firms 
both the costs of being away from their target ratios and the costs of adjustment 
play‎ important‎ roles.‎ A‎ firms’‎ speed‎ of‎ adjustment‎ of‎ their‎ target‎ investment‎
increases with time, meaning firms fulfil their target investment more efficiently 
over‎the‎time‎period‎this‎study‎concerns.‎This‎implies‎that‎firms’‎costs‎of‎being‎
away from their target investment or the costs of adjustment increases over time, 
therefore firms seem to be adjusting their investment faster in the last subperiod 
in comparison with the first subperiod, and that indicates that it is less and less 
affordable for firms to be away from their target investment.  
To summarize, the ICFS for physical investment has fallen dramatically. 
However, we emphasize that the cash flow coefficients for capital investment, 
controlled for growth opportunities, should have declined a great deal because of 
the sharp decrease of capital expenditure ratios that occurred during the period 
we study. We also find that over time there is an increase in the number of firms 
with persistently negative cash flows, which may suggest growing number of 
firms financially distressed. The bottom line is that the decrease in ICFS over 
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time may be explained with improvements in equity markets (Brown and 
Petersen, 2009), but that is not a sign of lower financial constraints firms face in 
year 2009 in comparison with year 1980. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents literature 
overview. Section 3 describes methodology. Following section demonstrates 
data and variable selection process. Section 5 reports empirical results and 
section 6 concludes.  
  
24 
 
2.2 Literature review 
 
Investment decisions are critically important because they are constantly 
linked with the future continuity, wealth and growth of the firm. An important 
factor about investment decisions faced by companies is that they are financially 
driven, which means that they are strongly dependent from financial decisions 
made by managers. Moreover, business investment is one of the most 
significant determinants of corporate value and is one of the major 
characteristics influencing an economy. Chirinko (1993) argues that the pace 
and pattern of business investment strongly affects economic activity, and the 
volatility of investment expenditure is a central contributing factor to aggregate 
fluctuations. 
Analysis‎of‎ the‎ firms’‎ investment‎decisions‎plays‎a‎domineering‎ role‎ in‎
research programs in macroeconomics, public economics, industrial 
organizations, and corporate finance. These research agendas have been rising 
on theoretical (e.g. debates over which model explains investment behaviour the 
best) as well as empirical basis (e.g. recently, a growing trend to unite the 
investment and financial decisions by studying interactions between them, or the 
interdependent nature of financial variables). Thus this chapter covers some of 
the most active areas of corporate investment research, namely broad 
theoretical and empirical literature that looks at how firms make investment 
decisions in the face of market imperfections such as informational asymmetry 
problems or agency costs and tries to find an answer to one pioneer question in 
corporate finance, which follows:‎how‎well‎firms’‎capital‎is‎allocated‎to‎the‎right‎
investment projects? This section has been structured to illustrate both a 
developed theoretical framework and empirical evidence challenges in both the 
investment decisions research and the financial characteristics research. In 
detail it presents models of capital-market imperfections in the investment 
process and demonstrates the main testable ramifications of those models. 
Description of problems raised by empirical studies is also incorporated in this 
paper.  
The next section discusses the most important aspects of market 
imperfection that affect corporate investment. The list of market imperfections 
consists of asymmetric information, moral hazard and adverse selection, agency 
25 
 
problems, behavioral factors, diversification, industrial organizations, taxes, 
government regulations and subsidies. The first four of these factors are briefly 
discussed next. 
 
2.2.1 Asymmetric information problems, moral hazard and adverse 
selection 
 
The appearance of theoretical models of asymmetric information brought into 
focus again the importance of how investment is financed.  Paper delivered by 
Akerlof (1970) demonstrated how markets function irregularly when sellers and 
buyers perform under various information setups, and therefore their well-known 
scrutiny‎ of‎ the‎ role‎ of‎ asymmetric‎ information‎ in‎ the‎ market‎ for‎ “lemons”‎
disconnected with established economic theory. Akerlof (1970) pioneered the 
adverse selection literature, showing the impact of informational asymmetry on 
quality. Literature picked up that similar argument could be referred to firms 
trying to acquire funds from lenders, thus applications to equity and debt markets 
were presented by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Greenwald, Stiglitz, and Weiss 
(1984), who found out that asymmetric information in terms of debt financing 
may increase the cost of new debt or even restrict firms from borrowing because 
of credit rationing. The reason is that lenders do not know how the money they 
lend is being invested. For example, higher interest rate may result in drop out of 
firms with valuable projects (adverse selection). Hence, firms with prominent 
growth opportunities may suffer seriously from asymmetric information. Then 
stemming from equilibrium credit rationing by suppliers of external finances, 
these firms spend on investment only when their internally raised finances are 
available. This induces a positive association between cash-flow and 
investment.  
Firms may choose to finance their investment from a wide array of sources of 
funds. In the presence of market imperfections, firms may prefer one source of 
funds over another. Myers and Majluf (1984) recognize this possible type of 
market imperfection, as the presence of information asymmetry between the firm 
- managers and the market - investors. They state that the information about 
firm’s‎ performance‎ held‎ by‎ managers‎ is‎ superior‎ to‎ that‎ known‎ by‎ outside‎
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investors. Outside investors are aware of this and hence require a greater rate of 
return to compensate for this information asymmetry. Therefore, using internally 
gathered up funds is much cheaper to raising more costly external funds. When 
firms suffer from liquidity constraints, managers may not be willing to issue new 
stocks but rather forego profitable investment opportunities. This lead to the 
main conclusion of the approach of costly equity finance, which is as follows: 
even firms that are badly in need of new equity may be unable or unwilling to 
raise it.  
Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss (1984) and Meyers and Majluf (1984) employ 
asymmetric information as the explanation for this financing hierarchy. Myers 
and Majluf (1984) introduce pecking order theory, which contend that raising 
equity externally will be problematic due to an adverse-selection problem. 
According to pecking order theory firms first use their internal funds, then the 
debt resources and finally will reach for equity funds to finance their investment 
projects. In other words, firms first employ the cheapest funds then gradually the 
most expensive. Fazzari et al. (1988), Bond and Meghir (1994), Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1995), and Lamont (1997), among others, deliver empirical 
evidence of the pecking order of financing costs and its influence on corporate 
investment levels. These studies find that investment levels of mostly financially 
constrained firms are most sensitive to the availability of internal funds. 
Asymmetric information between corporate insiders and the capital market is 
supposed to explain the investment distortions. Asymmetric information is the 
reason why external financing is more costly than they would be in a world of 
perfect markets. This is because outsiders cannot distinguish between firms 
having high versus low quality projects, and so will estimate every security issue 
as if it finances an average quality project.  
In the presence of asymmetric information, investors would estimate the 
value of the firm by observing signals given by managers. In situations of 
information asymmetry coexistence with agency problems, investors have much 
more‎difficult‎task‎to‎value‎the‎firm’s‎performance.‎Narayanan‎(1988)‎finds‎that‎
firm overinvests when it sells risky securities to finance a project with an 
unknown quality to investors. This is explained with the assumption that 
securities are valued according to the average project quality. 
When the market cannot distinguish between high-quality and low-quality 
investment opportunities, firms with high-quality opportunities are more likely to 
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finance their projects internally. The resulting adverse selection raises the cost of 
external financing compared to internal financing, forming a clear hierarchy for 
firms’‎sources‎of‎financing.‎In‎the‎presence‎of‎asymmetric‎information,‎internally‎
generated cash flow is the most likely source of funds for corporate investments.  
Summarizing financing constraints caused by asymmetric-information 
conflicts in the issuance of equity are the reason for the cash-flow-investment 
dependence. Explaining it from a different point of view, one source of raising 
external financing in order to achieve liquidity is to generate capital by issuing 
new equity. According to the theory of Myers and Majluf (1984), insiders of the 
firm have an advantage of better information about firm value than capital 
markets have. The insiders, such as managers and informed current 
shareholders, intend to pass wealth from new suppliers of capital to the existing 
shareholders. Outside investors, who are not as well informed as insiders, 
expect insiders to raise capital when this new capital is overvalued. This adverse 
selection implies that managers and firms face a premium on external financing. 
Therefore, firms will firstly use internal sources to fund investments. But, when 
investment expenditures exceed the internal funds, the premium on external 
financing starts to be relevant. This premium induces a liquidity constraint for 
firms, such that a proxy for internal funds becomes an important determinant of 
investment expenditures. Additionally, if the internal funds are insufficient, firms 
may pass on some positive net present value projects (underinvest) rather than 
issue securities for less than they are worth. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that 
firms’‎investment‎spending‎does‎not‎only‎depend‎from‎investment‎opportunities. 
The availability of internal funds also affects investment decisions, as external 
funds are excessively costly. Put differently, because of informational 
asymmetries good firms are undervalued by the capital market, and managers 
are biased odds to debt financing and underinvestment. According to Myers and 
Majluf this conflict can be sorted out when the firm can finance projects out of 
available‎cash.‎Therefore‎the‎“lemons‎premium”‎linked‎with‎external‎funds‎may‎
cause investment to be sensitive to the availability of internal finances for the 
project. Dybvig and Zender (1991) highlighted that a critical assumption for 
information asymmetry to produce underinvestment in the Myers and Majluf 
analysis is that management acts in the interests of existing shareholders.  
All in all, extensive research on information asymmetry and capital market 
imperfections demonstrates that because of market frictions, internal financing 
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are‎less‎costly‎than‎external‎financing‎because‎the‎latter‎comprises‎a‎‘lemons’‎
premium. The theory implies that cash flow will significantly influence investment 
behaviour, and managers are presumed to either overinvest or underinvest. 
Stulz (1990) demonstrates that managers are more likely to overinvest when 
cash flow is high, and underinvest when cash flow is low. Berkovitch and Kim 
(1990), studying investment, and Lang et al. (1991), studying merger and 
acquisition activity, have provided evidence which they interpret to be supportive 
of‎Stulz’s‎hypothesis.‎Jensen‎(1986)‎claims‎that‎free‎cash flow may be employed 
to finance negative NPV projects. This hypothesis of overinvestment states that 
a firm with free cash flow problems should increase dividend, because thanks to 
it,‎the‎market’s‎estimate‎of‎the‎amount‎of‎cash‎that‎will‎be‎wastefully‎invested, 
will‎decrease,‎hence‎a‎firm’s‎value‎will‎increase. 
The information asymmetry problem is closely linked with adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems. When actions of managers cannot be watched, then 
moral‎ hazard‎ arises;‎ and‎ “incentives‎ have‎ to‎ promote‎ the‎ correct‎ actions”‎
(Holmstrom, 1977). In cases, where firm is not a solely-owned  and finance its 
investment projects with help from external markets, the moral hazard problem 
seems unavoidable in terms of the relationship between managers and 
investors.  
Outside‎investors‎are‎often‎not‎able‎to‎verify‎the‎manager’s‎act‎of‎investment‎
or how managers make the investment decision. Scarifying resources into the 
monitoring of actions and employment of this information in the contract would 
be the most natural method of solving this problem.  Despite the fact that 
monitoring is supportive in following the action of managers, it is never perfect. 
Notwithstanding, when a potentially profitable investment opportunity exist in the 
firm, this monitoring will carry‎further,‎since‎investors‎“have‎to‎watch‎how‎cash‎
flow‎is‎used”‎(Myers,‎2000). 
In situations when firms have to raise costly external equities, adverse 
selection becomes also a direct outcome of the information asymmetry problem. 
According to Stein (2001) managers who favour their present shareholders at 
the expense of potential future investors may wish to sell new shares at times 
when their private information implies that these new shares are most 
overvalued. Consequently, the market rationally interprets equity issues as bad 
news (Asquith and Mullins, (1986)). In effect of this, managers of good firms may 
be unwilling to sell equity in the first place and even firms with proven prosperous 
29 
 
investment potential but financially constrained will be reluctant to issue equity. 
Nevertheless, Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) claim that in general 
the equity market is likely to be more severely affected by adverse selection 
problems, the debt market can be referred with the same basic adverse selection 
argument. Stein (2001) argues that at any given interest rate, managers will be 
more prone to borrow if they are aware of the fact that their firm is likely to 
default. Moral hazard is also recognized by Stein in the situation where 
managers who borrow have a greater incentive to take the kind of risks that lead 
to default. Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) present that 
credit rationing stems from these sorts of considerations, where firms suffer from 
not been able to acquire all the debt financing they would like at the generally 
accepted market interest rate. 
Firm’s‎ investment‎ decisions‎ can‎ be‎ highly‎ influenced‎ by‎ the‎ asymmetric‎
information problem, moral hazard and adverse selection. Hubbard (1998) 
states that a gap between the cost of external financing and internal financing is 
a result of the problem of asymmetric information between borrowers and 
lenders.‎With‎ information‎ lack‎about‎ the‎ riskiness‎or‎quality‎of‎ the‎borrowers’‎
investment projects, adverse selection leads to a gap between the costs of 
external financing in an uninformed capital market and internally gathered up 
funds. Hence, when managers make investment decisions they would depend 
on the availability of internally raised funds. The major conclusion is that 
investment is significantly correlated with proxies for changes in net worth or 
internal funds, ceteris paribus. According to Hubbard (1998) this correlation is 
most important for firms likely to face information related capital-market 
imperfections, that is, those companies experiencing severe financial 
constraints. 
Investment decisions of financially constrained firms with potentially good 
investment opportunities will be especially affected by moral hazard and adverse 
selection. A model of optimal financing of investment projects where managers 
have to apply unobservable effort and can also switch to riskier or less profitable 
projects has been studied by Biais and Casamatta (1999). They find that firstly, 
when the risk-shifting problem is more critical, optimal financial contracts of debt 
and equity combination can be carried out and secondly, when the effort problem 
is‎the‎most‎severe,‎stock‎options‎are‎needed‎to‎be‎included‎in‎the‎manager’s‎
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compensation scheme. However, the overall investment level would decline, if 
the moral hazard problem becomes worse. 
Furthermore,‎firm’s‎investment‎behavior can be influenced by the cash flow 
effect linked with other aspects of a firm. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) imply that 
over-investing firms announcing unexpected dividend change pass on 
information‎about‎the‎firms’‎levels‎of‎future‎investment.‎An‎increase‎of‎dividend‎
conveys to the market that firms will invest less in the future than was expected. 
Therefore, dividend changes carry information to the market and impact 
common stock prices. The signaling hypothesis contends that managers have 
information about the future opportunities of the firms, but this information is not 
available to the shareholders. 
 
2.2.2 Agency problems  
 
The agency problem is another major market imperfection constituent that 
impacts investment substantially. The influential document of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) initiated the issue of the misalignment of managerial incentives 
and shareholder interests, which arise mainly from the separation between 
ownership‎and‎control.‎According‎to‎this‎view,‎managers’‎objectives‎differ‎from‎
those of outside investors and managers act in their own best interests when 
opportunities arise, usually at the expense of outside investors - managers 
overinvest to derive private‎ benefits‎ such‎ as‎ “perks,”‎ large‎ empires,‎ and‎
entrenchment. This may be done in different ways such as excessive salaries, 
dilution of the ownership of outsiders, and spending resources on negative NPV 
investment projects. In other words the idea is that‎managers’‎pursuit‎of‎ their‎
own self interest makes them to pick a level of investment lower or higher than 
the optimum level for a completely manager owned firm.  
Managers may have an excessive taste for running large firms, as opposed to 
simply profitable‎ones.‎This‎agency‎problem,‎in‎which‎again‎managers’‎interest‎
diverge from those of shareholders is claimed to be the cause of empire-building 
and‎overinvestment.‎This‎“empire-building”‎tendency‎is‎emphasized‎by‎Jensen‎
(1986, 1993), among many others, who argue that empire-building desire will 
lead managers to spend essentially all available funds on investment projects. 
This causes the prediction that investment will be increasing in internal 
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resources. It also suggests that investment will decline with leverage, because 
high current debt payments require great amounts of cash out of the firm, 
therefore‎ decreasing‎ managers’‎ discretionary‎ budgets.‎ Put‎ another‎ way,‎
leverage serves as a disciplinary device in a sense that interest payments lower 
free cash-flow. More than this, the fixed obligations to debt holders, with 
underlined bankruptcy risk pressures managers to invest in valuable projects 
(Jensen (1986) and Zwiebel (1996)).  Stulz (1990), Harris and Raviv (1990), Hart 
and Moore (1995), and Zwiebel (1996)‎further‎developed‎and‎refined‎Jensen’s‎
ideas into formal models. These models in some states of the world, such as 
when the level of free cash flow relative to investment opportunities is higher 
than expected, predict ex post overinvestment and in others ex post 
underinvestment. 
Conflict between managers and shareholders may also appear when 
managers are concerned with how their actions impact their reputations – career 
concern, and ultimately their perceived value in the labour market. Narayanan 
(1985) contends that managers concerned with their labour-market reputations 
may have incentives to take actions that boost measures of short-term 
performance at the expense of long-run shareholder value. A similar approach 
comes from Stein (1989), who states that managers are not so concerned with 
their‎ own‎ reputations‎ per‎ se,‎ but‎ rather‎ with‎ their‎ firms’‎ stock‎ prices‎ over‎ a‎
near-term horizon. In both cases, the central point of the argument is that 
managers can do things that are unobservable to outside investors. As a result, 
underinvestment‎ is‎ rewarded‎ with‎ an‎ increase‎ in‎ either‎ manager’s‎ personal‎
reputations or in the stock price. Specifically, overinvestment, rather than 
underinvestment, is more likely to happen in some circumstances as a cause of 
an excessive taste to impress the labour market or the stock market in the short 
run. 
All‎ in‎ all,‎managers’‎ utility‎ is‎ positively‎ correlated‎with‎ firm‎ size‎ since‎ this‎
increases their pay, status and power. The target to maximize firm size 
disagrees with shareholders’‎ interests‎ in‎ case‎ of‎ firms‎ without‎ valuable‎
investment opportunities. Free cash flow is defined as the cash-flow that is at the 
discretion of managers, after valuable investments are carried out. This free 
cash flow is likely to be wasted by managers, who take on projects at the 
expense‎of‎ shareholders’‎welfare,‎ resulting‎ in‎overinvestment.‎Simply‎ saying,‎
the availability of free cash-flow causes overinvestment in the sense that the 
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available free cash flow is invested in projects increasing firm size but with 
negative net present value. Therefore cash-flow may be positively correlated to 
investment. Berle and Means (1932), Baumol (1959), and Williamson (1964) 
were‎ among‎ the‎ earliest‎ to‎ investigate‎ this‎ interests’‎ conflict.‎ Jensen‎ and‎
Meckling (1976) also propose that the interest between these two different 
groups of claimholders can run in the same direction through alterations of 
managerial ownership and, therefore, reduce the total agency costs within the 
firm. They introduce the model, where the relationship between managerial 
ownership and agency costs is linear and the optimal point for the firm is 
obtained when the managers own all of the shares of the firm. Simply saying, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that, increased equity ownership by insiders 
reduces agency cost. Higher equity ownership of the managers would better 
align the interest of managers and investors. Lambert et al. (1991) imply that the 
problem of managerial myopia can be solved, or at least reduced, by closely 
connecting the market stock‎price‎with‎the‎manager’s‎compensation.‎The‎object‎
should be efficient investment, that is, the investment that maximizes value 
regardless‎ of‎ the‎project’s‎ time‎perspective.‎However,‎ it‎ is‎ not‎ clear‎whether‎
stock compensation on its own can result in efficient investment. Narayanan 
(1996) point out that if the manager works on the basis of a cash compensation 
contract solely, she underinvests in the long run. If the manager is attracted with 
a stock-only compensation contract with the stock being restricted (stock that 
cannot be traded immediately) the manager overinvests in the long term. A 
compensation contract combining both cash and stock might encourage the 
manager to make efficient investment decisions.  
Two main assumptions are relevant to the managerial-discretion problem. 
First one is the absence of valuable investment opportunities for firms to 
overinvest. The second assumption states about imperfect monitoring and 
incentive structures. If monitoring would work ideally and 
managers-shareholders’ interests were at the perfection level aligned then 
managers would not overinvest. Corporate governance therefore plays critical 
role in the managerial-discretion conflict. This is because equating the interests 
of managers and shareholders to the same level alleviates agency costs.  
Literature reports that leverage, dividend and higher management ownership 
can act as the effective instruments in reducing the agency problems. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) contend that due to the agency problem, holding constant 
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the‎manager’s‎absolute‎investment in the firm and raising the stake of the firm 
financed‎with‎debt‎increases‎the‎manager’s‎share‎of‎equity‎and‎makes‎the‎loss‎
from the conflict between the managers and shareholders less severe. Jensen 
(1986) claims that increased leverage forces managers to pay out their excess 
cash flow instead of overinvesting. Borokhovich et al. argue that agency 
problems can be mitigated with dividends as they find that firms with more 
outside investors would experience a lower abnormal return when an increase in 
dividend is announced.  
Jensen (1986) analyzes empire building by addressing the agency problem 
directly to the ability of the firm to generate free cash flow (cash flow left after 
funding positive NPV projects). Shleifer and Vishny (1989) studied managerial 
entrenchment. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) establish clearly the 
overinvestment problem by recognizing as different firms with low and high 
investment opportunities. Firms with bad prospects are supposed to suffer from 
the overinvestment problem. Vogt (1994) set up an empirical model that 
identifies when underinvestment or overinvestment is the ruling over cause of 
sensitivities between cash-flow and investment. Additionally, corporate 
governance‎ starts‎ to‎ be‎ relevant‎ to‎ the‎ degree‎ of‎ Jensen’s‎ (1986) 
managerial-discretion problem and the involved as the consequence 
overinvestment.  
All in all, in the real world a corporate investment decision is a process that is 
affected by various components of imperfect market. This thesis studies 
corporate investment behavior under the assumption of an imperfect market.  
 
 
2.2.3 Theoretical model reflecting the relation between internal funds and 
investment 
 
Figure 2.1 presents the demand for capital by a firm and supply of funds to 
the firm. The demand curve, D, implies that an increase in the cost of funds 
reduces‎ the‎ firm’s‎ desired‎ capital‎ stock. The supply curve, S, has two 
components: a horizontal segment at r, the market real rate of interest; and an 
upward-sloping component, reflecting the costs associated with imperfect 
34 
 
information. The slope of this segment is determined by the marginal information 
costs, i.e. the higher are the marginal information costs the steeper is that 
upward-sloping portion of the S curve. 
 
Figure 2.1 Informational Imperfections and Underinvestment 
 
 
The first-best capital stock, K*, is determined by the intersection of the D 
curve and the S curve at the interest rate r. At this level the expected marginal 
profitability of capital equals the interest rate. The important point is that in this 
set‎ up‎ there‎ is‎ no‎ role‎ for‎ the‎ firm’s‎ internal‎ funds‎ to‎ play‎ in‎ determining‎
investment. The opportunity cost of internal funds is the market rate of interest at 
which the firm can borrow and lend in the capital market. It is also assumed that 
the‎firm’s‎ insiders‎and‎outside‎ investors‎are‎symmetrically‎ informed‎about‎ the‎
firm’s‎choice,‎investment‎opportunities‎and‎riskiness‎of‎projects.  
In the presence of information costs, the equilibrium capital stock for the 
firm is given by Ko. This is less than the first-best desired capital stock in a 
frictionless setting, K*. That is, there is underinvestment relative to the setting 
with no information costs.  
A firm facing no information costs or with sufficient internal funds to 
finance its desired capital stock, the equilibrium capital stock remains at K*. In 
other words, an increase in net worth independent of changes in investment 
opportunities has no effect on investment. For firms with sufficiently high 
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information costs, an increase in net worth leads to greater investment, all else 
being equal, while a decrease in internal funds lowers investment.  
In macro terms, during a boom, net worth of borrowers is high, shifting the 
S curve to the right, the cost of financing is relatively low, stimulating the demand 
for capital by firms facing information costs. Conversely, the decline in net worth 
during a recession raises cost of external financing, further reducing investment. 
The empirical strategy stemming from the model is to assess the impact 
of net worth on investment for firms with low and high informational costs. The 
hypothesis is that for given levels of investment opportunities, information costs, 
and market interest rates, firms with higher net worth should invest more. 
 
2.2.4 The sensitivity of investment to cash flow - theoretical literature 
review 
 
This section presents theoretical aspects of the sensitivity of investment 
to the internal cash flow. Since FHP and KZ (1997) reported contrasting 
outcomes for the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, the puzzle has attracted 
broad attention in the research world and many attempts have been undertaken 
to find a solution. Previous literature stresses the fact that information asymmetry 
is one of the most recognized market imperfections substantially affecting 
investment decisions of firms, i.e. while controlling for investment opportunity, 
firms with more cash are inclined to invest more. Hubbard (1998) argues that a 
gap between the cost of external financing and internal financing is an effect of 
the problem of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. This 
suggests that all else being equal, firms without information costs and firms with 
adequate net worth to finance their satisfying capital stock will not be influenced, 
while firms suffering from great information costs and low net worth encounter a 
positive‎association‎between‎internal‎funds’‎availability‎and‎levels‎of‎investment. 
Cash flow received great attention in the investment literature in the 
1980s following the emerging of asymmetric information models, and an 
empirical breakthrough in 1988 by FHP. They examine whether investment 
determinants disagree between firms for which, a priori, the cost of internal 
financing and external financing are similar and firms for which the cost of 
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external financing exceeds the cost of internal financing. They left behind the 
assumption of representative firm, and employed firm-level US sample of 422 
firms over the 1970 to 1984 time period to study differences in levels of 
investment among firms categorized in accordance with earnings retention. Put 
differently, they test differences in the sensitivity of investment to cash flow 
across groups of firms separated on the basis of the a priori possibility that they 
face serious financial constraints. Specifically, in order to examine the forecasted 
association between investment and its funding as well as investigate the 
importance of financing constraints FHP categorize a Value Line sample of US 
firms into subsamples based on the dividend payout policies, Firms that have low 
dividend‎payout‎ratios‎were‎regarded‎as‎‘most‎financially‎constrained’‎and‎those‎
that‎have‎high‎dividend‎payout‎ratios‎as‎‘least‎constrained’‎firms.‎They‎claim‎that‎
investment‎expenditures‎of‎the‎‘most‎constrained’‎firms, in comparison with the 
‘least‎ constrained’‎ones,‎ should‎ be‎more‎ sensitive‎ to‎ internal‎ cash‎ flows‎and‎
stock of liquidity. The empirical examination they provide uncovers considerably 
higher sensitivity of investment to cash flow and liquidity in the case of firms that 
keep nearly all of their income. This supports the hypothesis that cash flow 
affects‎a‎firms’‎investment‎because‎of‎capital‎market‎imperfections. 
The main assumption in their analysis is that dividends are related to 
financial constraints. The hypothesis is that lower dividends indicate higher 
constraints. This hypothesis is confirmed through the outcomes presented that 
show the influence of cash-flow on investment is greater for firms with low 
dividends.  Generally, FHP test the financing hierarchy hypothesis and find that 
firms’‎investment‎policies‎are‎indeed‎sensitive‎to‎their‎cash‎flow‎fluctuations‎and‎
that most financially constrained firms have greater cash flow sensitivity than 
least constrained firms. In other words they argue that the sensitivity of 
investment to internal funds should increase with the wedge between the costs 
of internal and external funds (monotonicity hypothesis).‎ According‎ to‎ FHP’s‎
notion, one should be able to gauge the influence of credit frictions on corporate 
spending by comparing the sensitivity of investment to cash flow across samples 
of firms sorted on proxies for financing constraints. The FHP framework can be 
interpreted as employing cash flow to measure net worth change. Thanks to this 
influential methodology they were able to classify between different possible 
functions of cash flow. Specifically, they estimated a fixed effect regression of 
physical‎ investment‎ on‎ cash‎ flow‎ and‎ Tobin’s‎ Q,‎ which‎ is‎ a‎ proxy‎ for‎ firms’‎
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investment demand, but it might be a poor measure of them. If the latter was 
true, then the coefficients on cash flow could be biased because of the 
correlation between cash flow and investment demand, and the effects of cash 
flow on investment would be expected to be approximately equal for all groups of 
firms. 
Alternatively, due to imperfect capital markets, cash flow could influence 
investment and internal finance is cheaper than external finance. In this situation, 
cash flow coefficient is expected to be higher in association with investment of 
firms more likely to face financial constraints. Comparing the level of the cash 
flow coefficients for firms more and less likely to encounter financial constraints 
would therefore facilitate beneficial measure stating the existence of financial 
constraints. 
FHP (1988) assert that firms with greater retention ratios encounter 
greater conflicts of informational asymmetry and were more likely to be liquidity 
constrained. They provide evidence that the investment levels of firms that have 
exhausted their internal finances are much more sensitive to fluctuations in cash 
flow than those of mature, high dividend firms. 
In the first stages of the evolution of the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
and firm financing constraints literature,10 FHP (1988), by providing the empirical 
evidence, initiated the traditional view that firms with a high degree of financial 
constraints show investment more sensitive to cash flow or put differently firms 
that confront more binding financing constraints, i.e., a higher differential cost 
between internal and external finances, have no other choice, but to depend 
more on internal funds for fulfilling investments. In particular, they argue that the 
investment decisions of firms with high dividend payout ratios would be less 
sensitive to fluctuations in their cash flows as compared with firms who have 
nearly exhausted all their low cost internal finances (i.e., have low dividend 
payout ratios). Firms suffering from information costs would decrease capital 
expenditures due to reduction in internal funds, holding constant the investment 
opportunities‎of‎a‎firm.‎They‎write‎“If‎information‎problems‎in‎capital‎markets‎lead‎
to financing constraints on investment, they should be most evident for the 
classes of firms that retain most of their income. If internal and external finance 
are nearly perfect substitutes, however, then retention practices should reveal 
                                            
10
 See Hubbard (1998) for a detailed review of this literature. 
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little about investment by the firm. Firms would simply use external finance to 
smooth‎investment‎when‎internal‎finance‎fluctuates,”‎(p. 164).  
Many‎firms’‎growth‎potential‎is‎constrained‎by‎limited‎internal‎capital‎and‎
critically depends on bank loans, equity issues, or venture capital investment. In 
this‎practical‎context,‎a‎firm’s‎investment‎decisions‎may‎in‎fact‎be‎closely‎related‎
to its financial choices. In other words, in the presence of market imperfections 
there is no perfect substitution between internal and external funds. The cost of 
external finance will now be measured as a function of the extent to which firms 
are subject to capital market imperfections, which means that generally firms will 
encounter an upward-sloping supply curve of external capital where capital 
market imperfections will in part determine its slope. This implies that firms that 
deal with severe informational and agency problems face both, limited access to 
external finance and restricted internal funds, and thus will have to give up 
profitable investment opportunities in some states of the world. Such firms are 
considered to be financially constrained and their investment starts to rely 
strongly on the availability of internal funds. The hypothesis that the sensitivity of 
investment expenditures of financially constrained firms to the availability of 
internal funds is higher than that of unconstrained firms has been examined 
broadly. To test this hypothesis, few firm characteristics such as size (Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1994), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg (1995)), age (Schaller (1993) and Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited 
(1995)), dividend (Fazzari and Petersen (1993), Bond and Meghir (1994), 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Hubbard et al., (1995) and Gugler (1998)), 
leverage (Whited (1992)), credit rating, close relationships with industrial or 
financial groups (business affiliation), bank-affiliated (Hoshi et al., (1991) and 
Van Ees and Garretsen (1994)), science-based (Audretsch and Weigand 
(1999)) and R&D (Brown (1997)), type of industry (Devereux and Schiantarelli 
(1990)), financing scheme (Bond and Meghir (1994)), the presence of a bond 
rating or commercial paper program(Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)) and 
capital intensity (Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (1997) and Kalatzis et al. (2008) and 
Kalatzis and Azzoni (2009)), have been employed among others to recognize 
financially‎constrained‎firms.‎Additionally,‎firms’‎cash‎flow‎has‎been‎used‎as‎a‎
proxy of internal funds in order to investigate whether the investment sensitivity 
to cash flow is a useful measure of financial constraints. In other words, a 
measure of assessing the degree of financial constraints faced by firms, which is 
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the sensitivity of investments to the availability of internal finance, controlling for 
investment‎opportunities‎expressed‎by‎Tobin’s‎Q,‎became‎very‎popular.‎ 
In accordance with both agency problems theory and asymmetric 
information theory, the level of investment should be sensitive to the level of cash 
flow in the firm. Due to information asymmetries and capital market 
imperfections, corporate investment expenditures are strongly influenced by a 
firm’s‎ability‎to‎internally‎generate‎cash‎flow.‎Under‎the‎agency‎view,‎investment‎
raises internal fund because the external capital market restricts the level to 
which managers can execute self-interested investment.  
 
2.2.5 The sensitivity of investment to cash flow - empirical literature review 
 
Overall, whether financing frictions affect real investment decisions is an 
important matter. The relationship between a firm financing constraints and 
investment–cash flow sensitivity has taken prominent place in the finance world 
in recent years. Extensive empirical literature highlights the existence and 
robustness of investment-cash flow sensitivity after controlling for investment 
opportunities. The majority of this literature links investment-cash flow sensitivity 
to imperfections in the capital market. The view is that firms facing tighter 
financing constraints, i.e., a larger cost differential between internal and external 
funds, have to rely more on internal cash for making investments. Amongst 
others, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) have followed and extended these 
notions. They examine a sample of UK firms to see whether different 
cash-flow-investment sensitivities exist in subsamples based on proxies for 
agency costs of external capital. The proxies include firm size (capital stock and 
employees), the number of years since initial quotation, and the industry 
(growing or declining). The investments of large firms, newly-listed firms and 
firms in growth sectors show higher cash-flow sensitivities.  
Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) study the cash-flow-sensitivities 
within a set of Japanese firms, which were categorized into groups– 121 firms 
(relatively strong ties with bank - members of keiretsu) and non-group – 24 firms 
(relatively weak ties with banks – not members of keiretsu). The latter ones had a 
higher cash-flow-coefficient and were presumed to be more financially 
constrained. The idea is that Keiretsu firms have access to external funds from 
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the‎“main‎bank”‎of‎the‎group,‎which‎monitors‎closely‎member firms and mitigates 
information cost in external financing. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) 
indicate the overinvestment importance through the various influences of 
cash-flow for firms with good and bad opportunities. The latter classification is 
carried‎ out‎ by‎ considering‎ firms‎ with‎ a‎ Tobin’s‎ Q‎ above‎ and‎ below‎ median‎
respectively. Overinvestment has no support in their analysis in terms of the 
evidence.  
Both the analyses by Hayashi and Inoue (1991), who employ data for 687 
quoted Japanese manufacturing firms during the period 1977 to 1986, and 
Blundell et al. (1992), who take into account data for 532 UK manufacturing firms 
during the period 1971 to 1986, discover that cash flows have a positive and 
highly significant effect on company investment,‎in‎addition‎to‎Tobin’s‎Q.‎ 
Oliner and Rudebush (1992) studied 99 NYSE listed firms and 21 OTC 
firms over the 1977-1983 time period. They interact the cash-flow coefficient in 
an investment regression model with proxies for information asymmetry (firm 
age, listing at exchange, and stock trades by insiders), agency costs (insider 
shareholdings and ownership concentration) and transaction costs (firm size). In 
order to compare with FHP the authors also test for the dividend yield. Despite 
the fact that for the full sample of US firms the individual interaction terms are 
insignificant, a compound measure of information asymmetry is significant and 
achieves the predicted positive effect. Oliner and Rudebush (1992) find that 
investment is most closely related to cash flow for firms that are young, whose 
stocks are traded over-the-counter, and that exhibit insider trading behaviour 
consistent with privately held information. Their conclusion is that financial 
constraints were worsening due to information conflicts.  
To‎avoid‎the‎problems‎related‎with‎the‎estimation‎and‎use‎of‎Tobin’s‎Q,‎
Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994) use an Euler equation approach to 
directly test the first-order condition of an inter-temporal maximization problem. 
Another advantage of this model is that it controls for the impact of expected 
future profitability in investment spending without the need for an explicit 
measure of expected demand or expected costs. FHP outcomes are supported 
by both studies.  
For Canadian firms Schaller (1993) provide evidence that the cash flow 
effects are more pronounced for young firms, firms with dispersed ownership, 
and nongroup firms. Two years later Chirinko and Schaller (1995) for a set of 
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Canadian firms, divide the sample according to age (years of inclusion in a 
financial database), concentration of ownership, industry (manufacturing and 
other), and group or independent. Their studies demonstrated that the cash flow 
constraints were most articulated in young firms, firms with dispersed ownership, 
independent firms and manufacturers. Furthermore, Gilchrist and Himmelberg 
(1995) detect a group of US firms and discriminate subsamples on the basis of 
size, dividend payout ratio and the availability of rating for bonds and commercial 
papers.  
Hubbard, Kashyap and Whited (1995) imply that identified connections 
between investment expenditures and internal financing may refer to the 
overinvestment of managers. Jensen (1986) suggests that in mature industries 
overinvestment is expected to be relevant. The definition of mature industries is 
based on profitability and 39 four-digit S.I.C. industries. In these mature US 
firms, agency costs do not seem to be important for business fixed investment 
after employing Euler equations. Vogt (1994) involve an interaction term 
between‎ Tobin’s‎ Q‎ and‎ cash-flow in the regression equation in order to 
empirically distinguish between managerial discretion and asymmetric 
information.‎ In‎ the‎ context‎ of‎ the‎ US‎ firms’‎ sample‎ he‎ uses,‎ there‎ is‎ strong‎
evidence for the presence of managerial discretion as well as the influences of 
asymmetric information which cannot be ignored. Both problems are appearing 
to be reduced by dividends. Hadlock (1998) tests the effect of insider ownership 
on the cash-flow-sensitivity of investment based on both free-cash-flow 
problems and asymmetric-information problems. For insider ownership below 
5%, an interaction term of cash-flow and insider ownership is found to be 
positive, while for insider ownership above this threshold is found to be negative. 
Hadlock (1998) comes to the conclusion that the findings are consistent with 
asymmetric-information conflicts but are inconsistent with the free-cash-flow 
theory. In other words, the sensitivity of investment to cash flow seems to be 
more highlighted when managers have a large ownership stake in the firm. This 
is consistent with the asymmetric information story, but not the agency story in its 
simplest form. The results of Morck et al., (1988) suggest that the agency 
explanation holds where there is low or high levels of managerial ownership, but 
not for an intermediate level of managerial ownership. Erickson and Whited 
(2000), Gomes (2001), and Alti (2003) all show that the results reported by FHP 
are consistent with models in which financing is frictionless. Both the studies of 
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Fohlin (1998) and that of Audretsch and Elston (2002) based on German firms 
samples find that accordingly during the 1903-1913 and 1970-1986 periods, 
greater cash flow-investment sensitivity is observed for liquidity constrained 
German firms. 
Other researchers that support or use FHP methodology are Fazzari and 
Petersen (1993), Himmelberg and Petersen (1994), Calomiris and Hubbard 
(1995), Kadapakkam et al. (1998), Fazzari et al. (2000), and Allayannis and 
Mozumdar (2004).  
A large number of empirical studies confirmed higher ICFS for firms facing 
tighter financing constraints by employing various proxies for financing 
constraints. This approach had freely functioned in the corporate finance world 
until Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (hereafter KZ) queried it in an influential paper 
which delivers utterly opposing evidence that investment is more sensitive to 
cash flow for unconstrained firms. They employ a mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative information obtained from company annual reports to rank each firm 
in terms of its apparent degree of financial constraint. KZ reanalyze the sample 
of low dividend payout firms examined by FHP. Specifically, their evidence was 
from the low dividend payout subgroup of the FHP 1970-1984 sample, FHP 
categorized 49 firms as the most constrained by putting into service information 
contained‎in‎the‎firms’‎annual‎reports‎and‎management’s‎statements‎on‎liquidity.‎
Whilst, based on statements contained in annual reports, KZ classify firms into 
groups:‎ “not‎ financially‎ constrained,”‎ “possibly‎ financially‎ constrained,”‎ and‎
“financially‎constrained”.‎They‎deliver‎a‎result‎contradicting‎FHP‎finding,‎namely‎
they‎ discover‎ that‎ the‎ group‎ of‎ “financially‎ constrained”‎ firms‎ actually‎
demonstrates the lowest sensitivity of investment to cash flow of the three 
groups. Based on their outcome, they argue that investment-cash flow 
sensitivities do not provide any evidence of the presence of financing 
constraints.‎Furthermore,‎KZ‎ (1997)‎disagree‎with‎FHP‎ (1988)’s‎ classification‎
scheme‎on‎the‎basis‎that‎a‎firm’s‎dividend‎policy‎is‎a‎choice‎variable,‎thus‎firms‎
are not necessarily financially constrained when they choose to pay out less 
even though they could pay high dividend. For instance, in reaction to a 
decrease in the personal dividend income tax rates firms may raise dividends. 
They recognize firms that have more funds than needed to fund their capital 
expenditures‎as‎‘never‎constrained’‎and‎if‎they‎have‎no‎access‎to‎more‎finance‎
than‎ needed‎ to‎ fund‎ their‎ investment‎ as‎ ‘likely‎ constrained’‎ by‎ employing‎
43 
 
qualitative and quantitative information from financial statements and reports. 
Their‎results‎point‎out‎that‎the‎investments‎of‎‘never‎constrained’‎firms‎are‎more‎
sensitive‎to‎cash‎flows‎than‎the‎investments‎of‎‘likely‎constrained’‎firms, which is 
a complete contrast to the findings of FHP (1988). KZ (1997) argue that the 
presumably financially constrained firms could have augmented their use of cash 
and lines of credit at a particular moment in time. They also argue that the 
monotonicity hypothesis is not a necessary property of optimal constrained 
investment.  
The‎ main‎ issue‎ with‎ KZ’s‎ (1997)‎ work,‎ which‎ is‎ pointed‎ out‎ by‎ their‎
critiques was their small sample size and their classification criteria. FHP (1997) 
and Schiantarelli (1995) contend‎ that‎ the‎ criteria‎ depend‎ on‎ “managerial‎
statements about liquidity that may be self-serving and problematic and 
somewhat subjective operational definitions of what it means for a firm to be 
financially‎constrained.”‎FHP‎(1997)‎also‎highlight‎that‎categorized by KZ (1997) 
the firm-years observations as most financially constrained are in fact 
observations from years when firms are financially distressed. FHP (1997) stress 
that KZ (1997) designed the sample, which excludes financially distressed firms, 
hence very few observations belong to the category KZ (1997) label as 
“constrained.”‎ Consequently,‎ the‎ sample‎ is‎ homogeneous‎ and‎ thus‎ lacks‎
sufficient heterogeneity to identify meaningful differences across their sample. 
However, KZ empirical result is supported by other empirical papers too. For 
example, Kadapakkam et al., (1998) demonstrate that when financial constraints 
are measured by firm size, financially unconstrained firms have higher 
investment-cash flow sensitivities than constrained firms. Cleary (2006) after 
analysing the empirical results of seven different countries, provides the 
evidence that financially constrained firms have lower investment-cash flow 
sensitivity than financially unconstrained firms. Dasgupta et al. (2009) show that 
even when a long-time horizon is taken into account, the negative relationship 
between financial constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity still holds. 
The results of KZ (1997) are puzzling because they imply that firms 
decide to depend firstly on internal cash flow for investment, in spite of the 
availability of additional external funds. Cleary (1999) continues this puzzle and 
also‎supports‎KZ’s‎results‎by‎employing‎more‎recent‎and‎clearly‎heterogeneous‎
data (1987–1994). He tests a large cross-section (1317 US firms), and by a 
discriminant score estimated from several financial variables measures financing 
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constraints. In particular, he divides firms according to financial variables that are 
linked with financial constraints. Multiple discriminant analysis, similar to 
Altman’s‎Z‎factor‎(Altman,‎1968)‎for‎predicting‎bankruptcy,‎determines‎financial‎
status‎ of‎ the‎ firm.‎ Cleary‎ (1999)‎ study‎ follows‎ KZ’s‎ (1997)‎ approach‎ by‎
categorizing firms into three different groups: financially constrained (FC), 
partially financially constrained (PFC) and not financially constrained (NFC). 
Whilst opposite to previous studies, Cleary (1999) introduce reclassification of 
firm‎financial‎status‎in‎every‎period,‎and‎proposes‎that‎the‎groups’‎composition‎
may vary over time to reflect changing levels of financial constraints at the firm 
level.‎Cleary‎surely‎improved‎on‎KZ‎(1997)’s‎methodology.‎His‎results‎indicate‎
that whilst all firms are very sensitive to firm liquidity, in line with KZ (1997) 
outcomes, firms that are more creditworthy show higher investment-liquidity 
sensitivity than those categorized as less creditworthy. Simply saying, Cleary 
finds that the cash flow coefficients are largest for the NFC firms, supporting the 
findings in KZ. 
KZ and Cleary find that the relation between sensitivities and liquidity 
measures is non-monotonic.  They state that financially constrained firms in fact 
show up a lower sensitivity of investment to cash flow than unconstrained firms. 
Similarly, asymmetric information does not appear to be a plausible explanation 
for‎the‎“socialistic”‎allocation‎of‎internal‎funds‎from‎a‎cash‎windfall‎within‎firms‎or‎
the poor quality of projects financed with those funds (Lamont (1997) and 
Blanchard et al., (1994)).   
The continuation of the discussion on the usefulness of 
cash-flow-investment sensitivities appears again in FHP (2000) and KZ (2000). 
Even though the result of the discussion is indecisive, KZ demonstrate that the 
outcomes of analyses in which the approach of FHP is employed, should be 
interpreted with caution. 
In the response to KZ, FHP (2000) underestimate KZ inferences by 
pointing out that gross investment cannot be below zero even when firm cash 
flows are extremely low or negative. Moreover, by definition, the more restricted 
access to external financing encounters the more constrained firm, thus they 
face this minimal investment level much quicker. Therefore, when internal cash 
flows reach a particularly low stage, the less constrained firm is likely to show 
higher investment–cash flow sensitivity than the more constrained firm. FHP 
(2000) claims that KZ (1997) and Cleary (1999) used methodology which tends 
45 
 
to categorize financially distressed firms as being financially constrained. KZ 
(2000) claimed in their response that the distinction between financing 
constraints and financial distress is not important. Another important indication 
by KZ (2000) is that investment cash-flow sensitivities should not be expected as 
a good measure of financing constraints. 
This above short discussion emphasises the controversy that has been 
generated here. Opposing views of the impact of financial constraints on the 
cash flow-investment relationship have been supported with empirical literature. 
A stronger relationship for the most financially constrained firms is supported by 
one subgroup of finance literature while another counterpart subgroup supports 
a stronger relationship for the least constrained firms. Another subgroup of 
research in this area has concentrated on reconciling the two sides of the 
debate.  
As the previous literature indicates, moral hazard together with adverse 
selection will evolve credit rationing, where external markets might be totally 
inaccessible by firms. In terms of the debate on cash flow-investment sensitivity 
referred to the level of financial constraint, the general assumption is that firms 
which are financially constrained are those which face greatly expensive external 
capital costs to finance a project, while the unconstrained firms can access 
external markets with no/little problems. Constrained firms may find that the main 
source of financing is internally generated cash flow and its availability may 
affect‎the‎firm’s‎ability‎to‎invest.‎However,‎access‎to‎the‎external‎market‎may‎be‎
totally unavailable for some of the most constrained firms because off the moral 
hazard problem. Equally, partially constrained and non-constrained firms whose 
investment relies on external financing and which confront costly external costs 
of funds will regard increases in internal cash flow as beneficial since more 
low-cost funds become available for investment. This field of research considers 
different predictions of cash flow-investment sensitivity than those of FHP and 
KZ (1997), and implies a U-shaped association. 
Povel and Raith (2001) offer a theoretical model predicting a U-shape 
relation between investment and cash flow, which is supposed to explain the 
findings of KZ. They analyze the optimal investment under financial constraints. 
Firstly, they define the financially constrained firms as firms suffering from 
imperfections in the capital markets when searching for outside capital. Next, the 
study‎defines‎ “more‎ financially‎ constrained”‎ firm‎as‎a‎ firm,‎which‎either‎need‎
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more external capital, or it faces a higher cost of raising any given amount in the 
capital‎market.‎Effectively,‎ the‎authors‎argue‎that‎a‎firm’s financial constraints 
depend on both the imperfection of the external market and the level of its 
internal funds.  
Theoretical papers of Almeida and Campello (2001), and Povel and Raith 
(2001) argue that the relationship between cash flow and investment may not be 
monotonically increasing across firms with different liquidity constraint levels, but 
may be U-shaped. According to Povel and Raith (2001) large negative cash 
flows lead to the complex influences of asymmetric information and the financial 
distress, to which firms response in the U-shape. Povel and Raith (2001) find that 
more information asymmetry generally increases the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. Their solution for accurate assessment of the effect of asymmetric 
information on investment – cash flow sensitivities is a sensible choice of sample 
splitting criteria, or getting rid of firms that have large negative cash flows from 
the sample, or both. We include their recommendations in our empirical analysis.  
The theoretical approach to examine the puzzle is demonstrated by 
Almeida and Campello (2002). They claim that the existing interpretation of the 
relationship between investment and cash flow assumes that financial 
constraints translate entirely into higher costs of funds. Nevertheless, they stress 
that firms often have to deal with quantitative limits such as credit rationing, and 
the‎firms’‎investment‎and‎the‎use‎of‎external‎finance‎are‎endogenously‎related.‎
These researchers contend that the direct effect of a cash flow shock on 
investment would be similar for all firms (one for one), since constrained firms 
invest all of their internal funds, while the indirect effect would be different 
because of the endogenous change in borrowing capacity, and given the change 
in investment, it will be greater for firms that can borrow against a higher 
proportion of the value of their investment. A theoretical model was developed by 
Almeida and Campello (2002) predicting that the investment-cash flow sensitivity 
increases as the credit constraints are relaxed.  
Lhabitant and Tinguely (2002) examines Swiss firms during both boom 
and recession periods. The researchers discover that when boom time is 
regarded, investment-cash flow sensitivities are homogeneous as in KZ (1997), 
while when the recession time is a focus, this relationship is heterogeneous with 
the sensitivity increasing monotonically, and with financing constraints, as in 
FHP (1988).  
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The disagreement on the cash flow-investment sensitivity of firms with 
different levels of financial constraint evolved various attempts to resolve the 
contradicting results of FHP (1988) and KZ (1997). Particularly, the focus on how 
to define a firm as financially constrained versus not financially constrained 
engaged a major portion of the theoretical papers. Maestro et al. (2000) and 
Moyen (2004) concentrate on finding a better way to distinguish less financially 
constrained firms from more financially constrained ones. To identify financially 
constrained firms from unconstrained firms Maestro et al. (2000) develope a 
dichotomous separation model. They conduct their study by using international 
data and argue that their method better categorizes firms as financially 
constrained and not financially constrained.  
Alti‎ (2003)‎ and‎ Moyen‎ (2004)‎ estimate‎ firms’‎ models‎ that substitute 
internal finance with debt and run OLS regressions on simulated data from the 
models to show that ICFS can be generated even if firms do not face financing 
frictions and that it is difficult to unveil firms with financing constraints, and the 
investment-cash flow sensitivity crucially depends on the classification 
procedure employed. Certain methods of financial constraint classification 
present high sensitivity between investments and cash flows, while others, 
demonstrate just the opposite. For example, Moyen (2004) proposes that 
different standards by which firms are classified into constrained and 
unconstrained groups can be made and this may lead to outcomes compatible 
either with FHP (1988) or with KZ (1997). Simply saying, Moyen (2004) asserts 
that the opposing outcomes of FHP (1988) and KZ (1997) originate mainly from 
their different criteria for financial constraints. Specifically, the models developed 
in Moyen (2004) suggests that the relationship between investment and cash 
flow for firms that pay low dividends and do not have access to external capital 
markets should be consistent with FHP (1988), while the relationship for firms 
that pay high dividends and which have access to external markets should 
support KZ (1997) and Cleary (1999).  
Also Cleary et al. (2007) point out that one strand of the literature have 
used variables that proxy asymmetric information as the criteria to distinguish 
between financially constrained and unconstrained firms.  Some examples of 
this strand may have included: firms belonging to Keiretsu or not (Hoshi et al., 
1991), NYSE firms vs. OTC firms (Oliner and Rudebush, 1992), bond rating 
(Huang, 2001), firms followed by financial analysts (Liu and Qi, 2001), 
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commercial paper and bond market access (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995). 
Another strand of the literature employs variables (indexes mentioned below) 
that‎asses‎the‎firm’s‎liquidity‎or‎its‎financial‎strength.‎Cleary et al. (2007) argue 
that if the data set consists mainly of positive cash flow large firms and the 
measure to differentiate financially constrained firms from unconstrained ones 
proxies for asymmetric information (i.e. market imperfection), then test outcomes 
will be in agreement with that of FHP (1988). Further, Cleary et al. (2007) claim 
that‎if‎the‎firm’s‎financial‎strength‎measures‎are‎employed,‎results‎are‎likely‎to‎be‎
aligned with those of KZ (1997) and Cleary (1999). The work of FHP (1988) and 
Cleary (1999) have been replicated by Cleary et al. (2007) who used the same 
data but with different methodologies and received the predicted results. 
Guariglia (2008) studies the extent to which the sensitivity of investment 
to cash flow differs as firms facing different degrees of internal and external 
financial constraints. They find that when the sample of UK firms is split on the 
basis of the level of internal funds available to the firms, the relationship between 
investment and cash flow is U-shaped. However, the sensitivity of investment to 
cash flow tends to increase monotonically with the degree of external financial 
constraints faced by firms. After combining the internal with the external financial 
constraints, Guariglia (2008) discovers that the dependence of investment on 
cash flow is strongest for those externally financially constrained firms that have 
a relatively high level of internal funds. 
Carreira and Silva (2010) in their review of recent empirical work on 
financial‎ constraints‎ faced‎by‎ firms,‎ recommend‎ “the‎best‎ that‎ one‎ can‎do‎ is‎
either to use a priori firm classification and/or to construct indexes that allow one 
to measure the degree of constraints that, in their turn, use proxies such as (a) 
dividend payout ratio; (b) firm self-evaluation; (c) cash stocks; (d) degree of 
leverage; (e) age, size; (f) institutional affiliation; (g)‎credit‎ratings.”‎The‎current‎
literature provides a few examples of indexes, such as: (a) a discriminant score 
estimated from several financial variables by Cleary (1999), (b) the KZ index 
developed by Lamont et al. (2001) and based on the argument of KZ (1997), (c) 
the WW index suggested by Whited and Wu (2006), (d) the index created by 
Musso and Schiavo (2008), (e) the size–age or SA index proposed by Hadlock 
and Pierce (2010).  
Additional papers in this area have concerned themselves with data and 
methodology issues.  Allayannis and Mozumdar (2001) argue that the 
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anomalous results reported by KZ (1997) and Cleary (1999) are due to the 
negative cash flow observations. Accordingly, the KZ results are driven by the 
outliers in their small sample and Cleary’s‎results‎are‎driven‎by‎negative‎cash 
flow observations. For example, Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004) employ a 
similar sample and the same discriminate analysis as Cleary (1999) in order to 
reinvestigate‎ Cleary’s‎ results.‎ They‎ obtain‎ the‎ same‎major‎ findings, such as 
financially constrained (hereafter FC) firms have the lowest sensitivity of cash 
flow. However, they recognize that FC firms contain more negative cash flow 
observations‎than‎the‎less‎constrained‎firms’‎category.‎Once‎they‎dropped‎these‎
observations, they receive a strong increase in the coefficient of cash flow for the 
FC class, but still the same coefficients for cash flow across the remaining 
groups. Consequently they conclude that the firms with negative cash flows 
included in the sample may be the reason for KZ and Cleary findings, because 
these firms are distressed financially and hence their investments are not 
sensitive to cash flow. Specifically they write in the following way about low ICFS 
amongst‎firms‎with‎negative‎cash‎flows:‎‘‘when‎the cash shortfall is severe, the 
firm is pushed into financial distress and is able to make only the absolute 
essential‎investment,”‎and‎thus‎‘‘any‎further‎cutback‎in‎investment‎in‎response‎to‎
further‎declines‎in‎cash‎flow‎is‎impossible”‎Allayannis‎and‎Mozumdar (2004, p. 
902). Furthermore, their study proposes that investment-cash flow sensitivities 
have been declining in recent years and the authors come up with two 
explanations for this, namely the improved external market efficiency or the 
increased supply of external funds. Huang (2001) also states that sample 
selection problems could explain the different results in the previous literature. 
He takes into account the data employed in several papers that generate 
different results and summarizes them, then he claims that most of the data used 
in the previous papers may not be representative because it is biased towards 
large firms. This data selection bias, according to the author, is the reason for 
differences in prior results and the monotonic relationship between cash flow and 
investment collapse when pooling the financially constrained and unconstrained 
firms in the tests.  
Hovakimian and Titman (2003) took a different route and detected the 
importance‎ of‎ financial‎ constraints‎ for‎ a‎ firm’s‎ investment‎ expenditure‎ by‎
studying the relationship between investment and proceeds from voluntary asset 
sales in financially healthy US manufacturing firms. They claim that because the 
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proceeds‎of‎ asset‎ sales‎ are‎ not‎ positively‎ correlated‎with‎ a‎ firm’s‎ investment‎
opportunities, they appear to be a cleaner indicator of liquidity than cash flow. 
They also apply the model of an endogenous switching regression with unknown 
sample separation, which does not require an a priori classification of firms. They 
find that cash raised from asset sales is a significant determinant of corporate 
investment, and the sensitivity of investment to proceeds from asset sales is 
significantly stronger for firms that are relatively financially constrained. 
A‎firm’s‎dynamic‎investment‎decision,‎subject‎to‎an‎endogenous‎financing‎
constraint, has been investigated by Boyle and Guthrie (2003). They argue that 
firm’s‎investment‎behaviour‎can‎be‎distorted by capital market frictions. They find 
that‎the‎threat‎of‎future‎funding‎decreases‎the‎value‎of‎the‎firm’s‎timing‎options‎of‎
investment, suggesting that the cash flow - investment sensitivity can be highest 
for high-liquidity firms and greater uncertainty has an ambiguous effect on 
investment. 
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Erickson and Whited (2000) and Alti 
(2003) state that the assessed sensitivity of investment to the availability of 
internal finance is influenced by the measurement problems linked‎with‎Tobin’s‎
Q. Therefore, they made an effort to recognize the impact of capital market 
imperfections on investment by using alternative measures of investment 
fundamentals, rather than employing Q as a measure of investment 
opportunities. Such as Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) assessed a group of 
VAR forecasting equations for a subgroup of information available to the firm, 
and‎subsequently‎on‎behalf‎of‎a‎measure‎of‎firms’‎investment‎opportunities‎they‎
evaluated a linear expectation of the present discounted value of marginal 
profits. They then appraised regressions of investment on the latter variable and 
cash flow followed. Once the new variable is built in the investment regression, 
imperfections of the capital markets exist if the coefficient on cash flow as 
forecasting variable included in this new measure of investment demand stays 
significant. Their outcomes obtained after examining US data demonstrate that 
the neoclassical model (without cash flow) is only valid for firms less likely to face 
financial constraints, while cash flow is significantly built in the regressions of 
constrained firms. These results are in agreement with those in FHP (1988). 
To certain extent this misunderstanding of FHP versus KZ comes from 
difficulties in measuring investment opportunities. If investment opportunities are 
measured wrongly, then cash flows, in addition to conveying information about 
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internal liquidity, can also cover information about future investment 
opportunities that are not picked out by proxies for q. Since the measurement of 
q include firm market value, this effect is likely to be more serious for firms 
suffering from information asymmetry problems, which are also the firms that are 
most likely to be financially constrained. In consequence, higher estimated 
coefficients of cash flow in investment regressions for firms a priori grouped as 
financially constrained can be expected.  
To solve this problem many different notions have been applied. One of 
them‎is‎to‎find‎shifts‎in‎a‎firms’‎internal‎funds that are uncorrelated with shifts in 
investment opportunities (e.g. Lamont (1997), Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited 
(1995), and Fazzari and Petersen (1993)). Generally the results for these imply 
that‎ investment‎ is‎ positively‎ related‎ to‎ the‎ firms’‎ internal‎ capital that is not 
correlated with their future profitability.  
GMM estimators that make the best use of the information in the higher 
order moments of the regression variables is offered by Erickson and Whited 
(2000, 2002) as a solution for the problem of the measurement error emphasised 
in their critical commentary. They introduce these estimators in the examination 
of a sample of US manufacturing firms from 1992-1995 period of time, they 
recognize that in comparison with conventional OLS estimates, Q explanatory 
power improves substantially, while cash flow as a determinant of investment 
loses significance.   
Gomes (2001) and Alti (2003) claim that sensitivity of investment-cash 
flow canld be positive even with no financial frictions. Gomes (2001), and Cooper 
and Ejarque (2001) also challenge the theoretically hypothesis that financial 
constraints existence can be stated by a significant coefficient on cash flow in an 
investment reduced-form regression.  
Charlton et al. (2002) find that the relationship between financial 
constraints of a firm and its investment-cash flow sensitivity depends on the 
industry of the firm. 
Financially distressed firms show a negative ICFS in the study of Bhagat 
et al. (2005), where after splitting the sample of distressed firms according to the 
sign of operating incomes: positive and negative, firms with negative operating 
incomes are the reason for the overall negative ICFS.   
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Rauh (2006) however, brings new evidence that as internal finance 
decrease because off mandatory pension contributions, capital expenditures 
drop down as well.  
Carpenter‎and‎Guariglia‎(2008)‎show‎that‎when‎the‎insiders’‎evaluations‎
of investment opportunities are considered in the model, then financially 
constrained firms have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity.  
Another alternative understanding of the contradictory relationship 
between financial constraints and investment-cash flow sensitivity comes from 
the study of Almeida and Campello (2010). The authors imply that high-costs 
external financing plays a differential role between financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms. Consistent with the assumption of previous literature, the 
internal cash flow and outside financing are substitutes for unconstrained firms. 
Hence, when reducing costly outside financing, investment-cash flow sensitivity 
increase in terms of the unconstrained firms. Nevertheless, when reducing costly 
outside financing, the constrained firms decrease the amount of internal funds as 
their source of investments. Therefore, usually constrained firms have a low level 
of cash flow. Only when they have enough cash flow and outside financing at the 
same time can they make investments. Thus, for these financially constrained 
firms, internal cash flow and outside financing complement one another. This 
explanation leads to a conclusion that the constrained firms have lower 
investment-cash flow sensitivity than unconstrained firms.  
Another avenue of research in this area is represented by papers 
conducting tests on the interaction between cash flow and other factors, which 
can‎be‎related‎to‎the‎firm’s‎investment‎decision.‎The‎impact‎of‎various‎factors‎on‎
the investment-cash flow sensitivity is explained by the cash flow augmented 
investment equation. Almeida and Campello (2007) analyse the interaction term 
between cash flow and asset tangibility of a firm. They show that for financially 
constrained firms, asset tangibility increases investment-cash flow sensitivity, 
while for financially unconstrained firms, asset tangibility does not have a 
significant effect on the investment-cash flow sensitivity. Agca and Mozumdar 
(2008) study the interaction between cash flow and the determinants that 
mitigate capital market imperfections. They discover that investment-cash flow 
sensitivity declines with increasing fund flows, institutional ownership, analyst 
following, antitakeover amendments and the existence of a bond rating. A 
negative association on the coefficient of the interaction term between cash flow 
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and the probability of information-based trading (PIN, developed by Easley et al., 
(1996) using a sequential trade microstructure model) was found by Ascioglu et 
al., (2008). This confirms FHP because it suggests a negative relationship 
between‎ a‎ firm’s‎ information‎ asymmetry‎ and‎ their‎ investment-cash flow 
sensitivity. 
To sum up, because the degree of financial constraint is not observable, 
different papers use different proxies for financial constraints and obtain different 
cash flow sensitivity results. A number of empirical studies, after employing 
various proxies for financing constraints, demonstrate that the estimated 
investment–cash flow sensitivity is indeed higher for more constrained firms. 
Examples of some of the proxies for no or only minor financing constraints are: 
high dividend payments (FHP; Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited, 1995), bond 
ratings and access to debt markets (Calomiris et al., 1995; Gilchrist and 
Himmelberg, 1995), business group affiliation (Hoshi et al., 1991; Calem and 
Rizzo, 1995; Shin and Park, 1999), banking relationships (Houston and James, 
2001), and age and dispersion of ownership (Schaller, 1993), or low surtax 
margins (Calomiris and Hubbard, 1995), bond ratings and access to debt 
markets (Calomiris et al., 1995; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995), membership in 
corporate groups (Hoshi et al., 1991; Calem and Rizzo, 1995; Shin and Park, 
1999), banking relationships (Houston and James, 2001), and age and 
dispersion of ownership (Schaller, 1993). In line with the notion that the 
correlation between investment expenditures and cash flow is because of 
financing constraints, researchers have identified that the sensitivity of 
investment expenditures to cash flow are much stronger for firms that are likely 
to be financially constrained (FHP; Hoshi et al., (1991); Whited (1992); Gilchrist 
and Himmelberg (1995); Hubbard (1998); and others). Additionally, the 
previously contradictive results in empirical research seem to be driven by 
choice of the measure to categorize firms into financially constrained and 
unconstrained‎ firms’‎ groups‎ as well as whether the data samples exclude 
observations with negative cash flow.   
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2.3 Methodology 
 
In this chapter we present hypotheses and the methodology utilized in this 
study. Then we explain the approach used in characterizing constrained and 
unconstrained companies.  
Firstly, this study employs year by year OLS analysis in order to examine 
if there is a decline of ICFS by year. Then cross sectional analysis are used to 
better understand what happened before and during the financial crisis period. 
OLS analysis of the three subperiods is included too. Lastly, the focus lays down 
on the analysis of GMM technique.   
 
2.3.1 Hypotheses 
 
We propose four main hypotheses for this chapter. 
The development of capital market should reduce the marginal cost of 
external finance, leading to a reduction in the ICFS (Brown and Petersen, 2009). 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Given the development of equity market over the last thirty years, the 
ICFS is expected to decrease over the last thirty years, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hall and Lerner (2010) and Islam and Mozumdar (2007) argue that in the 
presence of market imperfections, external funds may not provide a perfect 
substitute for internal funds, given that the premium for external financing will be 
higher. Financial crisis should increase the marginal cost of external finance, 
leading to a rise in the ICFS. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
 H2: Other things equal, financial crisis should lead to an increase in the 
ICFS.  
 
H3: Other things equal, cash holdings are positively related with capital 
investment given that cash is an effective hedging device. 
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H4: Given the development of equity market over the last thirty years, 
leverage has a negative impact on investment, ceteris paribus. 
 
2.3.2 Financial constraints criteria 
 
FHP claim that ICFS would identify the financial status of a firm. Since 
FHP (1988) and KZ (1997), the debate on the consistency of ICFS as a measure 
of the degree of financial constraints has been intensive in the literature and is 
still open for discussion. The definition and the measurement is the starting point 
when‎examining‎financial‎constraints.‎If‎one‎considers‎a‎‘classical’,‎more‎straight 
forward, but broader definition that a firm is financially constrained if there exists 
a wedge between the costs of using external and internal funds (see, for 
example, KZ, 1997), and then strictly speaking all firms can be labeled like this. 
Notwithstanding, the concept of financial constraints extends into the inability of 
a firm or a group of firms to raise the necessary amounts (usually due to external 
finance shortage) to finance their optimal line of growth. Put differently, financing 
constraints refer to the difficulty of raising external financing, or the cost 
differential between internal and external funds. 11  Consistent financial 
constraints categorization is a central issue of ICFS analyses.‎ “Financial‎
constraints are an abstraction, so researchers use proxies and indexes that 
allow‎ them‎ to‎ identify‎ and‎measure‎ the‎ degree‎ of‎ constraints.”‎ (Carreira‎ and‎
Silva, 2010).  
This study is interested in the relationship of investment and cash flow 
itself over time as well as in examining this relationship‎after‎firms’‎division‎into‎
financially constrained and unconstrained groups in order to test the empirical 
implications of the model. Similarly to the work of FHP (1988), the standard 
approach in the literature is to use exogenous sorting conditions that are 
hypothesized to be associated with the extent of financing frictions that firms face 
(e.g. Whited and Wu (2006), Campello et al. (2009), Fee et al., (2009)  and 
Almeida and Campello (2010), for recent examples of this strategy). Brown and 
Petersen (2009) split firms based on the number of years since their first stock 
price appears in Compustat, typically the year of their IPO - age. They also report 
                                            
11
 For instance, Lamont et al. (2001) employ negative real sales growth as a proxy for financial 
distress.   
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separate results for positive and negative cash flow firms. In terms of robustness 
checks they sort firms based on whether they have a positive net payout during 
the‎sample‎period‎and‎also‎according‎to‎firms’‎size.‎ 
To aid in the comparability of our results with those of BP (2009), we also 
use the more traditional a priori firm classification approach to test our theory.  
The set of variables we consider borrows directly from Hovakimian and 
Titman (2006) and is also extended to other variables. The proxies included 
seem to naturally capture different ways in which financing frictions may be 
manifested.‎For‎example,‎this‎set‎of‎variables‎includes‎a‎firm’s‎size‎(proxied‎by‎
the‎natural‎logarithm‎of‎total‎assets),‎a‎firm’s‎age‎based‎on‎the‎number‎of‎years‎
since their first stock price appears in Datastream, in other words the year of their 
IPO,‎a‎firm’s‎sales‎growth‎and‎a‎firm’s‎dividend‎payment‎(proxied‎by‎dividend‎
ratio).‎Furthermore,‎we‎also‎control‎for‎firm’s‎negative‎and‎positive‎cash‎flows. 
In the traditional literature, these variables are used individually as a priori 
measures of firm constraint category assignment. The next subsection explains 
that approach in more detail. 
However, we also attempt to combine three specific variables together in 
order to explore better measure of financing constraints. Specifically, we develop 
simple‎measure‎of‎firms’‎growth‎by‎referring‎to‎firms’‎size‎and‎age.‎Firstly‎we‎find‎
the‎rate‎of‎growth‎of‎firms’‎size‎- measured this time by net sales, from one year 
to‎ the‎ subsequent‎ year.‎ Then‎ we‎ calculate‎ the‎ average‎ of‎ those‎ firms’‎ size‎
changes from one year to another. On the basis of the median of this average of 
firms’‎size‎ increments‎over‎time‎we‎classify‎firms‎as‎financial‎constrained and 
unconstrained. Lastly we compare firms above and below the median of this size 
growth measure with the firms’‎age‎and‎size‎(measured‎by‎natural‎logarithm‎of‎
total assets).  
In‎ line‎with‎Lamont‎et‎al.’s‎ (2001)‎approach‎stating‎ that‎ in‎order‎ to‎be‎
constrained, a firm needs to have good investment opportunities, we define 
constrained firms when their size and age‎are‎below‎the‎sample’s‎median‎and‎
sales‎growth‎is‎above‎the‎sample’s‎median.‎Unconstrained‎firms‎though‎have‎
size‎and‎age‎above‎the‎sample’s‎median‎but‎sales‎growth‎below‎the‎sample’s‎
median. The sample of firms with size, age and sales growth below the sample’s‎
median should include firms most likely to be financially distressed.  The last 
sample‎ of‎ firms‎with‎ size,‎ age‎ and‎ sales‎ growth‎ above‎ the‎ sample’s‎median‎
should represent spurious issues. On one hand large and mature firms are 
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classed as unconstrained firms. On the other hand, financial constraints 
literature dictates that firms with high growth opportunities are constrained.  
However,‎ this‎ combined‎ measure‎ firms’‎ division‎ into‎ constrained‎ and‎
unconstrained groups may follow the contrasting philosophy that firms are 
unconstrained if their age growth raises positively and fast enough with their size 
growth‎in‎relation‎with‎firms’‎sample,‎but‎constrained‎if‎their‎age‎growth‎does‎not‎
reflect‎their‎size‎growth‎in‎relation‎with‎firms’‎sample.‎In‎line‎with this approach 
we classify firms as financially constrained if they are young, small and below the 
median of the size growth measure, less constrained if they are young, small and 
above the size growth median as well as mature and large firms with the speed 
of the size growth below the sample median and finally unconstrained firms 
when they are mature with size growth above the sample median. Although there 
are two groups of firms in this classification named as less constrained, we 
hypothesize that group of large, mature but slowly growing firms is more 
constrained than group of small, young and quickly growing firms. 
Several studies consider the evolution of firm size distribution and come 
up with the idea that growth rates and growth volatility are negatively related with 
firm size (and age). The financial constraints argument is one of the explanations 
for it e.g., the presence of financing constraints leads to a skewed distribution of 
firm size. Consistent with the optimal lending contracts models (Albuquerque 
and Hopenhayn, 2000), and Cooley and Quadrini (2001) built a model of 
financial market frictions and propose that smaller firms face higher probability of 
default, issue more debt and more shares and pay less dividends, and have 
higher growth rates and volatility. Hence, they assert that imperfect markets will 
lead to a skewed size distribution of firms.12 
The contradictive results from FHP (1988) and KZ (1997) have been 
explained by some later studies on the basis of the disagreement among 
researcher in identifying appropriate factors to separate less financially 
constrained firms from more constrained ones (Moyen, 2004; Cleary et al., 
                                            
12
 At the entrepreneur level Cabral and Mata (2003) create a model of heterogeneous constraints 
and investigate the evolution‎of‎the‎firm’s‎size‎distribution.‎They‎consider‎only‎two‎periods‎and‎
employ‎entrepreneur’s‎age‎as‎proxy‎for‎financial‎capacity.‎They‎claim‎that‎a‎higher‎probability‎of‎
being financially constrained applies to younger firms/entrepreneurs. Their findings based on a 
sample of Portuguese manufacturing firms from 1984 to 1991, imply that age has a significant 
impact upon the size distribution and, in detail, the younger firms/entrepreneurs are, the greater 
is the skewness of the distribution explained by the financial constraints. This argument found 
support in papers of Desai et al. (2003) and Faggiolo and Luzzi (2006). 
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2007). There are clear drawbacks of the criteria employed to divide firms into 
less and more constrained classes, e.g. dividend payout ratio, debt financing, 
financial distress, debt rating, firm size and firm age. The financial constraint 
feature itself may already influence these firm-specific variables. Furthermore, 
these classifying factors are time variant in the sense that a company 
categorized as financially constrained now may not remain constrained in the 
future. 
This‎speed‎of‎‎firms’‎size‎growth‎‎does‎not‎state‎what‎is‎the‎average‎size‎
of‎a‎firm‎over‎the‎years,‎as‎the‎‘classical’‎size‎classification,‎common‎in empirical 
literature on ICFS does, but in contrast, it shows how fast a firm was growing 
over time, which gives a clue on how constrained firm was up till now. Therefore, 
it looks at firms past and assesses how a firm has grown over time despite the 
possible financial obstacles. When a firm is mature and has high speed of size 
growth then that should indicate that this particular firm dealt well with financial 
constraints over time or that their policies and financial and investment decisions 
were successful. This measure differs from the absolute value of size measure in 
the sense that the latter one does not control for the fact that firms start from 
different size levels, hence the small one might be making appropriate policy 
decisions‎and‎“slowly‎but‎surely”‎developing‎its‎size‎(and‎that‎might‎help‎them‎in‎
accessing the external funds in the sense that their credit rate estimated by a 
bank might be higher because of lower risk, hence banks might favour those 
firms in financing their investment projects against, e.g. mature but hardly 
growing firms). While a firm with large amount of assets at the start of its listing 
might be reversing its size slowly, because of undertaking the wrong investment 
projects or making incorrect decisions about funding them e.g., leading to higher 
agency costs. For German firms for the period 1970 - 1986 Audretsch and Elston 
(2002), demonstrate that after the division of their sample into four groups of 
firms according to their size, they find that the medium size firms show a higher 
and most significant ICFS. They argue that SMEs in Germany are prevented 
from facing higher liquidity constraints thanks to a bank-oriented financial system 
and an institutional set. Very large firms in this analysis do not appear to be 
liquidity constrained. 
Small and young firms suffer more severely from the asymmetric 
information problems in comparison with their counterparts firms. This occurs 
because lenders struggle to get necessary information about these firms, such 
59 
 
as‎the‎‘quality’‎of‎the‎risk,‎or‎they‎are‎unable‎to‎control‎over‎the‎firm’s‎investment,‎
or‎ because‎ of‎ ‘weight’‎ and‎ visibility‎ of‎ such‎ firms.‎ For‎ instance,‎ Jaffee‎ and‎
Russell (1976) and Petersen and Rajan (1995), develop models where under 
these circumstances, smaller and younger firms are expected to be more credit 
rationed.  
However, for developed countries, Kadapakkam et al. (1998), and Cleary 
(1999) show that ICFS is greatest in the large firm size category and smallest in 
the small firm size group. These outcomes have been explained by Kadapakkam 
et‎al.‎(1998)‎as‎“larger‎firms‎have‎greater‎flexibility‎ in‎timing‎their‎ investments‎
and‎have‎more‎managerial‎agency‎problems”.‎Pratap‎ (2003)‎after‎ taking‎ into‎
account‎ dividend‎ payout‎ ratio‎ proposes‎ that‎ “adjustment‎ costs‎ explain‎ the‎
possible‎insensitivity‎of‎small‎firms’‎investment‎cash‎flow,‎as‎firms‎do‎not‎take‎
major‎investments‎before‎they‎attain‎a‎threshold‎level‎of‎liquidity.” 
For the period 1980–1992, Carpenter and Petersen (2002) employing a 
panel of US small firms demonstrate that the typical firm uses relatively little 
external funds and holds on to all of its income and that for the 90% of firms in 
their sample, which depend mainly on internal funds, the influence of cash flow 
on growth is above the unity, indicating that the growth of most small firms is 
constrained‎by‎internal‎finance.‎Carreira‎and‎Silva‎(2010)‎summarize‎that‎“even‎
if for constrained firms cash flow is independent of size, then growth will be 
independent of size, but the variance of growth rates will decline with size as 
larger‎ firms‎appear‎ to‎be‎ less‎constrained‎to‎ internal‎finance.”‎The‎supporting‎
evidence for this notion can be found in Oliveira and Fortunato (2006) who after 
examining a panel of Portuguese manufacturing firms (1990–2001) demonstrate 
that smaller‎firms’‎growth‎are‎more‎sensitive‎to‎cash‎flow‎suggesting‎that‎such‎
firms suffer from financing constraints.  
Overall, firms do not face costly external funds or its shortage only 
because‎of‎market‎they‎deal‎in.‎Intuitively‎one‎can‎state‎that‎firms’‎acting, such 
as internal or external funds management, also contributes into the constraint or 
unconstraint‎ firm’s‎ position.‎ Therefore,‎ observing‎ firms’‎ speed‎ of‎ size‎ growth‎
according‎to‎their‎age‎indicates‎whether‎a‎firms’‎management‎has‎well‎assessed‎
and predicted‎ the‎market‎ moves‎ and‎ trends‎ as‎ a‎ background‎ of‎ their‎ firms’‎
development‎and‎maximization‎of‎firms’‎shareholders‎interest.‎‎ 
All firms in the sample of this study employ debt finances, so the division 
cannot be criticized on the basis that some firms might have been only growing 
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due‎ to‎ successful‎ management‎ of‎ internal‎ funds.‎ A‎ firms’‎ age‎ could‎ be‎
considered as a bias of the combined measure, but in fact the firms in the sample 
are at the minimum four years old, which gives the market the basis for stating if 
the firm is doing well or not.  Moreover these firms are UK listed firms, which 
means that those firms have already achieved a certain level of performance. 
 
2.3.3 The standard regression model (ex-ante constraint selection) 
 
The standard empirical approach uses ex-ante firm sorting into constraint 
categories and least square estimations of investment equations, separately for 
each constraint regime. We also use this approach in our tests on investment, 
implementing the ex-ante separation schemes discussed in Almeida et al. 2004): 
Scheme 1: We rank firms based on their age and assign to the financially 
constrained (unconstrained) group those firms in the bottom-50th percentile 
(top-50th percentile) of the age distribution. Firms are not able to switch between 
young and mature groups within a given subperiod. 
ICFS literature‎employs‎firms’‎age‎which‎is‎an‎important‎determinant‎of‎its‎
performance variability.13 On average, small firms are younger than large firms, 
and hence their lack of experience, e.g. industry experience, in comparison with 
their large counterparts, this explains their financially constrained growth and the 
increased odds of failure of small firms in the industry. Young firms without 
established reputations may have a harder time raising external finance 
(Diamond (1991); Baker et al. (2003)). 
The age of the firm is potentially strongly correlated with asymmetric 
information problems and it is usually employed by the researchers as a proxy 
for the existence of financing frictions (e.g., Rauh, 2006; Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010); Brown et al., 2009; Fee et al., (2009)). Additionally, the effect of 
developments in capital markets should be most important for firms in the 
starting time of their life-cycle.  Mature/older firms have a well set up opinion in 
the market, which allows them more beneficial access to external finance, due to 
                                            
13
 Sakai‎et‎al.‎(2010)‎study‎how‎firms’‎borrowing‎costs‎evolve‎as‎they‎age.‎They‎discover‎that‎as‎
firms age their borrowing costs decline and‎that‎“the‎evolution‎of‎borrowing‎costs‎is‎partially‎due‎
to selection (i.e., total borrowing costs decline as defaulting firms exit) but is mainly attributable to 
adaptation‎(i.e.,‎surviving‎firms’‎borrowing‎costs‎decline‎as‎they‎age)”. 
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their established contacts with creditors within a longer time period (Berger and 
Udell, 1995).  
Scheme 2: We rank firms based on their size (proxied by the logarithm of 
total assets) and assign to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group 
those‎firms‎whose‎samples’‎years’‎average‎size‎lies‎below‎50th percentile (above 
50th percentile) in the sample. Firms are not able to switch between small and 
large groups within a given subperiod.  
 “Firm‎size‎is‎predominantly‎identified‎by‎the‎extant‎industrial‎economics‎
literature as one of the sources of heterogeneity in‎ firm‎ growth.”‎ (Rahaman‎
(2011))  
The most important issue here is that smaller companies are more likely 
to be financially constrained as they are subject to higher asymmetric information 
and agency problems, and hence, have difficulties in obtaining external finance. 
One of the characteristic and cause identified for the smaller companies is that 
their struggle to raise outside finance and are enforced to depend only on 
internal finance therefore their growth is constrained. If financial systems are not 
working correctly then this matter would be further sharpened. 
Scheme 3: We rank firms based on their dividend payout ratio and assign 
to the financially constrained (unconstrained) group those firms with zero 
(positive) dividend payout ratio over firm year observations for the whole sample. 
Firms are not able to switch between paying and not paying dividend groups 
within a given subperiod.  
Following FHP (1988) we stick to the theory that dividend paying, as 
against to non-dividend paying companies, are less likely to be financially 
constrained since they are able to shorten or stop dividends whenever their 
ability to access external financing becomes conflicting or impossible. Yet, this 
variable should be considered with caution due to the fact that cutting dividends 
for‎the‎sake‎of‎liquidity‎can‎also‎have‎opposite‎signalling‎impacts‎for‎the‎firm’s 
stock in the market (e.g. Healy and Palepu, 1988). 
Scheme 4: We rank firms based on their sales growth from one year to 
another and assign to the financially constrained (unconstrained) class those 
firms in the bottom 50th percentile (top-50th percentile) of the sales growth 
distribution for the whole sample.  
High sales growth firms are likely to have valuable investment 
opportunities stemming directly from their beneficial acting in past, so 
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underinvestment problems should appear in high sales growth firms. Low sales 
growth firms are less likely to have valuable investment opportunities, so they 
should suffer from overinvestment problems.  
Scheme 5: Finally we also divide firms into two groups according to cash 
flow sign: firms with negative (positive) cash flows. 
We also estimate separate regressions that capture only positive cash 
flow firms on the average over ten years period and regressions that covers only 
firm observations with negative cash flow on average over ten years period. Put 
differently, for each firm we calculate the sum of the cash flow ratio during the 
subperiod‎and‎if‎ the‎sum‎of‎ the‎firm’s‎cash‎flow‎ratio‎during‎the‎period‎is‎ less‎
than or equal to zero the firm is classed as a negative cash flow firm.14 Firms are 
not able to switch between negative and positive cash flow groups within a given 
subperiod. This split relates to Povel and Raith (2001), who argue that the 
association between investment and cash flow is in U-shape and only expected 
to be positive when firms have positive cash flows. Further, Allayannis and 
Mozumdar (2004) and Bhagat et al., (2005) indicate that negative cash flow 
observations can bias the results because the investment expenditures of firms 
are unlikely to respond to cash flow changes when they are in sufficiently bad 
shape. The implication of this possibility for our results may prove to be 
significant if, for example, there are firms among the so called flexible firms with 
negative cash flow observations.  
 
2.3.4 Four way split  
 
Taking into account the size of the sample we have also decided to split 
firms into four categories of the same size according to the same measures 
mentioned above, namely 1st quarter: up to 25th percentile, 2nd quarter: 25th – 50th 
percentile, 3rd quarter: 50th – 75th percentile and 4th quarter: above 75th 
percentile. This has been introduced in order to specify or define constrained and 
unconstrained firms in more detailed way, which is to better observe more 
particular changes and better control for such a big sample. The advantage of 
four-way sample split is that it controls better for firms which are on the edge of 
                                            
14
 Brown et al. (2009) and BP (2009) apply similar method of differentiating between negative 
and positive cash flow firms. 
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being financially constrained or financially unconstrained. The first 25 percent of 
the sample should clearly represent the constrained firms, the last 25 percent of 
the sample should clearly include the unconstrained firms, while the 50 percent 
of the sample in the middle could be constrained or unconstrained. Very often 
researchers in the process of splitting the sample into constrained vs. 
unconstrained categories introduce various ideas to get a better clear cut 
between constrained and unconstrained firms, e.g. they neglect the 10 percent 
of the sample from the very middle (see Florackis and Ozkan, 2004) or divide 
firms into three classes ( see FHP, 1988). Furthermore, due to various changes 
in the capital market observable in recent years, a greater share of firms shows 
negative cash flows, which may confound the results. Hence, the division of the 
firms into four quartiles may be able to control for these firms better. Also, as 
mentioned above, the four-way split is introduced because of very extensive data 
in terms of the number of firm year observations and time period data is collected 
for. Usually, researchers work with smaller samples in effect of very robust 
cleaning procedures, such as e.g. removing 5 percent of data from the bottom 
and top of data distribution for each variable in the model, eliminating firms with 
total assets or sales below 1 or 10 mln units, getting rid of firms with negative 
sum of cash flows over years or dropping firms with less than 6 consecutive 
years observations etc. Very modest cleaning procedures have been applied to 
the sample for this study, therefore, it is left with very robust data. Owing to this, 
the sample requires some extra divisions in order to control sufficiently for 
various aspects. Hence, the detailed sample split is carried out.  
Furthermore, we also estimate results for a four-way division based on 
size, age and sales growth. Large, mature firms with high sales growth are less 
likely to have problems of asymetric information. Underinvestment by such firms 
is most likely due to agency conflicts. In contrary, small, young firms with high 
sales growth are more likely to underinvest due to financial constraints linked 
with asymmetric information. Another advantage of four way split is that it helps 
to find firms which are very constrained and firms truly unconstrained. This 
combined measures related with both proxy for asymmetric informations as well 
as‎proxy‎for‎firm’s‎financial strength shed more light on the ICFS as a measure of 
financial constraints.   
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2.3.5 Base model 
 
Next after FHP (1988), we study the relationship between 
fixed-investment expenditures and cash-flow.‎ We‎ also‎ include‎ Tobin’s‎ Q‎ to‎
capture investment opportunities and industry dummies to control for industry – 
specific effects as well as time dummies to control for time – specific effects. All 
in all, we test firstly the following model: 
 
INVi,t = β0 + β1 CFi,t + β2 Qi,t + εi,t      (1) 
 
where INV is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets for firm i in 
period t, CF is the after-tax income before extraordinary items plus depreciation 
and amortization over total assets and Q represents growth opportunities, 
expressed by the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets. We want to 
maintain a common scale factor for all regressions therefore we divide by total 
assets the same as Baker et al. (2003). We also control for industry dummies 
and time dummies in all regressions, εi.t stands for measurement error. The 
primary variable of interest in this model is investment. A significant and positive 
coefficient of CF suggests that companies firstly rely on internal rather than 
external funds for financing investment, which is considered as a signal of 
financial constraint. On the other hand, an insignificant estimated coefficient of 
CF is taken as evidence that firms are financially unconstrained.  
 
2.3.6 Augmented model 
 
The impact of cash holdings on investment decisions 
In corporate finance cash stands as an effective hedging device for firms 
that are expected to be exposed to substantial capital market imperfections. In 
perfect capital market, investment expenditures are‎independent‎of‎companies’‎
financial policies, including cash policies, due to unlimited access to external 
capital available to all firms. In the real world capital markets suffer from several 
significant imperfections containing information asymmetry and agency costs, 
which lead to a wedge between the cost of internal and external funds. As an 
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outcome, firms are expected to hold higher cash reserves, because thanks to 
them they are more able to avoid the necessity of resorting to costly external 
financing in order to fund valuable investment opportunities.  
In general, there are three views in the literature related with cash 
holdings. The first one states that higher cash holdings of financially constrained 
firms are a value-increasing response to costly external financing. Higher cash 
holdings allow the firm to undertake positive net present value projects that 
would otherwise have been bypassed. For the financially constrained firms 
greater cash holdings might be more valuable owing to the fact that they allow 
the firm to invest when other funds sources are too expensive, limited or 
unavailable. The firm that faces external financial constraints with greater level of 
cash holdings is able to avoid underinvestment and reduced growth. The second 
view claims that constrained firms maintain higher cash balances to facilitate 
empire-building overinvestment. The third one asserts that the greater value of 
cash for constrained firms is a reflection of the market rewarding the firm for 
holding cash rather than overinvesting that cash in unprofitable projects. To 
distinguish between these alternative interpretations, we test whether higher 
cash holdings are associated with greater investment and whether this 
association is stronger for constrained than for unconstrained firms over time. In 
our model cash holdings are used as a measure of internal liquidity, which, 
similar‎to‎cash‎flow,‎may‎directly‎affect‎firms’‎investment.‎ 
As emphasized in the literature, cash holdings may permit constrained 
firms to undertake valuable future investments that they would otherwise have to 
forego. Denis and Sibilkov (2010) find that for constrained firms cash holdings 
are more valuable and they present evidence that more cash permits 
constrained firms to increase investment and that the marginal value of added 
investment is greater for constrained firms than for unconstrained firms. Brown 
and Petersen (2009) also provide direct evidence that cash holdings positively 
influence the real investment spending of constrained firms (but for R&D rather 
than physical investment). 
Overall, a number of researchers have pointed out that internal liquidity 
apart from its direct impact on firm investment is an important dimension of ICFS 
capital markets. There is an ambiguous connection between the stock measures 
of internal liquidity and cash flow sensitivity. One strand of literature argues that 
firms rich in cash savings are not really liquidity constrained because they can 
66 
 
employ it in order to undertake desired projects (KZ, 1997). Another strand 
states that firms are not forced to hold high levels of cash reserves unless they 
encounter difficult access to external capital and predict an internal liquidity 
shortage. 15  Hence, greater levels of cash holdings may indicate potential 
liquidity constraints. 
Nevertheless, the majority of ICFS studies fail to incorporate the role of 
cash holdings. According to Luo et al. (2007), Campbell et al. (2008), Lins et al. 
(2008) and Gamba and Triantis (2008) the cash-holding can be the liquidity 
reserve for future capital investment. Several papers stress the importance of 
cash holdings in achieving financial flexibility and decreasing problems of 
underinvestment. Faulkender and Wang (2006) show that the marginal value of 
cash is substantially higher for constrained than for unconstrained firms, 
especially in terms of high growth options firms. Recently Denis and Sibilkov 
(2010) found that constrained firms are able to undertake value-increasing 
projects owing to higher levels of financial slack. Their results are consistent with 
Faulkender and Wang (2006) in the sense that cash holdings are more valuable 
for constrained than for unconstrained firms. Gamba and Triantis (2008) develop 
a theoretical model where firms can mitigate the negative influence of financial 
constraints thanks to an appropriate liquidity policy, although their model ignores 
agency costs. Nevertheless, Harford (1999) present evidence that the 
overinvestment problem is more likely to affect the cash rich companies and that 
these companies tend to make value-decreasing acquisitions. Furthermore, due 
to the fact that cash-holding is a component of operating capitals which compete 
with capital investment for funds (Fazzari and Peterson, 1993), the cash holdings 
can significantly impact the behaviour of the capital investment. We try to tackle 
all these issues by including cash holding into our augmented investment 
regressions to control for the potential impact of financial slack. There are 
several papers which include cash holdings in the investment equation, such as 
                                            
15
 Consistent with this argument, Kim, Mauer, and Sherman (1998) show positive correlation 
between investment in liquid assets and the costs of external financing. Almeida, Campello, and 
Weisbach (2004) present that financially constrained firms seem to enlarge their cash balances 
with‎ increases‎ in‎ their‎ cash‎ flows,‎ and‎ that‎ constrained‎ firms’‎ cash‎ flow‎ sensitivity‎ of‎ cash‎
increases during recessions. They‎argue‎that‎“a‎firm’s‎cash‎balances‎and‎incremental‎savings‎
out‎ of‎ new‎ cash‎ flows‎ should‎ be‎ a‎ function‎ of‎ the‎ firm’s‎ position‎ in‎ the‎ financial‎ market.”‎
Subsequently Acharya et al. (2005) come up with similar result through demonstrating that 
financially constrained companies have a great inclination to save cash out of cash flow. Two 
latter researches take into account approach that cash reserves increase the capacity and ability 
of firms to invest.  
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work of Kadapakkam et al., (1998), Charlton et al. (2002), Dasgupta et al. (2009), 
Kim (2010) and Marchica and Mura (2010).  
 
The impact of leverage on investment decisions 
We also take into account leverage, which has an ambiguous expected 
effect on investment-cash flow sensitivity and may also more directly influence a 
firm’s‎capital‎expenditures.‎Lang et al., (1996) assert that leverage may impact 
investment in a number of ways. The amount of cash that can be employed for 
investment may be reduced thanks to leverage. Excess leverage may also 
impair‎ a‎ firm’s‎ ability‎ to‎ raise‎ additional‎ capital.‎Myers‎ (1977)‎ claims‎ that‎ the‎
managers of firms with great leverage level may forgo positive NPV projects 
because some or all of the benefits from the investment may be transferred to 
debt-holders, i.e. the underinvestment effect. According to Jensen (1986) and 
Stulz (1990) high leverage in low-growth firms discourages management from 
undertaking unprofitable investments. A negative relationship between leverage 
and investment is predicted by these theories. Lang et al. (1996), state that 
managers may sell assets, in order to provide finances in cases when other 
finances are either too costly or unavailable. Capital markets as a source of 
financing might be far too expensive for greatly leveraged or poorly performing 
firms due to adverse selection costs (Myers and Majluf, 1984) or agency costs of 
managerial discretion (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990).  Lang et al., (1996) study a 
numerous samples of US assets sales industrial companies within the time 1970 
– 1989 and explore the scenario where firms selling assets are characterized by 
high leverage or poor performance. In other words, they report a strong negative 
association between leverage and later investment only for corporations with low 
growth‎potentials‎(with‎Tobin’s‎Q‎ less‎ than‎one).‎Their‎outcomes‎again‎agree‎
with the hypothesis that leverage provides a weaker motive to invest in projects 
with poor prospects. Overall, the typical selling assets firm is motivated by its 
financial situation rather than by its comparative advantage. 
Hovakimian et al., (2001) find that firms with relatively high leverage ratios 
are reluctant to issue debt since excessive leverage increases the probability of 
financial distress. Nevertheless, for a certain category of firms, high leverage 
may also be understood as high capacity of debt and lower financial constraints 
Hovakimian (2009). This may induce a positive relationship between leverage 
and investment. Leverage may also decrease the amount of free cash flow, 
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which‎ may‎ reduce‎ managers’‎ likeliness‎ to‎ overinvest.‎ The‎ former‎ view‎ is‎
supported by the majority of empirical literature. For example, Lang et al., (1996), 
Aivazian et al., (2005) and Ahn et al., (2006) employing US or Canadian data, all 
show a negative association between investment and leverage and that the 
correlation is much stronger for firms with low growth. Aivazian et al. (2005) 
study overinvestment evolved by a manager–stockholder agency conflict 
identified by Jensen (1986), where a firm with weak growth opportunities should 
use debt as a tool to discipline managers, so the overinvestment is reduced in 
leverage. For a sample of Chinese listed firms, Firth et al. (2008) also find a 
negative relationship between leverage and investment, but indicate a weaker 
link among firms with low growth opportunities, poor operating performance, and 
high level of state shareholding. They assert that this is in line with the 
hypothesis that the state-owned banks in China impose fewer restrictions on the 
capital expenditures of low growth and poorly performing firms, as well as firms 
with greater state ownership.  
In this paper we investigate the role of external finance in ICFS 
regressions by including measures of leverage in our augmented dynamic 
investment models. We argue that this variable together with internal finances 
are potentially important omitted variables in most ICFS paper, and their 
inclusion helps address some concerns related with ICFS interpretation and 
understanding. Potentially all these variables matter a great deal for investment 
but are rarely included in ICFS analysis.  
We base our empirical analysis on an augmented version of the standard 
model of capital investment, which is as follows: 
 
INVi,t = β1INVi,(t-1) + β2CFi,t + β3Qi,t + β4Cashi,t-1 + β5LEVi,t-1 + αi + dt + ui,t    
           (2) 
 
where INV is the ratio of capital expenditures to total assets for firm i in 
period t, CF is the after-tax income before extraordinary items plus depreciation 
and amortization over total assets and Q represents growth opportunities, 
expressed by the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of 
equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets. We want to 
maintain a common scale factor for all regressions therefore we divide by total 
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assets the same as Baker et al. (2003). We also control for industry and time 
dummies in this regression, dt controls for year fixed effects, αi is a firm specific 
effect that controls for all time-invariant determinates of INV at the firm level, and 
ui.t stands for random error term. 
Our model takes from Bond and Meghir (1994), who include debt terms, 
instrumented with lagged values, in a dynamic model of physical investment. We 
consider cash and debt issues to control for potential omitted variable biases and 
to estimate the changing role of cash and debt finance for investment.  
We also use panel data to examine our predictions. According to Hsiao 
(1986) a large number of data points and combining features of both 
cross-sectional and time series data provided by panel data, improves the 
efficiency of econometric estimates. Thanks to panel data the degrees of 
freedom are increased, hence there is more variability and reduction in 
colinearity among regressors and all that lead again to more efficient 
estimations. Another of the motivations for employing panel data is to control for 
unobservable firm heterogeneity. Furthermore, panel data in comparison with 
cross-sectional data, is more flexible in the choice of variables used as 
instruments to control for endogeneity. The endogeneity problem appears 
because observable as well as unobservable shocks influencing corporate 
investment decisions are also likely to impact some of other firm-specific 
characteristics. The exogeneity between the regressors and error term, 
particularly in the financial data of the company is difficult to establish. Hence, 
the direction of causality between variables might be ambiguous because off 
potential endogeneity. It can be the case that observed relations between 
investment and firm-specific characteristics reflects the influences of investment 
on the latter instead of the other way round. The Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM hereafter) technique used on panel data reduces this problem 
by incorporating firm-specific effects (which reflects the cross sectional 
components of these unobservable shocks) and time dummies (which account 
for the common to all firms macroeconomic shocks). As a result, this allows us to 
pick up more efficient instruments to control for endogeneity. In other words, 
firm-specific effects are controlled for by estimating the dynamic investment 
model in first differences, instead of in levels. Specifically, in first difference GMM 
technique the model is estimated in first differences employing level regressors 
as instruments to control for unobservable firm heterogeneity. In the estimated 
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model also year dummies are included in order to control for time-specific 
effects. Methods, such as OLS and the fixed-effects estimator ignore the 
endogeneity problem, hence they provide inconsistent estimates of the 
parameters of the investment function. To control for potential endogeneity 
among regressors and alleviate the simultaneity bias cash holding and leverage 
measures are introduces to the model as lagged once variables.  
Overall, GMM estimation procedure structured by Arellano and Bond 
(1991) is employed to estimate this dynamic model covered by equation 2, which 
is our preferred model. Papers of Beck et al. (2000), Bond et al. (2003A), Beck 
and Levine (2004), and Brown et al. (2009) demonstrate similar approaches. 
Thanks to this method of analyzing this model we can cope with following 
problems. At the start, equation 2 is treated as dynamic models with firm fixed 
effects, however, in panels with proportionally few time periods, both OLS levels 
and within-firm group estimates will be biased (Nickell, 1981). Next, potentially 
every financial variable in equations 2 are endogenous, especially cash savings 
and total debt issues, therefore there is a need to use instrumental variables. At 
last, as Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) highlights, in case of high adjustment 
costs, firms reacting to transitory shocks may smooth investment to cash flow, 
which may, in effect deprive the long-run association between investment and 
cash flow. In detail, in a regression including fixed effects the estimated 
coefficient of cash flow will be biased downward if investment rather than 
respond to the transitory component, it responds to the permanent component 
due to adjustment costs. Among others solutions to this problem Himmelberg 
and Petersen (1994) proposed instrument lagged values of cash flow.  
Following Arellano and Bond (1991) who claim that if the error term in the 
undifferenced model is identically and independently distributed, then lagged 
levels dated as t-2 are potentially valid instruments and Sargan test of 
instruments validity do not reject the validity of the t-2 instruments. Thus we use 
instruments dated t-1 and t-2 for the following GMM regressions. The literature 
(e.g. Martonsson, 2009) shows that any earlier instruments do not yield 
consistent estimates for dynamic panels,‎thus‎we‎don’t‎include‎them. 
 
2.3.7 Optimal investment ratio and the speed of adjustment 
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The central objective of Equation 2 is to shed more light onto the empirical 
determinants of a firms’‎target‎investment‎and‎the‎adjustment‎process‎towards 
this target. This empirical model by concentrating on the dynamics of investment 
decisions and the nature of the adjustment process captures two important 
characteristics‎ of‎ a‎ firms’‎ investment‎ behaviour stemming from relaxing 
assumptions of a perfect market by Modigliani and Miller (1958). In the first 
place, firms have to pursue to their long-term optimal target investment ratio. 
This target investment is assumed to be a function of numerous firm-specific 
characteristics, however, unstable over time, different for each firm or various 
over both time and firms (see e.g. Dasgupta et al., (2008) or Gatchev et al., 
(2010)). In the second place, adjustment costs of investment are present, which 
cover a lag in adjusting to changes in the optimal target investment level. Various 
market‎ imperfections‎are‎ likely‎ to‎ disturb‎a‎ firms’‎ adjustment‎ process‎ to‎ their‎
target investment, especially complete adjustment to their target investment and 
immediate offsetting the results of events which take them away from their target 
ratios. Due to adjustment costs firms may not be able to adjust their investing 
ratio promptly and a delay is highly likely. Therefore, equation 2 is a partial 
adjustment‎model‎where‎ the‎firm’s financial behavior is described as a partial 
adjustment to a long-run target investment.  This setup makes it possible to study 
both the potential determinants of target investment ratios and the character of 
the adjustment to these targets. The need for accounting adjustment costs of 
investment led to the input of the lagged investment term to the formal models of 
investment behavior.  
The following procedure is applied in order to find the existence of a target 
investment ratio. This equation assumes that the target / desired long run 
investment ratio of firms is determined by a number of variables,  
 
I*it =‎Σkβkxkit +‎εit         (3) 
 
Where‎ εit is the disturbance term, which is assumed to be serially 
uncorrelated‎with‎mean‎zero‎and‎possibly‎heteroscedastic,‎and‎βk’s‎represent‎
common‎to‎all‎firms‎the‎unknown‎parameters‎that‎need‎to‎be‎estimated.‎A‎firm’s‎
current investment ratio is assumed in the model‎ to‎ adjust‎ to‎ firm’s‎ target‎
investment‎ratio‎with‎the‎degree‎of‎adjustment‎coefficient‎θ.‎ 
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Iit - Iit-1 =‎θ‎(I
*
it - Iit-1)        (4) 
 
where‎0‎<‎θ‎<1,‎Iit and I
*
it are respectively the actual and target investment 
ratio of firm i at time t. When‎θ‎=‎1, then actual Iit - Iit-1 changes in investment level 
is equal the target one without any delay (I*it - Iit-1) and the model is considered as 
functioning in perfect capital market. However, when the assumptions of the 
perfect capital market are distorted firms are only able to change partially. When 
θ‎=‎0,‎then‎there‎is‎no‎adjustment‎and‎firms‎set‎their‎current‎investment‎ratio‎to‎
its past value. Substituting equation (3) into equation (4) yields: 
Iit = (1 – θ)‎Iit-1 +‎Σkθβkxkit +‎θεit 
And rewritten as 
Iit =‎γ0Iit-1 +‎Σk=1 γkxkit +‎μit 
where‎γ0 = (1 – θ),‎γk =‎βk,‎and‎θεit =‎μit (where‎μit has‎the‎same‎properties‎as‎εit). 
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2.4 Data and sample description 
 
This section demonstrates the data sources and descriptive statistics for 
variables employed in the sample.  
The data used in this study is collected from Datastream database, which 
is the most comprehensive source of data on investment and other explanatory 
variables currently available to me. This dataset is based on the sample of UK 
listed non-financial firms, over the time period of thirty years: 1980-2009. These 
companies are classified according to the sector of their main activity, e.g. 
mining, retailers, technology or chemicals. Because the characteristics of the 
banking and insurance sectors companies are different from the companies of 
the other industrial departments in terms of financial statement, profitability 
measures and liquidity assessment, these companies are eliminated from this 
study. Also utilities sectors are not considered in this study. The detailed 
information about each enterprise is included in data set. Balance sheets and 
income statements are the key items of interest, as the law requires disclosure, 
the entire balance sheets and income statements are available from companies. 
Definitions for all variables employed in this analysis are provided in Table 2.1. 
Detailed summary statistics for the variables employed in the econometric 
analysis for entire sample are represented in Table 2.2. 
 
2.4.1 Variables selection 
 
Several cleaning procedures have been applied to the data, for the 
purpose of this paper. Firstly, financial and utility companies have been removed 
from the sample because of certain factors of their financial ratios and the 
peculiarity in their regulatory conditions. Next, observations with missing values 
are excluded. In terms of OLS regressions the dataset is much bigger firstly and 
it shrinks for the requirements of GMM analyses solely, companies with at least 
four successive years observations during the sample period has been selected.  
Then we drop outliers at the 1% level from the top and bottom cut-offs for the 
following variables: total assets, sales investment,‎cash‎flow‎and‎Tobin’s‎Q.‎We‎
then eliminated all firms whose growth of total assets from one year to another 
was more than 100%. This cleaning restriction has been applied in order to avoid 
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any firm year observations representing mergers or acquisitions of firms, which 
could influence the results. Finally we also get rid of firms whose sum of sales 
over the years equals to 0 or only the last observation for the firm is above 0 and 
the previous ones are 0. This last limitation has been included because of the 
need of calculating sales growth and its mean for each firm, though, this has not 
reduced the sample substantially. Huang (2001) asserts that a dataset that 
covers more companies and various sorts of companies will provide more 
reasonable outcomes, therefore negative cash flow and small firms are included 
in the sample along with positive cash flow and large firms. The intention of this 
paper is to cover a long time period to study the time-varying features of the ICFS 
relationship as in, e.g. Allayannis and Mozumdar (2001). 
In order to observe the changes of ICFS over time we present separate 
regression outcomes for three different subperiods: 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 
2000-2009. The starting and finishing years of the full sample has been decided 
by data availability, Datastream at our research place does not provide data 
before 1980 and the years after 2009 are very incomplete, at least at the time of 
our data collection. The overall sample is divided between these time periods of 
exactly equal length of time to keep the consistency of the analysis. This division 
into three subsample stems from the intuition that without it one can only deliver 
single coefficients for each variable from the model, which do not include any 
information about the changes over time. The full sample has not been divided 
into any smaller subsamples because of the GMM analysis which requires a 
minimum of four years observation per firm. In view of this last condition the 
sample size drops substantially. As described before we also categorize the 
firms according to their age, size, dividend payout ratio, sales growth and cash 
flow sign.   
Before we begin the empirical investigation in the following section, we 
provide descriptive statistics, namely mean and median, and discuss preliminary 
characteristics of the sample.  
The sample summary statistics are carried out according to the annual 
firm observations. As previously mentioned all variables are scaled by total 
assets. 
We concentrate our analysis on changes over time by investigating both 
three subperiods as well as year by year summary statistics. Descriptive 
statistics of differences between small and large, not paying dividend and paying 
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dividend as well as negative and positive cash flow ratios firms are also 
demonstrated over the five years of the sample in order to get a clear cut of the 
booming and financial crisis years.  
According to Cleary et al. (2007) one critical factor of the opposing results 
reported by the previous literature is whether to include the observations with 
negative cash flow or not. Because this study detects the changes of ICFS over 
time, it would have been biased to neglect those firms with negative cash flow on 
average over years, since in last subperiod these firms account for 30% of the 
sample. Furthermore, avoiding these firms would bias the years of booming and 
financial crisis even more, meaning the full picture of how firms acted during the 
economic growth and then during the economic downturn would be deprived.   
When‎a‎firms’‎size‎proxied‎by the‎natural‎logarithm‎of‎a‎firms’‎total‎assets‎
is differentiated by either positive or negative cash flow, it demonstrates that on 
average, firms with positive cash flow are usually larger and firms with negative 
cash flows are usually smaller. The same discovery was produced by Cleary et 
al. (2007) who argue that the monotonic increasing relationship between cash 
flow and investment found by FHP (1988) is driven by data selection bias in 
selecting only large companies and ignoring one third of the total sample that has 
a negative relationship between cash flow and investment. 
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Table 2.1 Variables Definitions 
Variable Definition 
TA Total Assets 
INV The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets 
CF 
The ratio of net income before extraordinary items plus depreciation and 
amortization to total assets 
Q 
The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity to book value of total asset 
CASH The ratio of total cash and short term investment to total assets 
LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets 
SIZE The logarithm of total assets 
AGE End date-Base date according to Datastream 
DIV The ratio of total cash dividend to total assets 
SG (%) The ratio of sales growth equal to ∆sales over 1-period lagged sales 
Notes: This table provides the definitions of the main variables used in our analysis. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Full 
Sample 
2000-2009 2000-2009 1990-1999 1990-1999 1980-1989 1980-1989 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
INV 0.045 0.030 0.064 0.052 0.080 0.066 
CF -0.005 0.069 0.084 0.095 0.103 0.101 
Q 1.864 1.380 1.610 1.364 1.349 1.213 
CASH 0.165 0.091 0.104 0.064 0.085 0.059 
LEV 0.189 0.150 0.191 0.176 0.124 0.112 
SIZE 11.241 11.044 11.345 11.018 12.362 12.150 
AGE 20.040 15 25.999 25 32.33 34 
DIV 0.021 0.012 0.027 0.025 0.022 0.021 
Obs. 9563   9361   2863   
Obs. with 
CF<0 
2556 
 
951 
 
52 
 
Obs. with 
CFSUM<1 
2897 
 
928 
 
17 
 
Firms 1382   1234   385   
Notes: This table shows UK firms’ sample characteristics over the period 1980-2009. Analytical 
definitions for all the variables are provided in table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 demonstrates that the investment expenditures halved in size 
between third: 2000-2009 (mean and median: 0.045 and 0.03) and first 
subsample: 1980-1989 (mean and median: 0.08 and 0.066). On average the 
cash flow measure dropped dramatically from 10% in the first subperiod, 8% in 
the second subperiod and down to a negative value of -0.5% in the last 
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subperiod. In contrast the proxy for growth opportunities has increased over time 
(1.3‎to‎1.6‎to‎1.8),‎as‎has‎the‎firms’‎cash‎savings‎(0.8‎to‎0.1‎to‎0.16).‎Leverage 
level, in terms of its mean measure, seems to increase from 12 % in the first 
subperiod to 19% in the second subperiod and stays around this level in the third 
subperiod.‎Importantly‎on‎average,‎the‎firms’‎size‎and‎age‎have‎declined,‎and‎
the size median for the last and second last decade are much smaller than the 
size mean, and the age median in the last decade is much smaller than the age 
mean. This indicates that over the last three decades the number of small and 
young firms has increased its share in the full sample, which is in line with two 
major events related with listed firms in the UK, namely establishment of both the 
Alternative Investment Market in 1995 and an international equity derivatives 
business EDX London in year 2003.  
Table 2.3 shows that interestingly, the capital expenditures ratio 
decreased prominently over time for all the firms group, in particular full sample 
ratio were 0.08 in 1980 year but only 0.035 in the last period. From the view of 
the finance sources, for all the firms in the sample, on average the cash flow 
variable slowly fluctuates over short periods of times ,but overall it decreases 
critically from 9% in 1980 to -1% in 2009 year. The fall into negative values 
appears first time in year 2001, after the IT bubble burst and the subprime 
mortgage crisis events occurred in year 2000. In contrast, the cash holding ratio 
grows almost systematically from 5% in 1980 to 16 % thirty years later, and total 
debt ratio grows from 10 % in the first year to 18 % in the last year of the sample 
period. The total debt ratio grows slowly over the first subperiod and jumps to 18 
% in year 1989 and stays around this level for the rest of the sample period. As in 
table 2.2 the‎ firms’‎size‎and‎age‎have‎plummeted‎over‎ time.‎Dividend‎payout 
ratio fluctuates over time but on a very small scale and overall it moves around 
2% levels.  
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Table 2.‎03 Descriptive Statistics by Year 
    INV CF Q CASH LEV DIV SIZE AGE Obs. 
1980 Mean 0.080 0.093 0.995 0.055 0.107 0.020 12.276 33.187 203 
 
Median 0.068 0.091 0.886 0.035 0.096 0.019 12.205 35 
 
1981 Mean 0.073 0.091 1.022 0.068 0.103 0.019 12.371 33.038 211 
 
Median 0.060 0.091 0.901 0.044 0.099 0.018 12.278 35 
 
1982 Mean 0.072 0.081 1.054 0.075 0.109 0.018 12.452 32.635 222 
 
Median 0.059 0.080 0.942 0.052 0.106 0.017 12.375 34 
 
1983 Mean 0.071 0.089 1.168 0.084 0.111 0.019 12.468 32.261 238 
 
Median 0.058 0.086 1.006 0.058 0.104 0.018 12.421 34 
 
1984 Mean 0.078 0.100 1.277 0.083 0.103 0.020 12.312 31.850 299 
 
Median 0.065 0.096 1.064 0.054 0.089 0.019 12.043 33 
 
1985 Mean 0.081 0.098 1.360 0.083 0.105 0.022 12.213 31.778 342 
 
Median 0.068 0.096 1.165 0.059 0.092 0.021 11.937 33 
 
1986 Mean 0.083 0.104 1.515 0.094 0.116 0.023 12.146 31.408 365 
 
Median 0.070 0.105 1.364 0.071 0.095 0.022 11.815 32 
 
1987 Mean 0.084 0.118 1.648 0.101 0.136 0.025 12.308 31.971 347 
 
Median 0.067 0.119 1.488 0.074 0.126 0.024 12.006 33 
 
1988 Mean 0.086 0.120 1.509 0.096 0.153 0.026 12.483 32.706 327 
 
Median 0.073 0.118 1.406 0.075 0.146 0.025 12.239 34 
 
1989 Mean 0.085 0.115 1.512 0.092 0.181 0.027 12.671 33.317 309 
 
Median 0.074 0.113 1.409 0.062 0.176 0.026 12.381 35 
 
1990 Mean 0.085 0.104 1.367 0.095 0.193 0.028 11.113 27.312 866 
 
Median 0.069 0.106 1.229 0.050 0.181 0.026 10.813 27 
 
1991 Mean 0.069 0.084 1.388 0.095 0.201 0.028 11.098 27.043 905 
 
Median 0.055 0.093 1.253 0.051 0.188 0.027 10.760 27 
 
1992 Mean 0.057 0.073 1.415 0.101 0.205 0.027 11.101 26.859 932 
 
Median 0.044 0.086 1.247 0.057 0.191 0.025 10.766 27 
 
1993 Mean 0.055 0.066 1.597 0.108 0.193 0.024 11.086 26.336 997 
 
Median 0.043 0.086 1.421 0.064 0.172 0.022 10.743 26 
 
1994 Mean 0.060 0.081 1.678 0.109 0.180 0.024 11.317 25.654 1046 
 
Median 0.048 0.093 1.494 0.077 0.161 0.022 10.922 25 
 
1995 Mean 0.064 0.086 1.654 0.106 0.184 0.026 11.460 25.516 1040 
 
Median 0.053 0.097 1.421 0.068 0.168 0.024 11.073 25 
 
1996 Mean 0.064 0.087 1.802 0.108 0.184 0.028 11.452 24.646 1051 
 
Median 0.053 0.097 1.514 0.071 0.166 0.026 11.083 23 
 
1997 Mean 0.065 0.096 1.779 0.110 0.182 0.031 11.543 24.905 979 
 
Median 0.053 0.103 1.444 0.075 0.170 0.027 11.167 23 
 
1998 Mean 0.065 0.085 1.722 0.106 0.192 0.030 11.651 25.562 847 
 
Median 0.054 0.098 1.344 0.066 0.177 0.026 11.322 24 
 
1999 Mean 0.061 0.077 1.653 0.097 0.204 0.029 11.711 26.719 698 
 
Median 0.049 0.094 1.277 0.061 0.188 0.024 11.427 25 
 
2000 Mean 0.056 0.044 2.176 0.152 0.188 0.026 11.550 22.952 855 
 
Median 0.041 0.079 1.414 0.080 0.166 0.017 11.214 19 
 
2001 Mean 0.055 -0.014 1.755 0.159 0.190 0.021 11.387 21.977 936 
 
Median 0.040 0.066 1.264 0.069 0.158 0.016 11.146 17 
 
2002 Mean 0.046 -0.042 1.547 0.162 0.202 0.019 11.282 21.255 1026 
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Median 0.034 0.058 1.196 0.080 0.160 0.013 11.085 16 
 
2003 Mean 0.042 -0.018 1.750 0.158 0.204 0.019 11.214 20.768 1085 
 
Median 0.030 0.066 1.265 0.084 0.161 0.012 10.973 16 
 
2004 Mean 0.042 0.008 2.013 0.171 0.193 0.020 11.109 20.094 1084 
 
Median 0.028 0.069 1.494 0.096 0.155 0.010 10.925 15 
 
2005 Mean 0.045 0.006 2.091 0.175 0.182 0.018 11.114 19.081 1074 
 
Median 0.028 0.071 1.561 0.103 0.135 0.009 10.938 14 
 
2006 Mean 0.044 0.004 2.127 0.179 0.176 0.024 11.119 18.221 1045 
 
Median 0.029 0.073 1.621 0.109 0.132 0.007 10.928 13 
 
2007 Mean 0.042 -0.007 2.023 0.172 0.178 0.020 11.139 18.047 929 
 
Median 0.026 0.077 1.609 0.104 0.138 0.010 11.009 13 
 
2008 Mean 0.041 -0.020 1.496 0.160 0.188 0.022 11.257 18.690 809 
 
Median 0.025 0.069 1.146 0.095 0.145 0.012 11.118 14 
 
2009 Mean 0.035 -0.011 1.529 0.160 0.185 0.020 11.349 19.315 720 
  Median 0.020 0.061 1.204 0.102 0.143 0.009 11.173 14 
 
Notes: This table shows the averages and medians for the variables in each year of the period 
1980-2009. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 2.1. 
 
To‎show‎the‎trends‎over‎time‎of‎investment,‎cash‎flow‎and‎Tobin’s‎Q‎the‎
graphical representation is provided next.  
 
Figure 2.2 Plots of the Yearly Averages of INV, CF and Q  
 
 
Overall, the descriptive statistics suggest that the first subsample is rather 
different from the last two ones, and that does not only apply to the sample size 
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but also to variables characteristics, in the sense that it covers mainly large and 
mature firms with high positive cash flow and high capital expenditures ratios, 
which are leveraged at low levels and save cash rather modestly with small 
investment opportunities proxies. It is almost as if the first subsample covers only 
unconstrained firms when in fact, this subperiod contains only three firms with a 
negative cash flow sum over‎the‎firm’s‎year‎observations.‎Therefore,‎one‎needs‎
to be careful in analyzing all three subperiods. All this is not supposed to imply 
that the first subsample could have any biased features, this is impossible 
because the criteria for all subsamples in terms of the data collection were the 
same, but it rather suggest the changes of the market conditions, and thus 
changes of a firms characteristics and also changes in firms investment 
decisions and financial decisions.   
In order to highlight the financial crisis and the booming time beforehand 
this paper covers detailed descriptive statistics over the last five years of the total 
sample‎period.‎The‎sample‎has‎been‎split‎according‎to‎the‎sign‎of‎firms’‎cash‎
flows-table 2.4 Panel A, dividend payout ratio – whether‎firms’‎pay‎or‎not‎pay‎
dividend-table 2.4 Panel B and size median-table 2.4 Panel C per each individual 
year. The firms were also divided according to age and sales growth, the results 
are very similar.  
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Table 2.4 Descriptive Statistics by Year across CF, DIV and SIZE 
  INV CF Q CASH LEV DIV SIZE AGE Obs. 
Panel A 
         CF<0 
2005 
        
277 
Mean 0.035 -0.275 2.881 0.277 0.202 0.003 9.499 14.628 
 Median 0.015 -0.144 1.757 0.169 0.080 0 9.141 10 
 2006 
        
281 
Mean 0.033 -0.283 2.614 0.284 0.157 0.003 9.528 12.605 
 Median 0.018 -0.154 1.683 0.181 0.052 0 9.266 9 
 2007 
        
236 
Mean 0.033 -0.347 2.490 0.279 0.177 0.003 9.453 11.890 
 Median 0.017 -0.184 1.781 0.216 0.069 0.000 9.192 9 
 2008 
        
223 
Mean 0.036 -0.345 1.807 0.223 0.202 0.014 9.791 13.336 
 Median 0.018 -0.196 1.068 0.131 0.126 0 9.462 9 
 2009 
        
218 
Mean 0.024 -0.269 1.888 0.201 0.205 0.006 9.961 15.092 
 Median 0.010 -0.146 1.206 0.119 0.125 0.000 9.726 10 
 CF>0 
2005 
        
797 
Mean 0.049 0.103 1.817 0.139 0.176 0.023 11.675 20.629 
 Median 0.032 0.095 1.529 0.092 0.149 0.017 11.376 16 
 2006 
        
764 
Mean 0.048 0.109 1.948 0.140 0.182 0.032 11.704 20.287 
 Median 0.032 0.098 1.613 0.098 0.154 0.016 11.445 15 
 2007 
        
691 
Mean 0.045 0.109 1.860 0.135 0.179 0.026 11.727 20.184 
 Median 0.030 0.100 1.583 0.089 0.158 0.016 11.549 15 
 2008 
        
585 
Mean 0.044 0.104 1.377 0.136 0.182 0.025 11.823 20.737 
 Median 0.028 0.094 1.167 0.088 0.149 0.017 11.647 15 
 2009 
        
501 
Mean 0.040 0.101 1.374 0.143 0.176 0.026 11.956 21.110 
 Median 0.024 0.089 1.203 0.097 0.147 0.016 11.776 16 
 
          Panel B 
         DIV=0 
2005 
        
468 
Mean 0.041 -0.111 2.512 0.248 0.178 0.000 9.739 13.474 
 Median 0.020 -0.006 1.709 0.158 0.079 0.000 9.505 10 
 2006 
        
475 
Mean 0.039 -0.115 2.405 0.237 0.164 0.000 9.823 12.608 
 Median 0.021 -0.007 1.633 0.154 0.091 0.000 9.578 10 
 2007 
        
393 
Mean 0.034 -0.152 2.260 0.237 0.167 0.000 9.721 12.580 
 Median 0.018 -0.013 1.627 0.158 0.082 0.000 9.484 10 
 
82 
 
2008 
        
323 
Mean 0.038 -0.174 1.731 0.219 0.186 0.000 9.713 12.591 
 Median 0.018 -0.022 1.165 0.139 0.100 0.000 9.509 9 
 2009 
        
305 
Mean 0.030 -0.127 1.771 0.204 0.199 0.000 10.120 14.669 
 Median 0.014 -0.015 1.283 0.132 0.139 0.000 9.811 10 
 DIV>0 
2005 
        
606 
Mean 0.049 0.096 1.766 0.118 0.186 0.031 12.175 23.411 
 Median 0.035 0.098 1.506 0.077 0.166 0.024 11.915 21 
 2006 DIV>0 
       
570 
Mean 0.048 0.103 1.895 0.130 0.185 0.045 12.198 22.898 
 Median 0.036 0.102 1.611 0.091 0.166 0.024 11.977 20 
 2007 DIV>0 
       
536 
Mean 0.047 0.100 1.849 0.125 0.187 0.035 12.179 22.056 
 Median 0.033 0.101 1.596 0.083 0.166 0.023 11.968 17 
 2008 DIV>0 
       
486 
Mean 0.044 0.083 1.339 0.121 0.189 0.036 12.284 22.743 
 Median 0.030 0.087 1.105 0.078 0.167 0.023 12.106 21 
 2009 DIV>0 
       
415 
Mean 0.039 0.074 1.351 0.129 0.175 0.034 12.252 22.730 
 Median 0.026 0.085 1.172 0.085 0.144 0.023 12.155 21 
 
          Panel C 
         SIZE<Median 
2005 
        
537 
mean 0.040 -0.070 2.405 0.224 0.150 0.010 9.266 14.030 
 p50 0.019 0.031 1.615 0.138 0.063 0.000 9.441 10 
 2006 
        
523 
mean 0.037 -0.072 2.354 0.229 0.135 0.012 9.283 13.015 
 p50 0.021 0.041 1.572 0.146 0.052 0.000 9.433 10 
 2007 
        
464 
mean 0.034 -0.091 2.212 0.217 0.137 0.012 9.285 12.961 
 p50 0.019 0.044 1.612 0.141 0.063 0.000 9.420 10 
 2008 
        
404 
mean 0.034 -0.108 1.675 0.204 0.147 0.018 9.380 13.611 
 p50 0.018 0.040 1.151 0.123 0.060 0.000 9.554 10 
 2009 
        
360 
mean 0.028 -0.088 1.653 0.203 0.147 0.015 9.472 14.819 
 p50 0.015 0.026 1.157 0.140 0.068 0.000 9.672 10 
 SIZE>Median 
2005 
        
537 
Mean 0.050 0.082 1.777 0.125 0.215 0.025 12.962 24.132 
 Median 0.037 0.091 1.548 0.085 0.192 0.019 12.590 21 
 2006 
        
522 
Mean 0.051 0.080 1.899 0.128 0.216 0.037 12.958 23.437 
 Median 0.037 0.089 1.652 0.088 0.192 0.019 12.556 21 
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2007 
        
465 
Mean 0.049 0.078 1.835 0.127 0.220 0.029 12.990 23.123 
 Median 0.034 0.093 1.608 0.084 0.198 0.020 12.675 20 
 2008 
        
405 
Mean 0.048 0.068 1.316 0.116 0.228 0.026 13.129 23.756 
 Median 0.034 0.080 1.140 0.074 0.216 0.019 12.863 22 
 2009 
        
360 
Mean 0.042 0.065 1.405 0.118 0.224 0.025 13.226 23.811 
 Median 0.028 0.077 1.230 0.080 0.200 0.016 12.969 22 
 Notes: This table shows the averages and medians for the variables in each year of the period 
2005-2009 across CF, DIV and SIZE. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in 
table 2.1. 
 
The financial crisis officially started in July 2007, however firms usually 
respond or adjust to such an exogenous shock with a delay, thus this year can be 
treated as a transformation year in terms of the capital market conditions 
changes. Therefore, to have a balanced view two years before, 2007 is treated 
as booming time and two years after 2007 is recognized as financial crisis time. 
Over the financial crisis years: 2008-2009 one can see a drop in capital 
expenditures‎for‎both‎firms’‎groups‎after‎firm’s‎different‎divisions, especially in 
year 2009. Cash flow is positive over all five years for positive cash flow, dividend 
paying, mature and large firms, while it is negative for their counterparts firms. 
The level of future expected investment opportunities is much higher for negative 
cash flows, nil dividend paying, quickly growing, young and small firms than it is 
to‎ their‎mature‎ counterparts‎ firms.‎The‎difference‎between‎a‎ firms’‎ groups‎ in‎
terms of cash savings is pretty high, firms with negative cash flows, not paying 
dividends, young and small save much higher (approximately twice as much) 
levels of cash than opposite firms.  On the other hand, groups of small, young, 
negative cash flow and not paying dividend firms are characterized by smaller 
levels of leverage in comparison‎with‎their‎corresponding‎firms’‎groups.‎Around‎
double‎ difference‎ appears‎ also‎ in‎ dividend‎ payout‎ ratio‎ between‎ both‎ firms’‎
groups‎for‎small‎versus‎large‎firms’‎division‎criteria.‎As‎expected‎negative‎cash‎
flow firms hardly pay any dividends. Also negative cash flow and non dividend 
payout firms are smaller and younger. Division of firms according to sales growth 
shows‎ different‎ features‎ in‎ comparison‎ with‎ other‎ division’s‎ measures.‎ The‎
capital expenditures ratio seems to be around same level of 4% for both 
corresponding groups apart from year 2009 when the ratio drops substantially for 
slowly growing firms to 2.7%. The cash flow variable is negative for firms growing 
84 
 
slowly and positive for firms growing quickly during years 2006, 2007 and 2009. 
In 2005 cash flow is positive for both groups, while in 2008 it is negative for both 
groups.‎As‎expected,‎Tobin’s‎Q‎is‎consistently‎higher‎for‎firms‎with‎higher‎sales‎
growth and smaller for firms with lower sales growth. Quickly growing firms have 
higher level of cash holding in each year in comparison to their counterparts 
firms. The ratio of total debt is smaller for firms growing quickly up to the year 
2008. In year 2009 these firms have higher level of leverage in comparison with 
slowly growing firms. This suggests that well growing firms relied more on 
internal finances during booming time but when the financial crisis appeared they 
increased their debt level and decreased their cash savings. Firms with higher 
sales growth pay relatively less dividends than firms with smaller sales growth in 
each year.  
In general, the impact of the financial crisis is most visible in year 2009 
where all financial characteristics are importantly different from years of 
economic growth. Also financially constrained firms are more affected by the 
crisis period than financially unconstrained firms. A meaningful drop in the proxy 
for‎the‎demand‎side‎for‎capital‎is‎well‎presented‎next‎to‎a‎drop‎in‎the‎firms’‎cash‎
flow. Interestingly small firms increased their dividend payout ratio in year 2008, 
while‎large‎firms‎decreased‎it.‎In‎the‎same‎year,‎the‎firms’‎size‎variable‎is‎higher‎
in comparison with previous years suggesting that many small firms could have 
gone out of business due to the financial crisis explosion.  
Overall, the summary statistics demonstrate that the direction of UK listed 
non-financial‎firms’‎behavior has changed critically. Most importantly, mean and 
median of cash flow plummeted drastically, which is to certain extent a result of 
growing number of firms with persistently negative cash flow and increase in the 
number of firms especially small and young. Also the number of listed firms in 
general increased sharply, implying higher use of public equity issues, followed 
by its easier access in recent decades.  
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2.5 Empirical results 
 
This chapter begins by demonstrating the effects of the investment model 
of Equation 1 by using the OLS method. We then look at the GMM regression 
outcomes based on the Equation 2 capturing cash savings and TD. We also 
recheck the association of ICFS by splitting the sample into groups of financial 
constrained and unconstrained firms according to age, size, dividend payout, 
sales growth and cash flow sign.   
 
2.5.1 ICFS over time  
 
Table 2.5 shows the estimation results for the year by year cash flow and 
growth opportunities sensitivity of physical investment based on the OLS 
regression described by Equation 1. Industry dummies are included but are not 
presented. The residuals (errors) are identically and independently distributed. 
The standard errors presented in brackets are heteroskedasticity-consistent and 
clustered at the firm level.  
For the first year of the sample, 1980, the ICFS is 0.253. It is statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level. The economic magnitude is easy to 
interpret: a one-dollar increase in cash flow increases investment by 25.3 cents. 
However, the investment-cash flow sensitivity declines over time, and in 2007 it 
is equal to 0.0156. Interestingly in 2008 ICFS is equal to 0.016 and in 2009 it is 
equal‎ to‎0.0217,‎which‎ implies‎ that‎ firms’‎ ICFS‎ is‎getting‎stronger‎due‎ to‎ the‎
financial crisis. All these estimates are statistically indistinguishable from zero, 
however the proxy controlling for future expected investment opportunities 
becomes statistically insignificant in years 2008 and 2009, indicating that the 
demand for capital is in a bad state in those years. These results are what we 
would have expected from this financial period.    
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Table 2.‎05 Cross-Sectional Regressions by Year 
DV:INV CF 
 
Q 
 
Obs. 
Adj. 
R-sq. 
1980 0.253*** (3.25) 0.022*** (2.69) 203 0.333 
1981 0.235*** (3.10) 0.028*** (2.82) 211 0.397 
1982 0.397*** (4.51) 0.020** (2.39) 222 0.373 
1983 0.508*** (5.38) 0.009 (1.21) 238 0.398 
1984 0.603*** (8.57) 0.002 (0.36) 299 0.413 
1985 0.164** (2.38) 0.021*** (3.38) 342 0.264 
1986 0.159** (2.21) 0.019** (2.55) 365 0.168 
1987 0.398*** (4.68) 0.006 (0.89) 347 0.239 
1988 0.238*** (5.40) 0.026*** (3.80) 327 0.248 
1989 0.264*** (3.01) 0.009 (1.22) 309 0.190 
1990 0.164*** (5.06) 0.012*** (3.06) 866 0.123 
1991 0.152*** (6.67) 0.007* (1.80) 905 0.121 
1992 0.132*** (7.21) 0.004 (1.62) 932 0.151 
1993 0.095*** (7.33) 0.002 (1.19) 997 0.116 
1994 0.094*** (4.61) 0.006*** (2.85) 1046 0.090 
1995 0.111*** (5.57) 0.004** (2.29) 1040 0.093 
1996 0.099*** (5.08) 0.004** (2.38) 1051 0.102 
1997 0.088*** (3.83) 0.004** (2.13) 979 0.087 
1998 0.104*** (7.01) 0.004*** (3.43) 847 0.135 
1999 0.114*** (6.54) 0.001 (0.58) 698 0.112 
2000 0.025* (1.83) 0.002* (1.66) 855 0.040 
2001 0.012* (1.91) 0.003** (2.01) 936 0.057 
2002 0.013** (2.31) 0.002** (2.05) 1026 0.053 
2003 0.019*** (2.95) 0.001 (1.10) 1085 0.037 
2004 0.020** (2.26) 0.002** (2.38) 1084 0.050 
2005 0.026*** (3.27) 0.002** (1.99) 1074 0.067 
2006 0.026*** (3.79) 0.003*** (3.04) 1045 0.064 
2007 0.016* (1.94) 0.003*** (3.06) 929 0.055 
2008 0.016*** (4.00) 0.002 (1.42) 809 0.102 
2009 0.022*** (3.39) 0.001 (0.52) 720 0.078 
p-Value 0.0024   0.0081       
Notes: This table displays results from the year by year investment regressions in 
equation 1. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 2.1. All 
regressions include industry dummies. P-values are for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are the same between the first (1980) and the last (2009) years.  T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to heteroskedasticity 
standard errors.   
 
The estimated investment-cash flow sensitivities for the full sample for 
each year are plotted in Figure 2.2.  
  
87 
 
Figure 2.3 Plots of the ICFS over Time 
 
 
The plot shows that investment-cash flow sensitivities have been 
fluctuating substantially over time especially during the first subperiod and 
smoothed mostly in the last subperiod. Overall ICFS show a declining trend over 
time. 
Table 2.6 shows the investigation of the time series pattern of ICFS by 
running rolling regressions‎of‎investment‎on‎cash‎flow‎and‎Tobin’s‎Q‎from‎1980‎
to 2009 for overlapping periods of ten year according to the model described in 
Equation 1.  
The first regression is for the period 1980-1989, the second for the period 
1981-1990, and so forth. According to this examination there is a clear and 
systematic decrease of the ICFS over time.  The ICFS drops by 93.8% from 
0.281 in the first ten years period to 0.0174 in the last ten years period. 
Furthermore,‎ the‎coefficient‎measuring‎ the‎ impact‎of‎Tobin’s Q on investment 
also declines nearly as systematically as the coefficients of cash flows. 
Specifically‎Tobin’s‎Q’s‎evolution‎starts‎from‎0.016‎for‎the‎first‎period‎and‎end‎
with 0.00194 in the last period, which gives a drop of 87.8 % between these 
periods. All the coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.1% level.    
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Table 2.6 Rolling ICFS by Ten Year Periods 
DV:INV CF   Q   Obs. 
Adj. 
R-sq. 
1980-1989 0.281*** (8.13) 0.016*** (6.10) 2863 0.269 
1981-1990 0.237*** (10.03) 0.015*** (7.24) 3526 0.218 
1982-1991 0.203*** (11.68) 0.014*** (7.49) 4220 0.194 
1983-1992 0.174*** (13.47) 0.012*** (7.54) 4930 0.194 
1984-1993 0.143*** (14.55) 0.009*** (7.19) 5689 0.187 
1985-1994 0.126*** (13.94) 0.008*** (7.19) 6436 0.174 
1986-1995 0.123*** (14.76) 0.007*** (6.79) 7134 0.161 
1987-1996 0.119*** (15.39) 0.005*** (6.44) 7820 0.152 
1988-1997 0.114*** (15.54) 0.005*** (6.21) 8452 0.141 
1989-1998 0.111*** (16.68) 0.004*** (6.59) 8972 0.135 
1990-1999 0.110*** (17.77) 0.004*** (6.35) 9361 0.129 
1991-2000 0.091*** (13.94) 0.004*** (6.63) 9350 0.102 
1992-2001 0.056*** (10.14) 0.004*** (6.93) 9381 0.081 
1993-2002 0.039*** (9.19) 0.003*** (7.53) 9475 0.079 
1994-2003 0.033*** (9.28) 0.003*** (7.38) 9563 0.085 
1995-2004 0.029*** (8.86) 0.003*** (7.39) 9601 0.091 
1996-2005 0.027*** (8.84) 0.003*** (7.19) 9635 0.091 
1997-2006 0.024*** (8.88) 0.002*** (7.12) 9629 0.088 
1998-2007 0.021*** (8.14) 0.002*** (7.03) 9579 0.081 
1999-2008 0.019*** (7.94) 0.002*** (6.13) 9541 0.072 
2000-2009 0.017*** (7.81) 0.002*** (5.72) 9563 0.069 
p-Value 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
   
Notes: This table displays results from the rolling ten year investment regressions in 
equation 1 from 1980 to 2009. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in 
table 2.1. All regressions include time and industry dummies. P-values are for the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are the same between the first (1980–1989) and the last 
(2000–2009) subsample periods. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the 
estimation we use consistent to heteroskedasticity standard errors.   
 
2.5.2 Cross sectional analysis 
 
There is robust literature describing the financial crisis which started in 
July 2007. The substantial losses in subprime loans in 2008 evolved a banking 
crisis which led to a current recession (Barrell et al., 2008). Without doubt this 
financial‎crisis‎ is‎affecting‎every‎firm’s‎ investment‎and‎financial‎decisions,‎and‎
therefore the ICFS is supposedly affected by all changed market conditions but 
also‎ in‎ this‎study‎ ICFS‎ is‎used‎as‎a‎ tool‎ in‎explaining‎ firms’‎behaviour‎during‎
financial crisis and the time before the crisis. If a firm is suffering from the current 
recession, it is possible that this firm experiences significant changes in 
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investment-cash flow sensitivity. In this paper, we examine whether small, 
young, non dividend paying, not well growing and negative cash flow firms 
experience significant change in investment-cash flow sensitivity during the 
current financial crisis, and compare them respectively with the change in 
investment-cash flow sensitivity for large, mature, dividend paying, well growing 
and positive cash flow firms. In all these sample splits firms cannot switch 
between subsamples because these criteria are calculated averages over all 
year observations per firm. This makes the criteria more time independent and 
exogenous in the sense that a longer time period was taken into consideration 
than just two years. Furthermore, 2007 has been excluded from this pre-crisis 
and crisis analysis, because it is well known that firms can not adjust to new 
market conditions as quickly as they would wish because of their previous 
commitments made before the crisis etc., hence 2007 is treated as 
transformation year. This way of thinking finds its support also in the previous 
year by year analysis in table 2.5, where 2007 still shows features of the 
pre-crisis period and the effect of the crisis starts to be visible in year 2008 rather 
than in year 2007 when it actually started. Thus we present the cross sectional 
results for periods 2005-2006 as a pre-crisis period and 2008-2009 as financial 
crisis. Years 2005 and 2006 are chosen on the basis that they are the same time 
length as the available financial crisis time period, but also these years show the 
brightest contrast with years of financial crisis, and this is as expected, because 
from the point of view of cycle moves in the economy, before every economic 
downturn there must be an economic growth. Table 2.7 shows cash flow and 
growth opportunity sensitivity of physical investments based on OLS regression 
in Equation 1 for financial pre-crisis and crisis periods. 
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Table 2.‎07 OLS Estimates of the ICFS over Pre-crisis and Crisis Periods  
DV: INV   CF   Q   Obs. Adj. R-sq. 
Panel A 
       
2005-2006 Full Sample 0.026*** (5.12) 0.002*** (3.69) 2119 0.068 
2008-2009 Full Sample 0.018*** (5.34) 0.002 (1.41) 1529 0.098 
2005-2006 CF<0 -0.001 (-0.01) 0.001 (0.61) 684 0.032 
2005-2006 CF>0 0.172*** (6.66) -0.001 (-0.39) 1435 0.120 
2008-2009 CF<0 0.001 (0.13) -0.001 (-0.14) 431 0.180 
2008-2009 CF>0 0.065*** (3.66) 0.002 (0.93) 1098 0.097 
2005-2006 DIV=0 0.003 (0.53) 0.001 (0.33) 623 0.075 
2005-2006 DIV>0 0.075*** (4.94) 0.003** (2.27) 1496 0.086 
2008-2009 DIV=0 0.006 (1.52) 0.001 (0.31) 434 0.181 
2008-2009 DIV>0 0.049*** (4.52) 0.002 (1.27) 1095 0.086 
Panel B 
       2005-2006 SIZE<50p 0.013** (2.35) 0.001** (2.06) 1060 0.032 
2005-2006 SIZE>50p 0.100*** (5.20) 0.002 (1.08) 1059 0.128 
2008-2009 SIZE<50p 0.011*** (2.78) 0.001 (0.61) 763 0.058 
2008-2009 SIZE>50p 0.036** (2.54) 0.003 (1.06) 766 0.130 
2005-2006 SIZE<25p 0.001 (0.09) 0.001 (0.39) 531 0.009 
2005-2006 25p<SIZE<50p 0.050*** (4.37) 0.004** (2.37) 529 0.092 
2005-2006 50p<SIZE<75p 0.107*** (5.33) 0.003 (1.24) 530 0.122 
2005-2006 SIZE>75p 0.096*** (2.68) 0.001 (0.68) 529 0.172 
2008-2009 SIZE<25p 0.001 (0.26) 0.001 (0.14) 383 0.032 
2008-2009 25p<SIZE<50p 0.032** (2.41) 0.004 (1.43) 380 0.092 
2008-2009 50p<SIZE<75p 0.021* (1.76) 0.006 (1.45) 384 0.136 
2008-2009 SIZE>75p 0.105*** (4.07) -0.004 (-1.30) 382 0.221 
Panel C 
       2005-2006 AGE<50p 0.021*** (3.57) 0.001 (1.46) 1052 0.061 
2005-2006 AGE>50p 0.051*** (4.14) 0.005*** (4.96) 1067 0.108 
2008-2009 AGE<50p 0.012*** (3.22) 0.001 (0.68) 748 0.098 
2008-2009 AGE>50p 0.049*** (4.91) 0.003** (2.06) 781 0.108 
2005-2006 AGE<25p 0.012 (1.54) -0.001 (-0.90) 477 0.003 
2005-2006 25p<AGE<50p 0.036*** (4.24) 0.003*** (2.81) 575 0.130 
2005-2006 50p<AGE<75p 0.041*** (2.69) 0.005*** (4.50) 515 0.105 
2005-2006 AGE>75p 0.072*** (4.62) 0.004*** (3.01) 552 0.117 
2008-2009 AGE<25p 0.012** (2.60) 0.003 (0.97) 361 0.111 
2008-2009 25p<AGE<50p 0.020** (2.17) 0.001 (0.28) 387 0.086 
2008-2009 50p<AGE<75p 0.036*** (2.89) 0.004* (1.88) 374 0.123 
2008-2009 AGE>75p 0.070*** (3.75) 0.002 (0.88) 407 0.118 
Panel D 
       2005-2006 SG<50p 0.028*** (3.30) 0.002** (2.54) 1058 0.060 
2005-2006 SG>50p 0.027*** (4.02) 0.002** (2.42) 1061 0.105 
2008-2009 SG<50p 0.014** (2.55) 0.001 (0.55) 765 0.083 
2008-2009 SG>50p 0.019*** (4.41) 0.002 (1.04) 764 0.120 
2005-2006 SG<25p 0.023*** (3.21) 0.001 (1.51) 530 0.071 
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2005-2006 25p<SG<50p 0.023 (1.08) 0.003 (1.40) 528 0.038 
2005-2006 50p<SG<75p 0.039** (2.36) 0.003** (2.03) 533 0.111 
2005-2006 SG>75p 0.020** (2.56) 0.001 (1.38) 528 0.104 
2008-2009 SG<25p -0.003 (-0.33) -0.001 (-0.51) 381 0.063 
2008-2009 25p<SG<50p 0.036*** (3.03) 0.001 (0.83) 384 0.117 
2008-2009 50p<SG<75p 0.028 (1.60) 0.004 (1.10) 382 0.108 
2008-2009 SG>75p 0.009** (2.21) 0.002 (0.88) 382 0.174 
Notes: This table presents the OLS estimation results of the investment model in equation 1. The 
estimations use pre-determined firms selection into two or four catergories. Constraint category 
assignments employ ex ante criteria based on firm dividend payout, size, age and sales growth.  
Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 2.1. All regressions include 
industry and time dummies. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use 
consistent to heteroskedasticity standard errors.   
 
 
The first two columns of table 2.7 in panel A report the ICFS for the full 
sample during the above mentioned periods, and the next columns show results 
for the following classifications, negative versus positive cash flow firms and 
non-dividend paying and dividend paying firms. We find that both the cash flow 
and‎ Tobin’s‎Q‎ coefficients‎ are‎ statistically‎ significant‎ and‎much‎ higher‎ during‎
financial boom time in comparison with financial crisis period, this is the case for 
both the full sample as well as positive cash flow firms and dividend paying firms, 
while negative cash flow firms and firms not paying dividends show positive 
increase in ICFS during financial crisis period. Moreover, for the period 
2008-2009‎ Tobin’s‎ Q‎ coefficient‎ is‎ not‎ statistically‎ significant.‎ In‎ summary,‎
negative versus positive cash flow classification and non-dividend paying and 
dividend‎paying‎firms’‎classification‎show‎that‎both‎positive‎cash‎flow‎firms‎and‎
dividend paying firms groups have much stronger ICFS relationship during 
financial boom time in comparison with financial crisis period.  
The Panel B shows the results when the sample is firstly divided according 
to‎the‎median‎of‎firms’‎averaged‎size,‎and‎then‎the‎sample‎ is‎categorized‎into‎
four smaller groups according to 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles of a firms’‎
averaged size. When the sample is divided into small and large groups according 
to‎ the‎median‎ of‎ a‎ firms’‎ averaged‎ size,‎ we‎ find‎ that‎ the‎ ICFS‎ is‎ higher‎ and‎
statistically significant for large firms in both periods, while the proxy for future 
expected profitability is significant only for the small firms during financial boom 
time. However, during financial crisis period the ICFS is weaker for both groups, 
below and above size the median. To learn more about constrained and 
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unconstrained firms during boom time and crisis time the sample is divided once 
more and this shows that if the period of economic growth and only large firms 
(above median) are taken into consideration then one can align these results with 
results of FHP (1988), where the smaller firms in the group of large firms have 
higher ICFS than larger firms in the same group of large firms.  The division of the 
full sample during financial crisis into four small groups according to size shows 
opposite results, i.e. it is unconstrained firms (the‎ largest‎ firms‎ in‎ the‎ firms’‎
distribution) which have much higher ICFS than constrained firms, while the 
coefficient‎for‎Tobin’s‎q‎is‎insignificant‎for‎every‎subsample.‎ 
In general, the sample split according to age in panel C shows that ICFS 
grows monotonically with the direction from constrained firms odds to 
unconstrained firms for both subperiods.  In other words, the more mature a firm 
is, the higher the ICFS, this is in line with KZ (1997) argument. However, the 
coefficient for investment growth is statistically significant only in the case of 
economic growth with the exception of one subsample of the most constrained 
firms, while it is completely insignificant during the financial crisis period. Also the 
CFS measure declines over time, in particular its size is consistently smaller 
during financial crisis period in comparison with financial boom period.  
In‎Panel‎D‎the‎firms‎are‎divided‎according‎to‎sales‎growth.‎In‎the‎first‎firms’‎
classification according to the sales growth median, ICFS is higher in the 
subsample of constrained firms and less sensitive for unconstrained firms, while 
coefficients‎for‎Tobin’s‎Q‎are‎significant‎and‎show‎opposite‎strength‎of‎sensitivity‎
during economic growth. However, during economic downturn the opposite is 
observable. When the sample is classified further into more precise subsamples, 
we can observe similar results but with sharper evidence.  
All in all, this cross sectional analysis suggests that firms overinvest during 
economic growth time and during recession time they underinvest.  
 
2.5.3 OLS analysis 
 
This section covers the investigation of ICFS over time. The OLS 
regressions for capital expenditures are reported in table 2.7, these  demonstrate 
the results returned from the estimation of our baseline regression model - 
equation 1 over time based on the three subperiods: 1980-1989, 1990-1999 and 
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2000-2009, where the investment is regressed on cash flow and growth 
opportunities. These results provide additional meaningful evidence which 
supports the decline of ICFS over time. 
 
 Table 2.‎08 OLS Estimates of the ICFS over Time 
DV: INV 2000-2009 1990-1999 1980-1989 
Full Sample 
   
CF 0.017*** 0.110*** 0.281*** 
 
(7.81) (17.77) (8.13) 
    
Q 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.016*** 
 
(5.72) (6.35) (6.10) 
Obs. 9563 9361 2863 
Adj. R-sq. 0.069 0.129 0.269 
Notes: This table presents the OLS estimation results over time of the investment model 
in equation 1. The sample includes all UK firms. Analytical definitions for all the 
variables are provided in table 2.1. All regressions include industry and time dummies. 
T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to 
heteroskedasticity standard errors.   
 
The ICFS together with the proxy for growth opportunities decrease 
systematically and significantly over time. 
 
2.5.4 GMM analysis 
 
The next step of our analysis is to test ICFS in the presence of other 
financial variables according to Equation 2. In the spirit of the existing literature 
on agency costs and corporate performance, the corporate leverage should have 
a negative impact on investment. This follows the attitude that this variable may 
function as an effective corporate governance device and therefore is expected 
to lower agency costs. Corporate governance is about investor protection. The 
better the investors are protected the more likely they will be willing to invest and 
the more possible it is that they will be willing to accept lower return on 
investments, due to the fact that the risk is lower. If corporate governance can 
achieve that, in other word if corporate governance can reduce the expected 
return by investors, it means that it is able to reduce the cost of capital to firms. 
The lower the cost of capital the higher the amount of profitable investment there 
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is.‎Financial‎analysist’s‎employ‎the‎Capital‎Asset‎Pricing‎Model‎(CAPM),‎which‎
estimates the cost of capital that is used in practice and gives the required rate of 
return, which can be interchangeable with the expected rate of return. CAPM 
comes from the relationship between risk and return. Corporate governance has 
implications for the risk incorporated in that model. In other words, the lower the 
risk, the lower the required rate of return, and this is good information for 
everybody. The lower the required rate of return means the lower cost of capital. 
Researchers like McConnell and Servaes (1995) or Harvey et al. (2004) have 
proved that leverage may work as an effective corporate governance device by 
decreasing the agency costs of free cash flow.  
In Table 2.9 we report the outcomes regarding the empirical determinants 
of‎a‎firms’‎investment‎for‎the‎full‎sample‎of‎non-financial firms having a complete 
panel of data. Based on Equation 2, dynamic GMM regressions with cash 
holdings‎and‎debt‎finances‎are‎reported‎in‎table’s‎2.9 and 2.10, 2.11, 2.12 and 
2.13. All financial variables are instrumented with lags dated t-1 and t-2. The 
GMM results in Tables 2.9-2.13 demonstrate that our model captures the 
dynamics‎ in‎ firms’‎ investment‎ decisions.‎ The‎ significant‎ but‎ less‎ than‎ unit‎
coefficients of the lagged dependent variable (LDV) suggests a costly and 
non-instantaneous adjustment process. The GMM estimates show a common 
pattern‎ in‎ the‎adjustment‎speed‎ [θ‎=‎1 - (coefficient of LDV)]. The adjustment 
process is quicker as time goes pass. In other words, the adjustment coefficients 
of the capital expenditures ratio indicate that the UK firms become quicker over 
time at adjusting the investment spending towards their desired level. The faster 
adjustment is made over time by UK firms could be because of the relatively low 
adjustment cost or the cost of being off the target is substantial. Overall, the 
results show that firms attempt to trade-off between the cost of being off-target 
and the cost of adjustment. 
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Table 2.9 GMM Estimates of the ICFS 
DV: INV 2000-2009 1990-1999 1980-1989 
Full Sample 
   L.INV 0.340*** 0.295*** 0.304*** 
 
(10.30) (9.83) (4.05) 
    CF 0.040** 0.019 0.147 
 
(2.22) (0.41) (1.26) 
    Q 0.005** 0.016** 0.013 
 
(2.50) (2.29) (1.18) 
    CASH -0.024 0.011 0.062 
 
(-1.00) (0.31) (0.70) 
    LEV -0.035** -0.056** -0.075 
 
(-2.33) (-2.00) (-0.74) 
Obs. 6799 6893 2093 
Firms 1382 1234 385 
Sargan 0.131 0.042 0.069 
Notes: This table presents the GMM estimation results over time of the investment model 
in equation 2. The sample includes all UK firms. Analytical definitions for all the 
variables are provided in table 2.1. All regressions include time dummies. T-statistic 
values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use asymptotic standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity. We report the Sargan test, which is a test of over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a χ2 under the null of valid instruments.    
 
For all firms in table 2.9, the coefficient of cash flow is very close to zero 
and shows decline over time, though this is not systematic. In the second 
subperiod cash flow coefficient is lower than the cash flow coefficient in the third 
subperiod, however the cash flow coefficient is statistically significant only in the 
last subperiod. The debt issue coefficients are negative, small and in second and 
third subperiods - significant and they show a declining impact of leverage on 
investment‎over‎time.‎Myers‎(1977)‎stated‎“that‎leverage‎could‎have‎a‎negative‎
impact on investment due to an agency problem between shareholders and 
bondholders. If managers act in the interest of shareholders, they can give in 
some‎ positive‎ net‎ present‎ value‎ projects‎ because‎ of‎ debt‎ overhang.”‎
Researchers, such as Jensen (1986), Grossman and Hart (1982), and Stulz 
(1990) also claim a negative relationship between leverage and investment, with 
the exception that their arguments are stated on agency conflicts between 
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managers‎and‎shareholders.‎They‎debate‎“that‎companies‎with‎free‎cash‎flow‎
but low (or no) growth opportunities can never invest (overinvest) in that the 
manager can undertake projects with negative net present value. This sort of 
strategy is costly to the manager, if the capital market considers such possible 
prospective, or there is a takeover of the firm by another firm. Hence managers 
have an incentive to pre-commit and increase leverage and spend cash on 
interest and principal. These approaches imply a negative interaction between 
leverage and investment but only for firms with no or little growth opportunities.”‎
Leverage can be influenced by expected investment opportunities and in the 
above‎ regressions‎ we‎ controlled‎ for‎ this‎ impact‎ by‎ including‎ the‎ Tobin’s‎ Q‎
variable. 
In contrary, cash holdings coefficients are insignificant for all three 
subperiods and the sign changes over time from positive in second and third 
subperiod to negative in the final subperiod. 
 
Table 2.‎010 GMM Estimates of the ICFS if CFSUM>0 
DV: INV 2000-2009 1990-1999 1980-1989 
Full Sample 
   L.INV 0.361*** 0.292*** 0.290*** 
 
(8.91) (9.15) (3.83) 
    CF 0.071** -0.031 0.109 
 
(1.97) (-0.56) (0.93) 
    Q 0.006* 0.020*** 0.015 
 
(1.87) (2.73) (1.53) 
    CASH -0.005 0.010 0.034 
 
(-0.16) (0.30) (0.41) 
    LEV -0.033 -0.061** -0.139 
 
(-0.95) (-2.11) (-1.45) 
Obs. 4854 6259 2082 
Firms 906 1087 382 
Sargan 0.0722 0.0595 0.0779 
Notes: This table presents the GMM estimation results over time of the investment model 
in equation 2. The sample includes only firms with positive cash flow sum over   time. 
Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 2.1. All regressions 
include time dummies. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation 
we use asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We report the Sargan test, 
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which is a test of over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a χ2 under 
the null of valid instruments.    
 
Table 2.10 shows the results for the full sample of firms but only those with 
positive cash flow sum over available firm year observations. These results are 
similar to the results for the full sample in table 2.8, however coefficient for cash 
flow in second subperiod gains negative sign but it is statistically insignificant. 
Also third subsample looses statistical significance‎for‎coefficient‎of‎tobin’s‎q‎and‎
leverage. However leverage shows same direction, namely it has a negative 
effect on the investment expenditures which decrease over time. There is still a 
drop in ICFS between third and first subsamples. All this indicates that overall 
results and particularly the pattern of ICFS over time are not driven mainly by the 
negative cash flow firms.   
 
Table 2.11 GMM Estimates of the ICFS across Small and Large Firms  
DV: INV 2000-2009 2000-2009 1990-1999 1990-1999 1980-1989 1980-1989 
 
Constr. Unconstr. Constr. Unconstr. Constr. Unconstr. 
  Small  Large  Small  Large  Small  Large  
L.INV 0.266*** 0.428*** 0.242*** 0.364*** 0.226** 0.111 
 
(6.65) (9.65) (6.95) (8.90) (2.28) (0.89) 
       CF 0.050** -0.016 0.043 0.015 0.228 0.202 
 
(2.55) (-0.64) (0.92) (0.37) (1.37) (1.28) 
       Q 0.004** 0.002 0.016*** 0.007 0.009 -0.015 
 
(2.21) (0.90) (2.78) (1.48) (0.82) (-0.53) 
       CASH 0.000 0.041 0.020 0.005 0.024 0.116 
 
(0.01) (1.34) (0.38) (0.18) (0.26) (1.28) 
       LEV -0.010 -0.015 -0.036 -0.075** -0.087 0.082 
 
(-0.66) (-0.52) (-1.19) (-2.20) (-0.97) (0.72) 
Obs. 3302 3497 3393 3500 991 1102 
Firms 740 642 641 593 219 166 
Sargan 0.228 0.015 0.234 0.020 0.500 0.310 
Notes: This table presents the GMM estimation results over time of the investment model 
in equation 2. The estimations use pre-determined firms selection into “financially 
constrained” and “financially unconstrained” classes. Constraint category assignments 
employ ex ante criteria based on firm size. The sample includes all UK firms. Analytical 
definitions for all the variables are provided in table 2.1. All regressions include time 
dummies. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient 
is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use asymptotic 
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standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We report the Sargan test, which is a test of 
over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a χ2 under the null of valid 
instruments.    
 
Table 2.11 shows the results for all three of the subsamples after each 
subsample division into two equal subsamples according to the size median. 
Large firms show a more systematic drop in ICFS over time in comparison with 
their counterpart firms, however only the small firms have a statistically significant 
cash‎flow‎coefficient.‎Tobin’s‎Q‎coefficient‎shows‎a‎decline‎between‎the‎second‎
and third subsamples. The cash holdings are insignificant for all subsamples but 
are consistently positive. Moreover their influence on investment consistently 
drops over time for small firms. The total debt coefficients decrease in the 
strength of their negative relationship with capital expenditures with time in terms 
of each subsample.  
Because the full sample which is considered in this study is robustly 
heterogeneous, meaning it covers all UK listed companies from very small ones 
to very large ones, from very negative cash flow firms to very positive cash flow 
firms etc., we decided to divide the firms further, beyond the simple division 
according to the median value. Thus each subsample after the median 
classification is divided again according to the median for each median 
subsample, so that each subsample (e.g. 2000-2009) is split into four equal 
subsamples according to again size, age and sales growth. However we only 
present in table 2.12 the sample division according to size in order to save space. 
For the first subperiod:1980-1989 only the largest firms group shows 
significant coefficient for lagged investment, it is as if only these firms adjust 
investment to their desired one or it is costly for them to be away from their target 
investment. This group also has a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
of cash holdings, suggesting that these largest firms finance their investment 
projects with cash savings. For the very small firms in the same subperiod the 
total debt coefficient is significant at 5% level and has a negative effect on 
investment.  
In the second subperiod: 1990-1999 the cash flow coefficients are positive 
but statistically insignificant in every‎ small‎ subsample.‎ Tobin’s‎Q, however, is 
significant for the three small subsamples apart from very large firms subsample 
and also the influence of Tobin’s‎Q‎on‎investment‎decreases‎as‎the‎size‎of‎firms‎
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grows within the subperiod. This is to be expected, based on the current theory, 
which claims that large firms are not as rich in growth opportunities as small firms 
are. Furthermore, within this subperiod, firms with size above the 25th percentile 
but below the 50th percentile in terms of size measure for the full sample, show 
negative and significant coefficient for total debt.  
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Table 2.12 GMM Estimates of the ICFS across SIZE Measure 
DV: INV L.INV 
 
CF 
 
Q 
 
CASH 
 
LEV 
 
Obs. Firms Sargan 
2000-2009 
             Size<25pct 0.216*** (3.64) 0.006 (0.33) 0.004* (1.70) 0.003 (0.11) 0.022 (0.62) 1610 390 0.036 
25<Size<50pct 0.223*** (4.53) 0.045* (1.93) 0.008** (2.08) 0.011 (0.39) -0.017 (-0.54) 1692 350 0.860 
50<Size<75pct 0.399*** (6.95) -0.011 (-0.66) -0.000 (-0.03) 0.060 (1.61) -0.002 (-0.05) 1734 326 0.044 
Size>75pct 0.452*** (6.99) 0.012 (0.71) 0.004** (2.20) -0.000 (-0.00) -0.063** (-2.16) 1763 316 0.024 
1990-1999 
             Size<25pct 0.243*** (5.48) 0.043 (1.05) 0.016** (2.42) -0.006 (-0.13) 0.032 (0.79) 1687 327 0.271 
25<Size<50pct 0.162*** (3.13) 0.075 (1.09) 0.013* (1.69) 0.018 (0.24) -0.069* (-1.94) 1706 314 0.461 
50<Size<75pct 0.324*** (5.66) 0.034 (0.93) 0.011* (1.86) 0.031 (0.73) -0.04 (-0.87) 1749 301 0.156 
Size>75pct 0.476*** (7.52) 0.038 (0.87) -0.001 (-0.34) -0.004 (-0.10) -0.049 (-1.57) 1751 292 0.157 
1980-1989 
             Size<25pct 0.100 (1.00) 0.119 (0.51) 0.009 (0.45) 0.106 (0.82) -0.303** (-2.42) 482 120 0.660 
25<Size<50pct 0.157 (1.06) 0.088 (0.56) 0.017 (1.40) -0.125 (-1.63) -0.089 (-1.64) 509 99 0.685 
50<Size<75pct 0.015 (0.08) 0.244 (1.55) -0.028 (-1.02) 0.091 (1.29) 0.124 (1.01) 547 85 0.245 
Size>75pct 0.171** (2.04) 0.153 (1.00) -0.003 (-0.19) 0.107* (1.86) -0.012 (-0.25) 555 81 0.626 
Notes: This table presents the GMM estimation results over time of the investment model in equation 2. The estimations use pre-determined firms 
selection into four classes. Constraint category assignments employ ex ante criteria based on firm size. The sample includes all UK firms. Analytical 
definitions for all the variables are provided in table 2.1. All regressions include time dummies. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. 
We report the Sargan test, which is a test of over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a χ2 under the null of valid instruments. 
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In the third subperiod: 2000-2009‎the‎firms’‎speed‎of‎adjustment‎to‎their‎
target investment grows monotonically as the size of firms decreases, meaning 
the smaller the firms are, the faster they adjust their target investment or it is more 
costly for them to stay away from their target investment. Cash flow coefficient is 
positive in three small subsamples within this subperiod, the only negative 
coefficient belongs to firms with size above the 50th percentile and below 75th 
percentile.‎Also‎Tobin’s‎Q‎coefficient‎for‎the‎latter‎small‎group‎ is‎negative‎and‎
insignificant. Very large firms show negative and a significant impact of leverage 
on investment spending. In contrast, the very small firms show positive influence 
of total debt on investment, as if they finance their investment with external debt 
funds,‎which‎is‎quite‎likely‎because‎very‎small‎firms’‎access‎to‎external‎finances‎
such as equity funds can be with a limited access, hence they might be forced to 
rely only on debt and internal finances. 
Overall conclusion from this subsamples splits is that ICFS decreases with 
time and total debt losses its strength in affecting investment expenditures over 
time.  
In the next stage of this analysis we intend to find very constrained and 
very‎unconstrained‎firms‎through‎combining‎classification‎of‎all‎ three‎divisions’‎
measures. Namely, we group firms as constrained ones if their size, age and 
sales growth are below the median for the full sample within certain subperiod or 
if their size, age and sales growth is above the median for the full sample, or if 
their size, age are above and sales growth are below the median for the full 
sample. We group firms as unconstrained firms when their size, age and sales 
growth are above the median of the full sample within a particular subperiod. 
Subsamples sizes drop substantially as expected. The intuition behind this is to 
find certainly constrained firms and unconstrained firms characterised not by one 
category but by a few of them. Therefore constrained firms are small, young and 
quickly or slowly growing firms, they can also be old, mature and slowly growing 
firms, while unconstrained firm are large mature and quickly growing firms. Owing 
to this new way of classifying firms, firms which are contradictive in their features 
with respect to the full sample, (such as e.g. small - old firm), or switching 
between the classes, (such as e.g. if the sample is categorized according to size 
one‎ firm‎might‎ appear‎ in‎ the‎ unconstrained‎ firms’‎ group‎ but‎ if‎ the sample is 
categorized according to age the same firm might appear in the constrained 
firms’‎group),‎are‎dropped.‎Put‎differently,‎ this‎ classification‎makes‎ triple‎ sure‎
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that the firm is financially constrained or unconstrained and it controls for firms 
switching between categories. Thanks to the large sample considered in this 
paper such a classification is feasible. The results of this sample division are 
presented in table 2.13 and they are very intriguing.  
In terms of ICFS first and second subperiods show similar trends while 
third subsample seems to be contradictive, which is in line with the fact that the 
last subsample covers financial crisis which is the most likely cause for opposing 
results. For the first subperiod: 1980-1989 and second subsample: 1990-1999 
ICFS is strongest in the subsample specified as large and mature firms but with 
slow‎pace‎of‎sales‎growth.‎However‎for‎this‎subsample‎Tobin’s‎Q‎coefficients‎are‎
negative and insignificant. This indicates clearly that these firms suffer from 
overinvestment problems. For the same subperiods ICFS is second strongest in 
the subsamples of firms characterized by small, young but with a great pace of 
sales growth. If one compares this subsample with the subsample of truly 
unconstrained firms then one would conclude that these firms are financially 
constrained, but if these firms are compared with firms featured as large, matured 
and slowly growing then the conclusion would be that they are unconstrained. 
Therefore, we have conflicting results and this example shows that it truly 
depends on which firms are compared with which. In other words, if this sample 
of small, young but quickly developing firms are judged by their size and age only 
they would be classed as constrained firms, however because they are growing 
fast, one can argue that they are unconstrained or if they are justified on the basis 
of‎sales‎growth‎ratio‎only,‎then‎they‎would‎be‎grouped‎in‎the‎unconstrained‎firms’‎
class. This demonstrates the need of categorizing firm by more than one 
measure, or more specifically it helps if the measure of classifying firms into 
constrained and unconstrained firms is not only related with asymmetric 
information problems but also with other financial measures. The bottom line 
here is that the more robust sample, and more robust information one considers, 
and more robust measures are applied to the sample the better picture one is 
able‎to‎draw‎about‎firms’‎investment‎and‎financial‎decisions.‎‎ 
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Table 2.‎013 GMM Estimates of the ICFS across SIZE, AGE and SG 
DV: INV   L.INV 
 
CF 
 
Q 
 
CASH 
 
LEV 
 
Obs. Firms Sargan 
2000-2009 
              Constr SIZE,AGE,SG<50p 0.066 (0.92) 0.012 (0.88) 0.000 (0.12) -0.003 (-0.08) 0.010 (0.42) 724 180 0.081 
Constr/Unconstr SIZE,AGE<50p & SG>50p 0.183*** (2.65) 0.027 (1.41) 0.012*** (2.79) -0.069 (-1.56) -0.052 (-0.92) 1344 341 0.257 
Constr SIZE,AGE>50p & SG<50p 0.421*** (7.25) 0.028 (0.77) 0.006 (1.01) 0.067 (1.60) -0.019 (-0.38) 1480 236 0.099 
Uncons SIZE,AGE,SG>50p 0.346*** (3.16) 0.038 (0.75) -0.002 (-0.44) -0.023 (-0.66) -0.099** (-2.23) 917 147 0.687 
1990-1999 
              Constr SIZE,AGE,SG<50p 0.194*** (3.76) -0.016 (-0.32) 0.020* (1.65) 0.083 (0.82) 0.046 (1.02) 734 158 0.508 
Constr/Unconstr SIZE,AGE<50p & SG>50p 0.245*** (3.63) 0.080 (1.27) 0.016* (1.83) 0.051 (0.90) -0.012 (-0.29) 1212 248 0.608 
Constr SIZE,AGE>50p & SG<50p 0.337*** (5.74) 0.105** (2.55) -0.017 (-1.37) 0.013 (0.36) -0.067** (-2.47) 1304 188 0.753 
Uncons SIZE,AGE,SG>50p 0.325*** (3.55) 0.019 (0.24) 0.012 (1.42) -0.075* (-1.95) -0.013 (-0.36) 900 137 0.406 
1980-1989 
              Constr SIZE,AGE,SG<50p -0.094 (-0.58) 0.127 (0.77) 0.055** (2.14) -0.154* (-1.75) 0.000 (0.00) 239 51 0.671 
Constr/Unconstr SIZE,AGE<50p & SG>50p 0.079 (0.84) 0.139 (0.68) 0.001 (0.04) 0.261** (2.37) -0.150 (-1.00) 334 83 0.249 
Constr SIZE,AGE>50p & SG<50p 0.088 (0.55) 0.472* (1.90) -0.005 (-0.22) 0.097 (0.66) -0.018 (-0.29) 413 55 0.186 
Uncons SIZE,AGE,SG>50p 0.066 (0.09) -0.089 (-0.17) 0.018 (0.61) 0.080 (0.50) -0.050 (-0.21) 240 35 0.993 
Notes: This table presents the GMM estimation results over time of the investment model in equation 2. The estimations use pre-determined firms selection into four classes. Constraint 
category assignments employ ex ante criteria based on firm size, age and sales growth. The sample includes all UK firms. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 
2.1. All regressions include time dummies. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the 
estimation we use asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We report the Sargan test, which is a test of over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a χ2 
under the null of valid instruments. 
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The third subperiod: 2000-2009 demonstrates that ICFS is highest for the 
subsample of unconstrained firms, which is in agreement with argument that 
during financial crisis period there is a problem of the availability of external 
finances, hence only those firms are able to amply invest because they reach for 
their internal funds, which is the case in this subsample.  Also for these 
unconstrained firms  the coefficient of total debt is negative and significant, which 
we interpret as the more leveraged firm is, the less it invests, and this suggests 
again a problem with the availability of external finances or higher costs of 
external funds, hence even unconstrained firms will finance their investment 
projects with internal funds. The subperiod covering the financial crisis event 
shows that the ICFS has dropped for mature, large and slowly growing firms in 
comparison with prior subperiods, suggesting that the financial crisis period partly 
limited‎these‎firms’‎abilities‎to‎overinvest. 
Four way split results can be also analysed from a different point of view 
and that is: the first subsample of firms characterised as small, young and slowly 
growing are mostly financially constrained in line with the theory, however, 
deeper investigation of these firms would probably conclude that there is a good 
share of distressed firms among all firms covered by this subsample.  The second 
subsample of firms described as small, young and quickly growing are most likely 
to suffer from asymmetric information problems and hence they will be 
underinvesting. The next subsample made up of large, mature and slowly 
growing firms shows that these firms are most likely to be facing overinvestment 
problem. Finally, the fourth subsample of large, mature and quickly growing firms 
classed as financially unconstrained group of firms is most likely to face 
underinvestment problems due to agency conflicts.   
Table 2.14 reports rolling regressions from 1980 to 2009 for ten year 
overlapping periods estimated with GMM technique in line with the model 
described in Equation 2.  
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Table 2.14 Rolling Regressions for Overlapping Periods 
DV: INV L.INV CF Q CASH LEV Obs. Firms Sargan 
1980-1989 0.304*** 0.147 0.013 0.062 -0.075 2093 385 0.069 
 
(4.04) (1.26) (1.21) (0.70) (-0.74) 
   1981-1990 0.322*** 0.123 0.015** 0.045 -0.123 2349 385 0.075 
 
(5.17) (1.06) (1.96) (0.67) (-1.42) 
   1982-1991 0.371*** 0.104 0.017** 0.086 -0.112* 2605 385 0.115 
 
(6.47) (1.05) (2.25) (1.36) (-1.65) 
   1983-1992 0.349*** 0.144 0.015* 0.035 -0.136** 2213 365 0.166 
 
(5.67) (1.10) (1.94) (0.55) (-2.39) 
   1984-1993 0.276*** -0.053 0.027*** 0.051 -0.089* 3427 944 0.062 
 
(6.44) (-0.67) (3.49) (0.73) (-1.72) 
   1985-1994 0.284*** -0.021 0.017*** -0.002 -0.076* 4043 968 0.112 
 
(8.94) (-0.43) (2.66) (-0.04) (-1.70) 
   1986-1995 0.295*** -0.023 0.020** 0.003 -0.066* 4600 982 0.008 
 
(9.19) (-0.44) (2.20) (0.06) (-1.74) 
   1987-1996 0.298*** 0.002 0.027** 0.002 -0.039 5121 996 4E-04 
 
(8.85) (0.03) (2.07) (0.03) (-1.29) 
   1988-1997 0.299*** -0.040 0.034*** 0.017 -0.066** 5813 1099 0.175 
 
(10.04) (-0.78) (3.06) (0.36) (-2.18) 
   1989-1998 0.298*** -0.004 0.024** 0.025 -0.041 6360 1144 0.032 
 
(10.01) (-0.08) (2.55) (0.61) (-1.51) 
   1990-1999 0.295*** 0.019 0.016** 0.011 -0.056** 6893 1234 0.042 
 
(9.91) (0.41) (2.32) (0.32) (-1.99) 
   1991-2000 0.310*** 0.022 0.017*** 0.048 -0.049* 6414 1180 0.009 
 
(8.10) (0.49) (2.77) (1.32) (-1.74) 
   1992-2001 0.397*** 0.078* 0.007 0.058* -0.017 5953 1129 0.053 
 
(8.82) (1.89) (0.95) (1.77) (-0.57) 
   1993-2002 0.452*** -0.011 0.007* 0.084** -0.033 5489 1051 0.02 
 
(10.37) (-0.23) (1.70) (2.32) (-1.18) 
   1994-2003 0.408*** 0.032 0.005* 0.049* -0.038 5760 1337 0.059 
 
(9.28) (1.50) (1.80) (1.72) (-1.17) 
   1995-2004 0.332*** 0.039* 0.005* 0.022 -0.046 5741 1304 0.133 
 
(9.68) (1.89) (1.73) (0.75) (-1.40) 
   1996-2005 0.316*** 0.038* 0.007** 0.009 -0.065* 5781 1267 0.198 
 
(8.50) (1.87) (2.21) (0.27) (-1.75) 
   1998-2007 0.324*** 0.043** 0.003 -0.008 -0.025 6024 1169 0.487 
 
(9.69) (2.51) (1.14) (-0.28) (-1.37) 
   1999-2008 0.325*** 0.054*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.020 6411 1280 0.144 
 
(9.75) (3.37) (-0.18) (-0.03) (-1.15) 
   2000-2009 0.340*** 0.040** 0.005** -0.024 -0.035** 6799 1382 0.131 
  (10.28) (2.16) (2.17) (-1.01) (-2.38)       
Notes: This table displays the GMM estimation results from the rolling ten year investment 
regressions in equation 2 from 1980 to 2009. The sample includes all UK firms. Analytical 
definitions for all the variables are provided in table 2.1. All regressions include time dummies. 
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T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use asymptotic standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity. We report the Sargan test, which is a test of over-identifying restrictions, 
asymptotically distributed as a χ2 under the null of valid instruments.    
 
Only those results for which both the identification and the 
over-identification criteria are satisfied are reported in bold, and as the 
coefficients are significantly different from 0 the results are in yellow colour. In 
comparison with the OLS results in Table 2.5,‎the‎GMM‎coefficients‎on‎Tobin’s‎Q 
are mostly larger than their OLS counterparts and this is in agreement with 
previous literature (see Erickson and Whited, 2000 or Agca and Mozumdar, 
2008). However, GMM estimators are more unstable because in a number of 
years‎ the‎ coefficients‎ on‎ Tobin’s‎ Q are statistically insignificant. The GMM 
coefficients on cash flow show a different pattern to the OLS estimators. The 
GMM investment-cash flow sensitivities are positive and significant in 10 out of 
21 subperiods at minimum 10% confidence level, positive and insignificant in the 
other 8 subperiods, and negative and insignificant in 3 subperiods.  These results 
show a clear decrease in ICFS over‎ time‎ and‎ coefficients‎ on‎ Tobin’s‎Q‎ also‎
present a declining pattern as times goes on. The cash holdings impact on 
investment is positive for most of the time but it becomes negative in the last 
three subperiods examined. The total debt influence on investment is negative all 
the time and its level is decreasing over time.  
To sum up, the cash flow coefficients in table 2.14 are similar to the OLS 
results presented above. Even though they are insignificant according to the 
GMM model they still decline with time in relation to the physical investment. In 
line with hypothesis 8 of this paper, debt exhibits to be more appealing in the 
physical investment regressions than cash holdings. 
All‎in‎all,‎after‎comparing‎the‎results‎based‎on‎Equation’s‎1‎and‎2‎it‎is‎clear‎
to see that after including cash holdings and debt finances in the model, ICFS 
becomes a little bit sharper in their drop, namely in the OLS regression without 
other financial variables cash flow coefficients falls from 0.281 in the first period to 
0.11 in the second period (60% drop), while in the GMM regression with other 
financial variable the cash flow coefficient decreases relatively from 0.147 to 
0.0187 (87%). 
After splitting the sample into different categories according to various 
measures, ICFS still shows the same pattern, no matter which classification 
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category we refer to,‎it‎is‎declining‎over‎the‎time.‎For‎all‎firms’‎groups,‎total‎debt‎
becomes less regularly and less negative in relation to the physical investment as 
time‎goes‎by.‎For‎positive‎cash‎ flow‎ firms’‎ the‎group‎ leverage‎coefficients‎ fall‎
down over time from -0.139 in the first period to -0.0334 in the last period. The 
sensitivity of investment to cash flow reduces as size and age increases. We 
interpret this finding as further evidence that the asymmetric information conflicts 
have an impact on investment-cash flow sensitivities because larger and older 
firms are more established and known in the market therefore the external 
finance becomes cheaper for them. Small firms are generally associated with 
greater information asymmetries. 
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2.6 Robustness 
 
The results in the previous chapter are robust to an alternative estimation 
procedure, namely we run fixed effects regressions based on both equations 1 
and 2. The results from these regressions are similar to the previous ones.  
As it has been broadly discusses in the literature, Q may not be a good 
enough control for investment opportunities because of its measurement 
problems, and hence other financial variables may proxy for investment demand 
(e.g. Erickson and Whited (2000)). However, for robustness purposes we have 
run‎ regression‎ with‎ sales‎ growth‎ instead‎ of‎ Tobin’s‎ Q‎ in‎ the‎ model‎ and‎ the‎
pattern of ICFS was similar.  Therefore issues with Q cannot properly explain why 
the ICFS decreases so substantially for physical investment over the time.  In the 
same way, measurements problems in Q are not able to explain the differences 
in the role of financial variables across physical investment. BP (2009) approach 
this with the possibility that Q started to be a better control for investment demand 
during their period of study, which they consider in theory as the reason for a 
decline in the ICFS.  They also write that they actually have run their regressions 
without Q and they still were coming up with the same pattern of ICFS falling 
down over the time, which implies that their findings are not affected by a 
reduction in measurement error related with Q.   Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) 
introduce contractual obligations to new investment projects as a helping proxy 
for information about investment demand. They discover that after incorporating 
this variable alongside Q in a typical ICFS regression, the cash flow coefficients 
decline for large firms, but nothing new happens with the cash flow coefficients 
for small firms, which supports the argument that the significance of cash flow in 
terms of small firms appears to be because of financing imperfections.   
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2.7 Conclusions 
 
The corporate finance literature covers very exciting as well as very 
important debates on financing constraints and investment–cash flow sensitivity. 
FHP (1988) initiated first the argument backed up by the empirical evidence that 
in the presence of capital market imperfections, firms facing a higher wedge 
between internal and external funds should be more severely affected by 
underinvestment problems when experiencing negative shocks to internal cash. 
Hence, more constrained firms should show higher investment–cash flow 
sensitivity. An ample amount of empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis 
has been provided by many subsequent papers of different authors. However, KZ 
(1997) and Cleary (1999) introduced new evidence showing the opposite – the 
least constrained firms exhibit higher investment–cash flow sensitivity. Our 
analysis provides a partial explanation for this puzzle by taking into account a 
very heterogeneous sample of firms over a thirty year period and showing that 
the FHP or KZ/Cleary results may appear depending on the sample selection in 
terms of the types of firms accepted in the sample as well as time period the 
sample originates from. The first applies to the problem of data mining, e.g. most 
of the evidence provided to support the FHP hypothesis is built on a very large 
firms’‎sample,‎and‎therefore‎this‎may‎lead‎to‎a‎very‎quick‎and‎easy‎explanation‎
when the phenomenon is actually more complex. The contradictive evidence 
provided by KZ is explained in detailed by work of Allayannis and Mozumdar 
(2004) who state that KZ/Cleary results are largely due to firms in distress as 
proxied by negative cash flow observations. Additionally, their tests suggest that 
KZ_s results are also affected by a few influential observations in a small sample. 
When such observations are excluded from their sample, the estimated 
sensitivities for financially constrained firms are much higher and overall results 
much closer to those in earlier papers. 
The evidence provided in this paper shows that whether the ICFS is higher 
for constrained or unconstrained firm purely depends on:  
1) Sample selection, e.g. if one includes small or large firms only, only 
positive‎cash‎flow‎firms,‎only‎firms‎with‎total‎debt‎ratio‎below‎1,‎with‎Tobin’s‎Q‎
below 10 or with total assets below 10mln or with only positive sales growth and 
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so on. That sort of criteria function practically in the literature, where some called 
this “data‎mining”‎or‎“cutting‎corners”‎ 
2) Which subsamples are compared with which subsamples of firms, 
which classification criteria is employed for the comparison, because various 
firms have various features, e.g. if a firm is old it does not necessarily means it is 
large or the other way round, therefore firms switching between subsamples may 
affect the results 
3) Time period of the sample, whether the sample covers economic 
growth or economic downturn 
4) Industry or country selection, different industries have different 
financial characteristics, different countries have different financial systems 
differently affecting firms financial and investment decisions and so on.  
In this paper we used various empirical models and measures to test how 
different determinants of firms influence their investment policy over a thirty year 
time period. Therefore this paper extends earlier empirical analyses on the 
relationship between investment and other variables in a few important 
dimensions. Employing a panel of UK publicly traded non-financial firms between 
1980 and 2009, we investigate the changes of ICFS over very long period of time, 
we also test whether financing concerns influence firm investment decisions. By 
examining the role of cash flows and growth opportunities in determining 
investment in perfect and imperfect market, we are also able to underline the 
importance of these characteristics, which has been explored partially in the 
literature. It seems that cash flow of firms can be used sufficiently for hedging 
purposes in cases of fluctuations in financial constraints, which limits the ability of 
firms to undertake profitable investment opportunities. 
The obvious conclusion stemming clearly from these results is that the 
ICFS for physical investment has declined sharply over the time, regardless from 
controlling for negative cash flow firms, the role of cash holdings and debt 
financing or splitting sample to two or four contrasting groups according to 
various measures like age, size, sales growth or dividend payments, and that this 
decline cannot be explained on the basis of measurement error alone. The 
results of this paper also reveal an increase in the proportion of small, young and 
negative cash flow firms.  
The closer investigation of cash holdings in recent decades shows that 
their overall role in the ICFS is‎ insignificant,‎with‎ the‎exception‎of‎small‎ firms’‎
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subsamples. Whereas the role of leverage is not as substantial as it used to be, 
its negative impact decreases with time.  
The investigation of financial crisis time versus financial boom period 
provides additional evidence to support the FHP arguments. During periods of 
financial crisis firms face higher costs or shortage of external funds, in other 
words, the financial constraints that firms face, are more severe than before, 
therefore the only way for firms to invest is to employ internal funds if these are 
available and that is what we can find from studying the results of this paper. 
During the financial crisis period the ICFS becomes highest for unconstrained 
firms in contrast with the financial boom time when constrained firms show higher 
ICFS.  
Of course, the outcomes recorded in this work are grounded on the study 
of companies from only one country. More research will be needed to further 
investigate the role of different characteristics in determining corporate 
investment. Particularly we feel that Corporate Governance should become a 
more relevant issue in the financial world. Although there has been a great chunk 
of research that shows that there are indeed effective corporate governance tools 
to reduce the expected agency costs, we know little as to how these governance 
mechanisms interact with each other. Hence there is still a gap in the literature 
regarding the exact nature of the relationship between alternative corporate 
governance‎mechanisms‎and‎ their‎ role‎ in‎ determining‎ the‎ firm’s‎ financial‎ and‎
investment decisions, especially over long period of time. There is an area for 
future study on what the research on Corporate Governance has to offer 
investors, and recommends the incorporation of Corporate Governance issues 
and their implications for corporate financial management. The extent to which 
financial and investment decisions influence corporate performance needs to be 
analyzed. 
All in all the analysis in this paper demonstrates that the cash flow 
coefficient on investment is decreasing with time. We conclude that firms during 
financial crisis decrease significantly their investment and start to save cash by 
increasing their cash holdings.   
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Corporate research and development (R&D hereafter) spending has 
increased prominently in the last few decades (see, e.g., Brown and Petersen, 
2009).‎ The‎ emergence‎ of‎ ‘‘high‎ technology’’‎ industries‎ such‎ as‎ software‎ and‎
biotechnology as well as the raising importance of innovation to non high-tech 
industries has fuelled such growth. The goal of raising R&D expenses is to 
increase firm-level innovation and ultimately firm value. Science and Engineering 
Indicators (2010) assert that the world's R&D expenditures have been on an 
11-year doubling path, growing faster than total global economic output. This 
indicator of commitment to innovation went from an estimated $525 billion in 
1996 to approximately $1.1 trillion in 2007. The steady and large upward trend 
illustrates the rapidly growing global focus on innovation. Furthermore, according 
to the Battelle-R&D Magazine (2011) global R&D spending is expected to 
increase by 3.6 percent in 2011 to $1.2 trillion.  
Economists and policy makers have stressed the central role of R&D 
activities in driving long-term economic growth. Schumpeter (1942) is one of the 
first economists to emphasize high place of innovations and knowledge 
accumulation in determining the long run growth. By defending the monopoly 
power of large corporations, which are able to finance uncertain innovative 
projects with their past profits, Schumpeter (1942) indirectly refers to the validity 
of internal finance for innovation. From then onwards the importance of financial 
factors‎ for‎ firms’‎ investment‎ decisions‎ has‎ been‎ extensively‎ discussed‎ (see‎
Hubbard (1998), Hall (2002) for a review). Also, the impact of the financial system 
on economic growth has been acknowledged by the literature for a long time 
(Levine 2002).  
There is a large literature concerning the characteristics determining the 
level of investment in general. In addition to market demand, the centre of 
attention is usually on the financial sources for the investment and specifically the 
use of internal funding (retained earnings or cash flow). Typically the studies find 
a correlation between capital investment and the availability of internal funds 
(Hubbard 1998). The theoretical explanation for this relation is largely based on 
information asymmetries between firms and external financiers. Hence, these 
information asymmetries attribute to market imperfections, namely financial 
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constraints.‎ Firms’‎ activities‎ are‎ financially‎ constrained‎ if‎ internal‎ finance‎ is‎
deficient and external finance is either relatively costly, carrying an external 
finance premium, or rationed. Both, agency conflicts and adverse selection 
problems are relevant (Von Kalckreuth, 2006). 
Two strands appeared in the literature in terms of the severity of financing 
constraints’‎ influence‎on‎R&D investment versus physical investment. On one 
hand, it has been argued by many researchers that financing constraints are 
more relevant to R&D than to capital expenditures. Since the theoretical 
explanations for a found correlation between investment in physical capital and 
the availability of internal funds (Hubbard 1998) is largely based on information 
asymmetries between the providers of capital and firm owners or managers, the 
linkage has been assumed to be even more pronounced for R&D investments 
than for physical investments because R&D investment is more risky than 
investments in fixed assets. Additionally, it is also more difficult to collateralize. 
This is also what the empirical literature on the determinants of R&D investments 
(surveyed by Hall 2002) concludes. Debt poorly substitute internal finances in 
case of R&D investment due to lack or limited collateral ability of R&D projects to 
secure‎firm’s‎borrowing,‎great‎rate‎of‎risk‎featuring‎innovative‎activities‎as‎well‎as‎
the complications in estimating the expected future prospects of R&D investment. 
All this is even more manifested in terms of companies described as e.g. small or 
young, because they are more like to encounter credit constraints due to their 
“informational‎ opacity”‎ in‎ comparison‎ with their counterparts firms, large or 
mature, which can deliver detailed financial information or in the latter instance 
they are already well known to the market. 
Debt is not a popular source of funding for R&D. Instead R&D investment 
is sensitive to cash flow variations and this sensitivity is often greater in market 
based economies (e.g. US) than in bank based economies (e.g. France, Japan) 
(Mairesse et al.,1999). This is ascribed to that the information asymmetries are 
smaller when firms and banks have trustful and long standing relations. Carreira 
and Silva (2010) states that compared with physical capital, R&D investments 
face more severe financial constraints. Binz and Czarnitzki (2008) find that the 
availability of internal funds is more decisive for R&D investment than for capital 
investment. They assert that R&D is harder to finance through external resources 
in the first place, which is reflected by the higher sensitivity of R&D to internal 
financial‎resources.‎Binz‎and‎Czarnitzki’s‎(2008)‎results show that the observed 
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reaction of R&D to financial constraints is lower than for capital investment, which 
they explain on the basis of argument existing in the literature for a long time that 
adjusting R&D is more costly than capital investment, which implies that the firms 
try to smooth R&D spending over time. Furthermore, prior work on R&D 
investment identifies that R&D investment has high adjustment costs because in 
a great part it consists of wage payments to highly skilled technology workers. 
The change of staff working on R&D projects can be very costly due to very large 
hiring and training costs as well as the problem of unwanted dissemination of 
proprietary information on innovation efforts. Therefore it is costly for firms to 
adjust the flow of R&D investment in response to temporary changes in the 
availability of finance (Brown and Petersen, 2011). 
Studies by Fazzari et al., (1988), Hsiao and Tahmiscioglu (1997) and 
Aghion et al., (2004), demonstrate that firms with a high level of investment in 
physical capital face more financial constraints, and that these constraints affect 
their ability to invest in R&D. Pindado et al. (2010) find that capital-intensive firms 
face greater financial constraints, and as a result, the market valuation of their 
R&D projects is lower. Capital intensity also has a negative effect on the 
relationship between firm value and R&D spending due to the greater financial 
constraints faced by capital-intensive firms. Overall, the sensitivity of R&D 
investments to cash flow is often seen as a sign of that firms are financially 
constrained due to financial market imperfections. Himmelberg and Petersen 
(1994) find that small high-tech firms are particularly vulnerable to such 
imperfections. This suggests a possible underinvestment in R&D and that 
research opportunities as a result may not be fully exploited. 
On the other hand, Bond et al., (1999) find significant differences between 
the cash flow influences on R&D and investment for large manufacturing firms in 
the United Kingdom and Germany. German firms in their sample are insensitive 
to cash flow shocks, whereas the investment of UK firms not conducting R&D 
investment does respond. They conclude that financial constraints are important 
for British firms, but that those which do R&D are a self-selected group that faces 
fewer constraints. Studies by Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) or Cincera (2003) 
imply that, given the existence of very high adjustment costs for innovation 
investment in the sense that a large part of R&D expenditure is wages for highly 
qualified staff that cannot be hired or fired fast, firms will engage in R&D activities 
only if they do not expect to be seriously affected by credit constraints. Bond et al. 
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(2003) do not find cash flow sensitivity for R&D investments either in the UK or in 
Germany. They argue that innovative firms are not likely to face financial 
constraints‎as‎they‎are‎“deep‎pocket”‎firms,‎i.e.‎they‎engage‎in‎innovation‎activity‎
when they have plenty of internal financial resources to do so.  
The main research question of this study is how capital market 
imperfections affect firms with respect to their R&D investment decisions. There 
are at least three reasons why R&D investment is particularly likely to be 
influenced by capital market imperfections. Firstly, the returns to R&D investment 
are skewed (see Harhoff et al. (1999)) and greatly uncertain, partly because R&D 
projects have a low probability of financial success. Mansfield et al. (1977) finds a 
probability of financial success for R&D projects of only 27%. Secondly, serious 
asymmetric information problem is likely to exist between firms and potential 
investors. Thirdly, limited collateral value of R&D investment can importantly 
magnify the capital market imperfections.  
The present study also aims to contribute to the theoretical discussion 
about determinants of R&D activity, by investigating the R&D investments of the 
US and UK firms from 1990 until 2010. The motivation for the study is that there 
are several factors that may potentially counteract the theoretical expectation of 
cash flow sensitivity. The US and UK economies are classified as a market based 
systems according to a ranking made by La Porta et al. (1998) or Levine (2002) 
and that would point towards more sensitivity of cash flow. However, the literature 
also recognizes a very sharp rise in the proportion of negative cash flow 
observations (see e.g., Brown and Petersen, 2009) and that would point towards 
negative cash flow sensitivity. Also, the tax systems of US16 and UK17 exhibit 
some peculiarities that are different between the two countries and that are 
                                            
16
 The‎important‎issue‎related‎with‎firms’‎R&D‎investment decisions is an accounting treatment of 
R&D expenses, such as the R&D tax allowances, subsidies or tax credits. US government treats 
the expenditures of R&D as capital expenses, which can be deducted as current business 
expenses. (See IRS.gov at 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/industries/article/0,,id=100123,00.html) 
17
 UK has two schemes for claiming R&D relief, depending on the size of the company or 
organization, that is the Small or Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) and the Large Company 
Scheme. From 1 August 2008, the tax relief on allowable R&D costs is 175 (150 beforehand) per 
cent for the SME and 130 (125 beforehand) per cent for the Large firms. SME scheme includes 
also payable credit of up to £24 for every £100 of qualifying expenditure on R&D to 31 July 2008 
and of up to £24.50 for every £100 thereafter, while large company scheme has no payable credit. 
Both schemes also cover details about subcontractors, employee costs, staff providers, materials, 
payments to clinical trials volunteers, utilities, software, subcontracted R&D expenditure and 
capital expenditures. SME scheme also covers particulars about subsidies and grants. (See HM 
Revenue and Customs, 2011 at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/ct/forms-rates/claims/randd.htm) 
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different from many other countries. There are a number of ways to make 
allocations for future investments that would lower the tax rate. Such allocations 
and their subsequent use for investments would lower the immediate sensitivity 
to cash flow. These contingencies call for a closer investigation of determinants 
of R&D expenditures in the US and UK contexts.  
This paper provides additional empirical evidence on the role of financial 
factors‎in‎company‎R&D‎investment‎decisions‎for‎US‎firms’‎sample‎and‎UK‎firms’‎
sample. Detailed analysis of the impact of cash flows on R&D investment over 
time by using different measures of cash flows and different time aspects are 
presented as well. This investigation directly examines the stability of R&D 
investment-cash flow sensitivity over time. Hence, year by year estimations are 
presented. For comparison reason, detailed analysis of the impact of cash flows 
on physical investment over time is demonstrated too. Moreover, this study 
explores, at micro-level over 21 years period of time, behavior of firms involved in 
investing in R&D projects. Thus, roles of cash flows, cash reserves, net debt and 
net stock issues in determining corporate R&D investment expenditures are 
investigated over two subperiods: 1990-1999 and 2000-2010. Implicitly, 
characteristics of firms, intensively investing in R&D activities versus firms weakly 
maintaining R&D investments, are analyzed. More specifically, firms are divided 
according to an average‎R&D‎investment‎intensity‎measured‎with‎firm’s‎average‎
over time ratio of R&D expense over total assets (small versus high R&D 
intensity). Additionally, firms are also divided according to the industry they 
belong to (high-tech versus non high-tech industry). 
There are only two papers presenting the changes of R&D 
investment-cash flow sensitivity over time, Brown and Petersen (2009) and Chen 
and Chen (2012) based on US firms sample. Brown and Petersen (2009) find that 
the physical investment-cash flow sensitivity has declined and largely 
disappeared but if R&D is included as investment, then the investment-cash flow 
sensitivity is still strong, particularly for firms with positive cash flows. Chen and 
Chen (2012) demonstrate that during the recent credit crunch, the R&D-cash flow 
sensitivity is near zero or negative, even for firms with positive cash flows. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, this study looks not only at year by year R&D 
investment-cash flow sensitivities over time‎but‎also‎R&D‎positive‎firms’‎capital‎
expenditures-cash flow sensitivities. Brown and Petersen (2009) reports changes 
of ICFS over time separately for R&D firms sample and capital expenditures firms 
118 
 
sample, hence their R&D firms sample is smaller in size, in comparison with 
capital expenditures sample. This analysis considers same sample size for R&D 
and physical investments, thus it presents directly how positive R&D firms invest 
in capital expenditures. This allows consistent discovery of positive R&D firms’‎
behavior in details. Additionally all analyses are also controlled for negative cash 
flow firms. 
Contrary to prior studies (estimating R&D investment cash flow sensitivity 
over time) that take into account the US firms this work delivers evidence for both 
the UK and US markets. To‎author’s‎knowledge,‎there‎ is‎no‎study‎of‎ the‎R&D‎
investment-cash flow relationship through time or study of the physical– cash 
flow relationship over time based on the UK listed firms. Although, UK and US 
both have market-based financial systems they do differ, therefore setting them 
together for a comparison should show interesting results. The US and UK are 
often described as Anglo-Saxon countries with respect to ownership structures of 
companies and institutional and legal framework. Despite the fact that the UK and 
the‎US‎are‎seen‎as‎functioning‎according‎to‎a‎similar‎“common‎law”‎regulatory‎
system (La Porta et.al., 1998)18, the UK market is substantially different in certain 
points.‎ For‎ example‎ the‎ weak‎ role‎ of‎ directors’‎ boards and institutions in 
mitigating agency problems in the UK have been empirically found by 
researchers such as Faccio and Lasfer (2000), Goergen and Rennebog (2001), 
Franks et al. (2001) or Short and Keasey (1999). There are distinct corporate 
features between the US and the UK, which may have important implications with 
regard to the R&D investment behavior of firms. For instance, as average yearly 
plots in section 5 suggest the UK total investment composition, defined as a sum 
of physical and R&D investments, changes in favour of R&D investment 10 years 
after the US firms. Guarglia (2009) argues that the relatively small amount of 
venture capital financing, the relative lack of corporate bond and commercial 
paper markets, and the relative thinness and highly regulated banking and equity 
markets, seem to make the idea of financing constraints that affect firm behavior 
much more plausible to European researchers than to the US ones. Therefore, 
this work adds to the debate on the effects of financial constraints on R&D 
                                            
18
 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998) describe for 49 countries the level of 
shareholder-rights protection. On a scale from zero (no protection) to six (high protection), UK and 
US firms receive a score of five. For purpose of a comparison with other continental-European 
countries, France, Germany or the Netherlands get low scores for shareholder protection (three, 
one and two, respectively). 
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investment over time, with a focus on the UK and the US rather than just the US. 
This is a valid issue because the controversy about how to interpret the R&D 
investment cash flow sensitivity is much less developed in the UK than it has 
been in the US. 
Furthermore, this paper contributes to the literature on R&D investment 
decisions of firms on few more grounds. Firstly, with respect to the main research 
question set above, features of financially constrained and unconstrained firms 
are presented in effect of various sample divisions. Following Fazzari et al., 
(1988), this work employs a comparative approach between classes of firms.19 
Therefore, two samples of UK and US firms considered in this paper are divided 
according to measures of firm age (young versus mature) and dividend payout 
ratio (low or none versus high dividend), which proxy for financial constraints. 
Secondly, the impact of R&D investment variability on the R&D investment 
cash flow sensitivity is examined over time in this paper. Samples are divided 
according‎to‎firm’s‎average‎R&D‎investment‎variability‎over‎time,‎measured‎with‎
the average standard‎deviation‎of‎firm’s‎R&D‎expenditure‎over‎time‎(small‎versus‎
high R&D expenses variability). This factor can play an important role for 
investment decision-making of corporations during the period when firms suffer 
from serious financial fragility. R&D investment variability assesses how the firm 
manages its R&D function over time. R&D expenditure variability is a measure of 
the fluctuation in firm level R&D spending over time. A firm with relatively low 
R&D spending variability invests about the same amount on R&D each time 
period and its R&D investment is relatively stable over time, while a firm with 
relatively high R&D spending variability changes its R&D expenditure frequently 
and substantially over time and its R&D investment is fluctuating over time. The 
main objective of this analysis is to show that R&D investment variability is an 
indication of effective governance of the research and development process and 
effective corporate finance management. In order to support and continue good 
progress on innovations, firms may preserve discretionary funds in the form of 
organizational slack (Bourgeois, 1981) so that they are able to fund immediately 
                                            
19
 Since the work of Fazzari et al. (1988) the methodology of sample-splitting has been broadly 
adopted in the literature on financing constraints and investment, despite the criticism produced 
by Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and their followers. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) assumes that all 
firms face binding financial constraints and they supply a counter-example in which a firm that 
faces greater financial constraints (much higher costs of external finance in comparison with 
internal funds) could have a lower sensitivity of investment to internal finance. However, also see 
the response in Fazzari et al., (2000). 
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promising opportunities as soon as they are discovered. The form of 
organizational slack can be generating cash holdings or decreasing debt ratio 
(Bourgeois and Singh, 1983; Bromiley, 1991). 
The next contribution lies in the dynamic analysis of the R&D investment 
decision. In this context the approach this work takes is that market imperfections 
such as adjustment and transaction costs may prevent firms from rapidly 
adapting to their desired target R&D investment. A partial target-adjustment 
model that allows for the possibility of delays in response of firms in adjusting 
their R&D expenses is employed. Specifically, to formally investigate the 
behaviour of R&D firms, a dynamic R&D regression is examined that includes 
cash‎flow,‎Tobin’s‎Q,‎firm‎size,‎cash‎holdings,‎stock‎issues‎and‎debt‎issues.‎By‎
including in one regression cash flow and cash holding, which represent internal 
finances sources, and stock and debt issues, which represent external finances 
sources, this research will be able to answer another question, that is which 
finances are more important for R&D firms. R&D investment regression is 
estimated with‎ a‎ “system”‎ GMM‎ estimator‎ that‎ accounts‎ for‎ unobserved‎
firm-specific effects and controls for the potential endogeneity of all financial and 
non-financial (e.g. size) variables.  GMM in this study estimate dynamic R&D 
models that include measures of internal and external finance in order to explore 
the importance of cash savings, public equity finance and long term debts finance 
for R&D investment. As pointed out by Brown and Petersen (2010) a large 
literature investigates the link between internal finance and physical investment, 
but comparatively few studies consider R&D and even fewer evaluate the role of 
external finance. For comparison reason, also OLS estimates are reported for 
basic and augmented models. 
Fourthly, this research examines the relationship between finance and 
R&D over time covering financial crisis period for panels of US and UK listed 
firms. All‎the‎samples’‎splits‎stated‎above‎are‎performed‎for‎various‎subperiods in 
order to observe the changes of firm behaviour over time and over financial crisis 
period. The following subperiods are created: 1990-1999, 2000-2010, 2000-2007 
and 2008-2010, where the last two: respectively, pre-crisis and crisis periods, are 
specifically created for the purpose of examining the financial crisis period. In 
other words, this‎study‎detects‎financially‎constrained‎and‎unconstrained‎firms’‎
behavior before the financial crisis: 2000-2007 and during the financial crisis: 
2008-2010. Parsimonious evidence of the financial crisis event should be 
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included in year by year analysis. However, the deeper analysis is needed to 
draw any meaningful results. Therefore, the OLS technique is applied to the 
model. The OLS technique applied in this chapter still attempts to control for 
potential endogeneity by lagging the regressors one period. GMM technique is 
not suitable here because of its requirement of minimum 4 consecutive firm year 
observations. Therefore the financial crisis dummy is created which takes value 
of 1 for years 2008 to 2010 and value of 0 for years 2000 to 2007 in the second 
subperiod of US and UK samples. The interaction term between cash flow and 
financial crisis dummy is included in the R&D investment in order to examine the 
effect of financial crisis on the sensitivity of R&D investment to fluctuations in 
cash flow.  
The main finding of this paper is the persistently negative relationship 
between cash flow and R&D investment. Empirical literature on financial 
constraints finds that, holding investment demand fixed, investment is sensitive 
to changes in internal funds, and that this sensitivity is stronger for more 
financially constrained firms (Fazzari et al., 1988). In other words, this negative 
relationship can be explained with financial constraints theory where more 
constrained firms suffer from more costly external finances and the lack of 
external funds when they are required. Therefore, given the presence of financial 
markets imperfections, firms with negative profits may struggle to get loans, 
whereas firms with positive profits may not, hence the latter may expand even 
more. 
The negative ICFS found in this paper is almost independent from the 
measure of cash flow or from dropping or including the negative cash flow firm 
year observations or firms whose sum of cash flow-to-assets ratio over the 
sample period is negative in the sample. This negative association between R&D 
investment and cash flow is much stronger for financially constrained firms, which 
may indicate that these firms finance their R&D projects with other available 
funds. Counterparts firms also show negative relationship between R&D 
investment and cash flow, however their R&D investment-cash flow sensitivity is 
much weaker and most of the time insignificant, suggesting that these firms are 
more likely to employ cash flow in the process of‎financing‎firms’‎innovations,‎or‎
the alternative understanding, is that they do not require as much financing of 
R&D because they invest relatively less in R&D projects. Similar trend is found for 
net stock issues coefficients, but on the smaller scale. This is in agreement with 
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study of Brown and Petersen (2009) who stresses the rising importance of public 
equity as a source of funds for the time period 1970-2006, particularly for firms 
with persistent negative cash flows. 
As‎expected,‎Tobin’s‎Q‎– proxy for growth opportunities, appears to play a 
significant role in explaining R&D investment, with a greater economic coefficient 
for constrained firms defined by classification measure related with asymmetric 
information conflicts, such as age, but smaller coefficient for firms defined as 
fixed R&D investment than firms defined as cutting edge R&D investment, both 
measured‎ by‎ firm’s‎ average‎ R&D‎ standard‎ deviation‎ over‎ firm’s‎ years‎
observations. This is in line with common belief that financially constrained firms 
have higher growth opportunities in comparison with unconstrained firms. For the 
full sample of US and UK firms between 1990-1999 and 2000-2010, we discover 
a strong positive and most of the time significant link between cash holdings and 
R&D, but in most cases insignificant and negative or positive link between 
external finance and R&D and between size and R&D investment. The positive 
and significant coefficient on cash holdings is greater for so called financially 
constrained firms than for their corresponding firms. All this suggest that 
financially constrained R&D firms save up cash stock out of cash flow innovations 
or stock issues in order to finance their R&D investment, while unconstrained 
R&D‎firms’‎behaviour‎is‎indeterminate.‎This‎finding‎is‎in line with study of Brown 
and Petersen (2011) who find that firms most likely to face financing frictions rely 
extensively on cash holdings to smooth R&D, while firms less likely to face 
financing frictions appear to smooth R&D without the use of costly cash holdings.  
When financial crisis period is considered the ICFS is still even more 
negative and significant, whereas cash holdings coefficients are more positive 
and significant according to the OLS regression. In line with GMM results cash 
holding of the‎full‎sample‎of‎US‎firms’‎impact‎R&D‎investment‎negatively‎during‎
the crisis.  
In terms of comparison the US firms with the UK firms we learn that the 
coefficients for the UK firms are much greater than for the US firms, implying 
stronger dependence of R&D investment on financial variables in the UK than in 
the US market.  
The robust estimated results highlight that the negative dependence of 
investment on internal sources cannot be fully attributed to the persistently 
negative cash flow firms. It appears again that firm cash holdings exerts a 
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significant impact on the availability of financial sources to be channeled into 
R&D investment for negative and positive cash flow firms.  
This‎ paper’s‎ findings‎ also‎ indicate‎ that‎ R&D‎ investment‎ is‎ now‎ an‎
important fraction of corporate investment spending for a significant share of 
publicly traded firms. According to the sample of this research the share of R&D 
investment in total investment, measured as the sum of physical and R&D 
investments, is higher than the share of capital investment for US firms since year 
1992 and for UK firms since year 2001. 
Overall, the results show that R&D investment has been affected by 
financial constraints. Lastly this study shows vast range of differences between 
R&D firms in the US and UK. The most outstanding one is that US firms show to 
be much more advanced in their R&D investing process.   
The remainder of the paper is designed as follows. Section 2 discusses 
literature review on R&D investment and internal equity finance. Section 3 
provides empirical models, hypotheses development and the estimation method. 
Section 4 delivers a description of the dataset, together with some summary 
statistics. Section 5 presents empirical results. Section 6 presents robustness 
checks. Section 7 summarizes the paper. 
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3.2 R&D investment and its financing – literature review 
 
Literature on R&D investment is dominated by US and UK countries (see 
e.g., Anagnostopoulou and Levis, 2008).20 This chapter concentrates on US and 
UK firms for three reasons. Firstly, the research on R&D investment is well 
developed in those countries and thus the comparison of this research with other 
studies is possible. Secondly, the data availability stands behind such well 
developed R&D research in the US and UK market and also plays its role in 
choosing these markets for the investigation in this paper. Finally, US market is a 
leading market in investing in R&D projects.21 Duesterberg (2010) presents that 
when measured on a value-added basis, U.S. manufacturing is the global leader 
in high-technology goods, it holds around a 30% global market share. Moreover, 
European Commission (2011) demonstrates that the UK outperforms both the 
EU average and a group of similar countries and nears the United States in a 
range of indicators such as high quality publications, high quality patents and 
high share of the population engaged in knowledge intensive activities. On the 
other hand, the system underperforms in terms of public and private R&D 
investment and technological performance as measured by the importance of 
patents in the economy.   
 
3.2.1 Theoretical aspects 
 
Technological progress is recognized by the economy as the central 
determinant in explaining the process of economic growth, the performance 
competitiveness‎ between‎ firms‎ and‎ industries,‎ and‎ the‎ evolution‎ of‎ firms’‎
production structure. Economic growth is driven by the products, processes and 
services born from creative ideas. The expenditures on research and 
development form the existence and development process of creative ideas. 
Despite the fact that not all R&D activities are successful to materialize any 
                                            
20
 “US‎were‎found‎to‎have‎shown‎the‎maximum‎share‎(43‎per‎cent)‎of‎publications‎(and‎more‎than‎
50‎per‎cent‎citations‎share),‎followed‎by‎the‎UK”‎(Gupta‎et‎al.,‎2007). 
21
 “The‎ United‎ States‎ remained‎ by‎ far‎ the‎ single‎ largest‎ R&D-performing country. Its R&D 
expenditure of $369 billion in 2007 exceeded the Asian region's total of $338 billion and the EU's 
(EU-27) $263 billion. The U.S. 2007 total broadly matched the combined R&D expenditures of the 
next‎ four‎ largest‎ countries:‎ Japan,‎ China,‎ Germany,‎ and‎ France.”‎ (Science and Engineering 
Indicators: 2010, http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind10/c0/c0s2.htm). 
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tangible results, these failures also contribute in creating the corpus of knowledge 
needed to stimulate the innovation process.  
Schumpeter‎(1942)‎points‎out‎to‎large‎firms’‎role‎as‎engines‎of‎economic‎
growth, because they generate knowledge in specific technological areas and 
markets.‎This‎ recognition‎ is‎sometimes‎ referred‎ to‎as‎ “creative‎accumulation”.‎
Aghion‎and‎Howitt‎ (1992)‎among‎others‎formalized‎Schumpeter’s‎views‎ in‎ the‎
field of (endogenous) growth model, which predicts that the effects of incremental 
changes in the innovation activity are substantial social gains for the entire 
economy, as the innovation is adapted and diffused. Arrow (1962) also 
recognizes that the knowledge incorporated in new technologies cannot be fully 
taken‎for‎ its‎creators’‎own‎use.‎To‎the‎extent‎of‎knowledge‎being‎a‎good‎with‎
features of non-rivalry (the consumption of one individual does not take away 
from that of another) and impossible excludability (there is a struggle to keep an 
individual out from enjoying it) it cannot be kept secret, thus a market failure 
appears leading to underinvestment in R&D. 22  Griliches (1992) provides 
empirical support on this approach by demonstrating that the private rate of 
return on investment in R&D is lower than the social rate. 
The presence of a wedge between the private rate of return of R&D 
investment and the cost of capital when innovators and providers of finance are 
different entities is also argued by Arrow (1962). Undoubtedly, by means of 
external finance resources funding R&D intensive activities is difficult owing to 
the existence of imperfections in capital market. Automatically, this assumption is 
in contrast with the theorem of Modigliani-Miller (1958) which states that any 
positive net present value investment project can be financed either internally or 
externally, since external funds can substitute for internal capital without any 
costs.23 A crucial implication stems from the theories of the firm functioning in 
imperfect‎capital‎markets‎that‎is‎firm’s‎investment‎decisions‎are‎determined‎by‎
financial factors like retained earnings and the availability of new debt or equity. 
According to Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) in most advanced economies, 
R&D investment appears to be mainly financed by internally accumulated cash 
flow. This leads to the question of whether firms finance R&D investment with a 
                                            
22
 On the basis of this argument, interventions like government support of R&D, the intellectual 
property system or R&D tax incentives, are usually justified. 
23
 Certain assumptions apply to this theory, such as the simultaneous presence of a perfect 
informational context, an efficient capital market and the absence of bankruptcy costs. 
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great share of internal finance due to financial constraints or is it a voluntary 
strategy.‎ The‎ latter‎ reason‎ can‎be‎ connected‎with‎ the‎ “free‎ cash‎ flow”‎ theory‎
introduced by Jensen (1986), which argues that managers overinvest in projects 
with negative net present value when their interests are not aligned with interest 
of stakeholders (maximizing corporate value). The former view can be linked with 
the‎“pecking‎order‎theory”‎of‎financing‎initiated‎by‎Myers‎(1984),‎which‎asserts‎
that financial sources firms use are set in a hierarchical order by means of their 
costs. A difficulty in estimating the right value of future cash flows generated from 
investment projects by lenders or outside investors creates the wedge in the cost 
of financial resources, and that result in underinvestment problem, which means 
that companies are not able to finance all positive net present value projects. 
Hence firms firstly exhaust internal equity financing and then, if funds are still 
desired, turn to debt and external equity. 
Large number of scholars believes that in most developed economies 
R&D investment is mainly financed by internally accumulated cash flow, while the 
evidence on the impact of internal equity finance on R&D is not consistent. Few 
advantages of internal finances over debt have been pointed out, namely no 
need for collateral requirements, no need for dealing with adverse selection 
problems and no need to be concerned about magnifying problems linked with 
financial distress (Brown et al. 2009). However, two most obvious disadvantages 
may apply to innovative firms funding their R&D only with internal finance. First, 
existing profits of innovative firms may not reach the desired level to finance all 
profitable and socially desirable R&D opportunities. Specifically, this is very 
relevant to young, fast growing firms. Second, volatile profits associated with 
business cycles may generate unwanted fluctuations in financing R&D 
investments, which in contrary require a rather smooth investment path over 
time. 
Prior work on R&D investment also identifies several firm-specific factors 
that‎are‎important‎for‎firms’‎R&D‎investment‎decisions.‎There‎has‎been‎evidence‎
that firm age, size, equity, growth opportunities, and cash flow volatility play a 
significant role in determining how much firms choose to invest in R&D activities. 
For example, owing to the research of Brown et al. (2007) who, after investigating 
a panel of 1,347 US publicly traded high-tech firms from 1990 to 2004, found that 
supply shifts in equity finance (both internal and external) had an aggregate effect 
on R&D, thus explaining most of the dramatic 1990s R&D boom in the US. They 
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conclude that stock markets play a role in economic growth by directly funding 
innovation.  
Recently corporate finance literature has developed and empirically 
confirmed a view that internal equity finances is preferred to debt or external 
equity source of funds for R&D investment (see Brown and Petersen, 2011). 
Firstly, this approach has been explained on the basis of asymmetric information 
theory. R&D investment suffers more from asymmetric information because 
innovative projects are not easily understood by outsiders, or there is uneven 
knowledge about their likelihood of success between entrepreneurs and 
providers of external funds in favour of entrepreneurs. Asymmetry of information 
is also very high for R&D activities as the progress in R&D is difficult to follow and 
the quality of a final product can remain uncertain for several years. Management 
does not have currently available data that can be used to evaluate or refute 
project manager claims (Stein, 2003).  R&D projects can endure for 10 to 12 
years without producing a rent generating patent (Bernardo et al., 2001: 333).  
The secrecy of information and incomplete disclosure of the relative 
efficacy of R&D projects lead to moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). R&D 
costs are often sunk, patented innovations markets are segmented and often 
have oligopolistic characteristics, and tacit knowledge and skills of scientists 
make it difficult to fire them (Trushin, 2011). These interfere with the classical 
assumptions‎ of‎ Hayashi‎ (1982)‎ that‎ the‎ average‎ Tobin’s‎ Q‎ sufficiently‎
characterizes‎firm’s‎ investment‎opportunities,‎ thus‎the‎importance‎of‎cash flow 
emerges naturally.  
Secondly, as argued by Leland and Pyle (1977) or Carpenter and 
Petersen (2002) high-tech investments have a low probability of success, thus 
the returns on R&D projects are skewed with a high ratio of uncertainty. 
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2004) in the 
pharmaceutical industry, only 8 percent of drugs that are approved for phase I 
clinical trials are granted ultimate approval. Inefficient decision-making within the 
firm may be to certain extent the reason behind this lack of success. It has been 
noticed that in many firms, senior management is poorly-equipped to recognize 
the best R&D investment projects. Previous research by Hoskisson and Hitt 
(1988) and Hoskisson, et al. (1993) suggest that headquarters management in 
highly diversified firms suffer from the absence of the domain expertise to make 
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operational and strategic assessments of division-level R&D investments. 
Furthermore, in a highly diversified firm the R&D of one division is less likely to 
benefit another division. Milgrom (1988) points out that even if headquarters 
management has domain expertise, divisional squabbles in such firms decrease 
firm productivity. 
Thirdly, as pointed out by Lev (2001) or Berger and Udell (1990) 
investments in innovation cover largely intangible assets, such as salary 
payments‎ which‎ lack‎ collateral‎ value‎ for‎ securing‎ firms’‎ borrowing.‎ Hall‎ and 
Lerner (2010) states that more than 50% of spending on R&D is directed to the 
salaries of innovators, who contribute to‎their‎firms’‎future‎expected‎earnings‎in‎
the form of new products and services. Hillier et al. 2010) point out that because a 
significant‎proportion‎of‎R&D’s‎inherent‎value‎comes‎from‎the‎innovators’‎human‎
capital, this intangible asset may be lost to the‎company’s‎shareholders‎ if‎ the 
innovator leaves the firm. Investment in fixed assets is less risky and easier to 
collateralize than investment in intangible assets, which may be more prone to 
financing constraints as a consequence. Bester (1985) and Hubbard (1998) 
demonstrated how the absence of collateral for debt finance may badly influence 
the possibility to access external finance for innovative firms. 24   
Fourthly, without proper analytical tools it is difficult to estimate the 
expected future revenues of scientific and technological research because of 
their uncertainty.25 Given these issues, the cost of external capital for R&D 
funding is significantly greater than for other corporate investments and more 
sensitive to fluctuations in internal cash flow. An important argument worth 
mentioning‎here‎ is‎that‎of‎Bhattacharya‎and‎Ritter‎(1985)‎who‎highlights‎firms’‎
reluctance to fund their R&D externally due to their strategic reasons. Firms are 
not so keen to transparent to outside investors information on their R&D 
activities, since there is a threat that this knowledge could leak out to competitors. 
R&D is conducted within competitive environments, hence R&D projects carry 
higher competitiveness level and therefore they can face problems in situations 
when the firm looks for external support and is in a risk of information leak to 
rivals, which could result in a decrease of the prospective value of innovation. 
                                            
24
 Mocnik (2001) for a sample of Slovene firms provides support for the hypothesis that firms with 
a high level of intangible assets should be characterized by a lower debt/equity ratio. Also Berger 
and Udell (1990) for a large sample of US firms report a negative correlation between leverage 
and intangible assets. 
25
 The CAPM or arbitrage pricing theories fails to do so.. 
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R&D intensive firms seek to innovate better and faster than the competition. 
Megna and Klock (1993) demonstrates that firm performance is negatively 
related to the number of patents created by the firm's competitors. Firm 
performance suffers when competing firms innovate faster (and generate more 
patents). Thus, the speed of creating innovations faster than the competition is 
important along with creating valuable innovations themselves. 
R&D investment has two very important characteristics, the first one refers 
to the first stage of launching a R&D programme when R&D requires substantial 
funds and the second one is linked with big fluctuations in the level of spending in 
existing research programmes, which are very expensive. R&D spending 
constitutes mainly of wages of R&D staff, and this usually covers highly skilled 
workers and their hiring, firing and training costs. Decisions of establishing R&D 
project are more related to potential financial constraints, than decisions about 
year to year expenditures in existing research investments. Schumpeter (1942) 
implied that the R&D participation decision‎ is‎ more‎ for‎ the‎ firms‎ with‎ ‘deep‎
pockets’,‎meaning‎that‎most‎of‎the‎time‎firms‎that‎do‎commit‎to‎R&D investment 
are confident they can sponsor them from internal funds, because raising 
external finance for R&D is very expensive, especially in the UK due to 
accounting reasons. Thus, it is safer for managers to rely on internal finances to 
pay for their R&D investments. This preference of managers is possibly even 
more intense in case of smaller companies which are unable to protect their 
innovations through complementary assets, such as established distribution 
networks (Scellato (2007)). Lastly, because there is no secondary innovation 
market, R&D firms can be particularly badly affected by financial distress due to 
their concentrated, firm-specific assets, which compose non-redeployable 
capital. Cornell and Shapiro (1988) assert that market value of innovative firms 
based on future growth options suddenly declines when these firms face financial 
distress.  
Despite all the problems and difficulties, for knowledge intensive industries 
R&D is important in creating competitive advantage. Many researchers confirm 
that R&D investment is a critical source of patents, and the creation of patents is 
strongly related to the creation of shareholder value. 26  E-mail, fiber optic 
transmission cables, and breakthrough drugs like Lipitor were created through 
                                            
26
 Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2005), Lev and Sougiannis (1996), Jaffe (1986), Pakes (1985) 
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private-sector R&D. The temptation of discovering ground-breaking innovations, 
and the wealth and fame that award such achievement, compel firms to carry on 
committing to risky R&D. 
In summary, issues of asymmetric information problems, greatly 
diversified corporations, lack of collateral value and lack of the ability to estimate 
the expected future revenues of R&D investment may make investment in R&D 
projects more prone to financing constraints as a consequence. Hence the view 
that internal equity finance is preferred to debt or external equity source of funds 
for R&D investment is rational. Since R&D investment is so difficult to manage, 
and since it is such an important precursor to the creation of valuable new 
knowledge, firms can overinvest or underinvest in R&D. Firms obtain resources 
that they consider will give competitive advantage, and use those resources in 
attempts to generate shareholder value. In the case of R&D, this is a uniquely 
difficult process. The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the determinants 
of‎firms’‎R&D‎investment‎decisions.‎More‎specifically,‎we‎are‎interested‎in‎what‎
determines‎firm’s‎ability‎to‎fund‎new‎R&D‎projects‎when‎they‎are‎discovered or 
firm’s‎ ability‎ to‎ maintain‎ the‎ existing‎ R&D‎ activities,‎ regardless‎ of‎ the‎ firm's‎
current operating performance or the obstacles discussed above. 
 
3.2.2 Empirical evidence  
 
Financial Factors and R&D Investment 
Investment in R&D is usually considered to be subject to financing 
constraints due to outcome uncertainty and asymmetric information between 
borrowers and lenders (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962; Bhattacharya and Ritter, 
1983; Myers and Majluf, 1984; Anton and Yao, 2002). Moreover, R&D investment 
is usually described as an investment with a low inside collateral value because it 
is sunk once expensed (Alderson and Betker, 1996).  
Hall (2002) summarizes several important features of R&D that can be 
responsible for the higher external capital costs for an R&D project in comparison 
with‎the‎cost‎of‎cash‎generated‎through‎a‎firm’s‎revenue,‎such‎as‎asymmetric‎
information between inventor and investor, moral hazard on the part of the 
inventor, tax deduction legislation that affects costs of servicing external debts 
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and incomplete markets as debt-holders prefer physical assets as collateral to 
secure loans: sunk costs of R&D are usually higher than of physical investment.  
The‎ role‎ of‎ financial‎ factors‎ on‎ firms’‎ capital‎ investments‎ has‎ been 
extensively examined. However, the‎ role‎ of‎ financial‎ factors‎ on‎ firms’‎ R&D‎
investment is not clear. Majority of documents on the association between capital 
investment and internal finance insist on the important role for internal finance. 27  
This is not the case with R&D investments, where the related evidence is mixed 
(see Hall (2002) for a review). Early papers by Scherer (1965), Mueller (1967) 
and Elliott (1971) deliver empirical evidence with no relationship between internal 
finance and R&D. However, a small literature has emerged showing that 
company R&D spending is sensitive to cash flow, but unsurprisingly the results 
are often weak in the sense of economic or statistical significance. Himmelberg 
and Petersen (1994) stress that these analyses took into account only large 
firms, which usually have more cash flow than they need for investments.  
Most of the following studies find significant and positive influence of cash 
flow on R&D investments (Hall (1992), Hao and Jaffe (1993), Himmelberg and 
Petersen (1994), Mulkay et al. (2001), but there are also papers where that 
relationship does not always hold (Bhagat and Welch (1995), Harhoff (1998), 
Bond et al. (1999), Bougheas et al. (2003)). Adopting an accelerator type model 
on a large panel of US manufacturing firms Hall (1992) tests the degree of 
correlation between R&D and cash flow and discovers a strong impact of cash 
flow on R&D expenses as well as negative correlation between R&D investments 
and the degree of leverage. By splitting their sample according to firm size Hao 
and Jaffe (1993) point to internal financial resources as a major determinant of 
R&D expenditure decisions. They find no liquidity effect for large firms although 
they find support for the hypothesis that R&D is liquidity constrained. After 
examining a panel of 179 US small, high-tech firms Himmelberg and Petersen 
(1994) also point to internal financial resources as a major determinant of R&D 
expenditure decisions. Harhoff (1998) demonstrates for German small firms a 
significant sensitivity of R&D investments to cash flow. Hall et al., (1999) find that 
R&D is much more sensitive to cash flow in U.S. firms than in French and 
                                            
27 Fazzari, Hubbard et al. (1988) in their seminal paper stress the key role of cash flow in 
investment decisions of firms. According to Almeida, Campello et al. (2004) financially 
constrained firms save more cash from their own cash flow. See also Hoshi et al. (1991), 
Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989), Oliner and Rudebusch (1992), Vogt (1994), Chirinko and 
Schaller (1995) among others. 
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Japanese firms. According to Mulkay et al. (2001) cash flow has a weaker 
influence in France than in the United States both for R&D and ordinary 
investment. Next Hall (2002) delivers a prominent review of the R&D-cash flow 
literature based not only on the studies in the US and concludes that small and 
new innovative firms experience high costs of capital and even large firms prefer 
internal funds for the financing of R&D. For the UK firms Bond et al. (2006) 
discover that cash flow predicts whether a firm does R&D or not, but not the level 
of R&D indicating that UK firms that do R&D are a self-selected group that face 
fewer constraints. Yet, such effects do not apply to German firms. Recent studies 
by Brown, Fazzari and Petersen (2009) and Brown and Petersen (2011) find a 
strong association between R&D and both internal and external equity finance for 
young (but not mature) publicly traded U.S. firms. 
A comprehensive summary of literature is provided by Hall and Lerner 
(2010) with a conclusion that it remains an open question whether financing 
constraints matter for R&D. Such a conclusion is aligned with the mixed results in 
studies of U.S. firms and the findings of weak or no evidence of financing 
constraints for non-U.S. (mainly European) firms.  
 
Stock and Debt Issues and Cash Flow Sensitivity 
The recent literature considers R&D‎investment‎as‎an‎“equity-dependent”‎
type of investment. Brown et. al (2007) study the effect of cash flow and external 
equity on aggregate R&D investment and they provide further support for the 
view that supply shifts in equity finance are important factors driving economic 
growth. Firm mainly oriented in investing in R&D are well known to employ little 
debt. Among other numerous explanations, Cornell and Shapiro (1988) explain 
this by the poor collateral value of R&D and the aspect that using debt finance 
may evolve troubles of financial distress that can be especially dangerous for 
R&D-intensive firms. Bradley et al. (1984), Titman and Wessels (1988), Hall 
(2002) and Kayhan and Titman (2007) bring on the evidence of negative relation 
between R&D and leverage. In effect, young firms, especially those with low or 
negative cash flow, investing in R&D can be strongly relying on the access to 
financial sources raised from public equity.  There are at least two reasons to 
directly incorporate stock issues when testing for financing constraints on R&D. 
First, firms rely heavily on stock issues in the years immediately following their 
IPO (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998)), which is also a time period of low (or 
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negative) cash flows and high R&D intensity. This negative correlation between 
stock issues and cash flow should lead to a downward bias in the estimated 
R&D-cash flow sensitivity in regressions that omit stock issues. Second, 
including stock issues in the R&D regression (appropriately instrumented) 
permits tests of whether variation in access to external finance matters for R&D, 
as it should in a world of imperfect access to external finance (Brown et al., 2011). 
As mentioned before R&D is difficult to collateralize because it is an 
intangible asset. Very restricted collateral value of R&D limits the use of debt, 
since risky firms typically must pledge collateral to obtain debt finance (Berger 
and Udell, 1990). Brown and Petersen (2010) add that the nature of the debt 
contract is poorly suited for the uncertainty and skewness of returns associated 
with high-tech investment. Success in R&D is highly uncertain, and an 
R&D-intensive project may be difficult to monitor and assess, exacerbating 
agency problems (asymmetric information). Thus, R&D intensive industries may 
have a low ability to raise finance especially in less developed financial systems 
(Ilyina and Samaniego, 2011).  
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) argue that for high-tech firms, the limited 
collateral value of assets, together with adverse selection, moral hazard, and 
financial distress should cause the marginal cost of debt to increase rapidly with 
leverage. Szewczyk et al. (1996) report that average approximation for Tobin‟s Q 
is statistically significant in explaining abnormal returns connected to R&D 
projects, and that these returns are higher for leveraged firms. Price to book ratio 
is a proxy for the average Q, because marginal Tobin’s Q is unobservable. 
McConnell‎ and‎Servaes‎ (1995)‎ find‎ for‎US‎ firms‎with‎ high‎Tobin’s‎Q‎ that‎ the‎
leverage has a negative impact on corporate value, but a positive impact on the 
value‎of‎firms‎with‎low‎Tobin’s‎Q.‎Aivazian,‎et‎al.‎(2005)‎detect‎for‎Canadian‎firms‎
negative relationship between leverage and investment. Ahn et al. (2006) find for 
diversified firms with high Tobin’s Q a negative influence of leverage on 
investment. Chiao (2002) finds a negative influence of debt on R&D spending in 
science-based industries, but a positive one in non-science based industries 
indicating that risk is significantly lower in the latter. 
It is clear that R&D-intensive firms make little use of debt finance (e.g., Hall 
(2002)). Equity is better suited for financing R&D than debt, because with equity 
financing there are no collateral requirements, shareholders share in upside 
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returns and additional equity does not magnify problems associated with financial 
distress, which can be particularly costly for innovative firms. Kim and Weisbach 
(2008) report evidence suggesting that a main reason for stock issues is funding 
R&D. They explore IPOs and SEOs across 38 countries and show that in the four 
years following the stock issue, the cumulative average increase in R&D is more 
than half the size of the stock issue. However, owing to various reasons external 
equity is not a perfect substitute for internal finance, such as substantial flotation 
costs (e.g., Lee et al.,‎ (1996))‎ and‎ the‎ “lemons‎ premium”‎ due‎ to‎ asymmetric‎
information (Myers and Majluf (1984)).  
Brown and Petersen (2009, 2010) come to conclusion that public equity 
finance play important role in the financing of high-tech investment. In detail, they 
claim that the financing of young high-tech firms occurs as follows: internal 
finance is typically small and often negative, debt is essentially unavailable, and 
VC financing is limited in scope, suggesting that public equity is the key marginal 
source of finance.  
Brown and Petersen (2010) points out that R&D firms are mainly public 
and there are almost no major private high-tech firms. They argue that a plausible 
reason for this is that the external capital supplied by public equity markets is 
crucial for the development of young high-tech firms given their limited access to 
other sources of finance. Internal funds are less costly than public equity, but 
internal cash flow of small and young firms is usually negative.  
 
3.2.3 Summary 
 
R&D activity can result in either product or process innovations (i.e., 
increases in the efficiency with which other inputs are used in production). There 
are several reasons to expect that more R&D-intensive industries have greater 
need for external finance. R&D may be associated with longer gestation periods 
because it does not yield immediate results. R&D may be a lumpy type of 
investment because it may require large start up investments for new firms and 
also for new projects. R&D investments are likely to be sunk and they are also 
inherently risky. Burley and Stevens (1997) find that the ratio of new product 
ideas to new products is 1:1,000. In R&D-intensive‎ industries,‎a‎ firm’s‎market‎
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niche may be constantly under threat from innovative competitors, so that 
expected harvest periods may be relatively short (Kamien and Schwartz,1982).  
Changes in R&D expenditure are interpreted by numerous researchers as 
evidence of earnings manipulations (Baber et al., 1991; Bushee, 1998; Elliot et 
al., 1984). A popular view is that changes in R&D expenditure may cause 
damaging disruptions in the R&D process (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Grabowski, 
1968; Hambrick et al., 1983; Kor and Mahoney, 2005). Therefore firms that have 
same level of investment over time are expected to create very little disruption in 
their R&D labs. In effect, they make the steadiest innovations progress. Kor and 
Mahoney assert that in order to create sustainable competitive advantage 
consistent and sustained high levels of R&D investment are required. In addition, 
Hambrick et al., (1983:759) states "research workers are not perfectly elastic in 
supply and cannot be fired and rehired as business conditions might warrant". All 
this implies that firms steer R&D expenditure levels for reasons that could 
seriously impact progress towards innovation. However, on the contrary firms 
that "stick with it" may be prevented from terminating bad R&D investments in a 
timely manner because they suffer from a form of "organizational inertia" 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Aborting unsuccessful R&D activities can be 
difficult, because R&D project managers can be motivated to continue their own 
projects (Bernardo et al., 2001; Stein, 2003). An important point worth mentioning 
here is that one of Fogel et al., (2008) that suggests that economies that quickly 
replace declining firms with fast growing firms generate more economic growth 
than economies that have the same dominant firms over time. Such "creative 
destruction" (Schumpeter, 1942) may drive superior R&D performance at the firm 
level as well. Previous literature implies that if underperforming projects are 
identified‎and‎terminated‎more‎quickly‎(“cutting‎costs”),‎then‎some‎freed-up R&D 
resources can be invested into new projects. This policy seems to be more 
effective at creating firm value (Swift, 2008).  
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3.3 Empirical model 
 
Previous literature shows that cash flow is an important determinant of 
R&D investment, and that asymmetric information is considerably greater for 
R&D than for tangible fixed investments. Effectively, the cost of external funds will 
necessarily be higher for R&D than for tangible investments (Cleary et al., 2007; 
Domadenik et al., 2008). Ascioglu et al., (2008) find that firms with high cash flow 
levels are also less averse to R&D activity. Thus cash flow is expected to be 
positively related to R&D investment. However, Brown and Petersen (2010) find 
that firms most likely to face financing frictions rely extensively on cash holdings 
to smooth R&D, while firms less likely to face financing frictions appear to smooth 
R&D without the use of costly cash holdings. This finding indicate that firms plan 
their R&D investment and its financing well in advance, hence their R&D 
investment cash flow relationship can be negative if they are assessed in the 
same year, while the association between R&D investment and cash holdings is 
expected to be positive.  Also Lerner et al. (2011) claim that R&D expenditures 
have features typical of long-run investments. In particular, their costs are 
expensed immediately, yet their benefits are unlikely to be observed for several 
years. 
External financing (i.e., long-term debt) are also more likely to be more 
costly than internal financing thanks to market imperfections.  Because external 
funds are not perfect substitutes with internal funds, these market imperfections 
encourage R&D projects to be financed through internal resources (Islam and 
Mozumdar, 2007). Moreover, the probability of bankruptcy forces firms to rely on 
retained earnings to finance innovations (Blundell et al., 1999). Accordingly, a 
negative relation between debt issues and R&D investment and also a negative 
relation between equity issues and R&D investment are expected.  In the spirit of 
majority of R&D investment literature, which present that strong returns on R&D 
encourage and incentivize future R&D investment, lagged values of R&D are 
employed in the model of this work to explain current R&D expenditure.28 
All above mentioned firm characteristics explain great part of the variation 
in R&D investment. However, R&D activity is also strongly characterized by 
                                            
28
See Lev and Sougiannis (1996) or Dunlap-Hinkler et al., (2007). 
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unquantifiable factors, such as corporate strategy, firm culture, and the 
propensity to innovate (Hillier et al., 2011). Because these factors are impossible 
to measure, we incorporate them into our empirical model through an individual 
effect (FIRMi) and time effect (YEARt), which controls for the unobservable 
heterogeneity across firms in our analysis; εi,t is the random disturbance. Of 
course, all variables apart from size are scaled by total assets to avoid 
heteroskedasticity problems. 
This section introduces the explanatory variables for three alternative 
specifications to empirically model the cash flow sensitivity of R&D investment. 
The first specification is parsimonious. In addition to firm size, it only includes 
cash flows and investment opportunities. R&D investment is defined as the ratio 
of R&D expenses to total book assets. CF is defined as the ratio of earnings 
before extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization to total book 
assets.‎Proxy‎for‎investment‎opportunities,‎Tobin’s‎Q,‎is‎measured‎by‎the‎ratio‎of‎
book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity to book value of assets. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. The 
baseline empirical model can be written as: 
 
R&Di,t = α0 + α1CFi,t-1 + α2Qi,t-1 + α3SIZEi,t-1  + εi,t,    (1) 
 
We want to maintain a common scale factor for all regressions therefore 
we divide by total assets the same as Baker et al. (2003). We also control for 
industry dummies and time dummies in all regressions, εi.t stands for 
measurement error.  
Equation 1 is estimated with OLS technique in which independent 
variables are lagged one year to control for potential endogeneity problems (see 
Duchin et al., 2010). 
The primary variable of interest in this model is cash flow (CF hereafter). In 
line with a standard interpretation, a positive and significant coefficient of CF 
suggests that firms primarily rely on internal rather than external funds for 
financing investment, which is taken as a signal of financial constraint. On the 
contrary, an insignificant estimated coefficient of CF is seen as evidence that 
firms are financially unconstrained (Arslan et al., 2006).  
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In addition, R&D decisions should also be affected by the attractiveness of 
future investment opportunities. Noting the difficulty in empirically measuring 
those opportunities, the baseline model uses Tobin’s‎Q to capture information 
about the value of long-term growth options that are available to the firm same as 
work of Almeida and Campello (2010). Importantly previous research has 
recognized that the estimate‎ returned‎ for‎α2 might give less useful information 
about the effect of financial constraints on R&D policies‎than‎the‎estimate‎of‎α1. 
Firm size is included in the baseline model because investing in R&D activities 
may entail fixed costs; on the margin, the larger firms within a given subset of 
firms could be more favourably predisposed to substitute between internal and 
external funds due to economies of scale (Almeida and Campello, 2010). 
An alternative estimate of the cash flow sensitivity of R&D investment is 
obtained‎ from‎ a‎ specification‎ in‎ which‎ a‎ firm’s‎ decision‎ to‎ change‎ its‎ R&D 
investment‎in‎the‎face‎of‎cash‎flow‎innovations‎takes‎into‎consideration‎the‎firm’s‎
pre-existing stock of internal funding and its ex ante financial structure. Following 
the literature on investment demand (e.g., Fazzari and Petersen (1993), 
Schiantarelli and Sembenelli (2000)), on liquidity demand (Almeida et al. (2004)), 
and on capital structure (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1995)), the annual R&D 
investment also as  a function of the beginning-of-the-year stock of cash and 
liquid securities (CASH HOLDINGS), net new funds from stock issues and net 
new long-term debt modelled, where all of these three additional variables are 
scaled by total assets.  
 
R&Di,t = α0 + α1CFi,t + α2Qi,t +‎α3SIZEi,t +‎α4CASHi,t−1 +‎α5STOCKi,t−1 + 
α6DEBTi,t−1 +‎εi,t.          (2) 
 
The lagged R&D investment term is included in the model 3 due to the 
presence of adjustment costs of investment.  
 
R&Di,t =‎ α1R&Di,t-1 +‎ α2CFi,t +‎ α3Qi,t +‎ α4SIZEi,t +‎ α5CASHi,t−1 + 
α6STOCKi,t−1 +‎α7DEBTi,t−1 + βi + dt + ui,t.      (3) 
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We also control for industry and time dummies in this regression, dt 
controls for year fixed effects, βi is a firm specific effect that controls for all 
time-invariant determinates of R&D at the firm level, and ui.t stands for random 
error term. 
We control for pre-existing stocks of cash holdings because a firm can use 
these alternative components of internal wealth to accommodate shocks to cash 
flows. As in previous research of Brown and Petersen‎(2010),‎a‎firm’s‎net new 
funds from stock issues and net new long-term debt enter as additional 
determinants of the R&D investment. Stock and debt issues are included in the 
model to evaluate the changing role of external finance for R&D investment. Debt 
issues and cash holdings should show a positive relation with R&D in firms that 
face binding financing constraints, though debt issues are relatively unimportant 
as a source of funds for the typical R&D firm (see Fig. 1 in section 4.4.3). In 
contrary, as discussed above, the coefficients on cash flows and stock issues 
should share a negative relation in firms that rely on cash reserves to finance 
R&D. 
To‎formally‎test‎whether‎a‎firm’s‎financial‎characteristics‎are significant in 
determining its R&D expenses during the financial crisis period the following 
model is estimated: 
 
R&Di,t =‎ α1R&Di,t-1 + α2CFi,t +‎ α3Qi,t +‎ α4SIZEi,t +‎ α5CASHi,t−1 + 
α6STOCKi,t−1 +‎ α7DEBTi,t−1 +‎ α8CRISIS‎ +‎ α9CRISIS*CFi,t + 
α10CRISIS*Qi,t +‎ α11CRISIS*SIZEi,t +‎ α12CRISIS*CASHi,t−1 + 
α13CRISIS*STOCKi,t−1 +‎α14CRISIS*DEBTi,t−1 + βi + dt + ui,t. (4) 
 
where a dummy variable for the crisis period, CRISIS which captures the 
average change of R&D investment over 2008-2010 period is included. The 
coefficient on CRISIS is expected to be negative if the R&D investment was 
reduced on average during 2008-2010 period. Each financial variable in the 
model except for the lagged dependent variable is interacted with the financial 
crisis dummy in order to capture the effect of financial crisis on the impact of 
these variables on R&D investment. For instance, an interactive term between 
cash holdings and the crisis dummy shows whether the impact of cash holdings 
on R&D changes during the crisis.  
140 
 
  
3.3.1 Hypotheses 
 
Summary statistics show that the number of firms with negative cash flows 
grows over time, hence these firms are not so plausible to finance their intangible 
investments out of them. Allayannis and Mozumdar (2004, p. 902) claims that 
‘‘negative‎ cash‎ flow‎ is‎ a‎ useful‎ proxy‎ for‎ characterizing‎ firms‎ that‎ are‎ in.‎ .‎ .‎
financially distressed situations,”‎which‎attenuates‎their‎investment‎response to 
changes in cash flow. Furthermore there is a substantial increase in‎firms’‎R&D‎
investment‎ratio‎but‎substantial‎decrease‎in‎firms’‎cash‎flow‎ratio‎over‎the‎time‎
period this study considers. Also, in Figures 1 A and B we observe two opposite 
trends, that is the trend of R&D investment increases over time while the trend of 
cash flows decreases over time.   
 
H1: Given the development of equity market, the increasing share of negative 
cash flow firms in the sample and the pronounced rise of R&D investment over 
the last twenty one years, the R&D ICFS for the full sample of firms is expected to 
be negative and increase in its negativity (the R&D ICFS trend is downward) over 
the last twenty one years, ceteris paribus.  
 
The development of capital market should reduce the marginal cost of 
external finance, leading to a reduction in the ICFS (Brown and Petersen, 2009). 
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Other things equal, improvements in capital markets should lower the ICFS 
for all types of investment. 
 
Hall and Lerner (2010) and Islam and Mozumdar (2007) argue that in the 
presence of market imperfections, external funds may not provide a perfect 
substitute for internal funds, given that the premium for external financing will be 
higher. Financial crisis should increase the marginal cost of external finance, 
leading to a rise in the ICFS. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H3: Other things equal, financial crisis should increase the ICFS for all types of 
investment. 
 
In the spirit of Brown and Petersen (2011) we argue that firms seriously 
involved in investing in R&D activities should be prepared to maintain a smooth 
path of R&D, due to high adjustment costs related with R&D investment. For 
financially unconstrained firms, R&D consistency is straightforward, as shocks to 
one financing source can be offset with other financing sources. But for financially 
constrained firms relying extensively on volatile sources of finance, R&D 
smoothing may be much more challenging. One available and certain way to 
smooth R&D is to finance it from non volatile sources such as build up 
precautionary cash holdings. Increased capacity of debt, as an alternative form of 
firms’‎ financial‎ slack, does not really apply to R&D investment, because R&D 
investment is usually an investment in intangible assets with hardly any collateral 
value. Cash holdings can be utilized to finance committed R&D investment when 
there is a negative shock to the availability of either cash flow or stock issues. 
Brown and Petersen (2011) present similar argument that firms smooth their 
R&D investment by drawing down cash holdings to offset partially (or completely) 
a negative shock to the availability of either cash flow or stock issues. We argue 
differently to Brown and Petersen that firms are more likely to directly finance 
R&D investment with cash holdings rather than with cash flows or stock issues. 
Firms build their cash holdings well in advance before they start their commitment 
to R&D projects. As mentioned before, studies by Cincera (2003) or Himmelberg 
and Petersen (1994) imply that, given the existence of very high adjustment costs 
for innovation investment, firms will engage in R&D activities only if they do not 
expect to be seriously affected by credit constraints. Bond et al. (2003) argue that 
innovative‎ firms‎ are‎ not‎ likely‎ to‎ face‎ financial‎ constraints‎ as‎ they‎ are‎ “deep‎
pocket”‎ firms,‎ i.e.‎ they‎engage‎ in‎ innovation‎activity‎when they have plenty of 
internal financial resources to do so. Also R&D investment is usually considered 
as long term investment, so firms prepare for its financing well in advance, rather 
than just financing them straight out of volatile cash flows. In order to assure the 
continuity of R&D investment, firms need to find regular and safe source of funds 
for them, which in most cases are cash savings, given that readily available cash 
balances help firms to avoid costly external finance and grant them the ability to 
take the opportunity of valuable investments. Therefore, firms engaged in R&D 
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projects will be very concerned about keeping cash holdings on the required level 
for financing their R&D activities; hence when positive shocks to cash flow 
appears or when positive shock strikes stock issues, R&D investment is likely to 
relatively decrease, because firms firstly want to accumulate enough 
precautionary cash holdings for future R&D investment so that they can finance 
their R&D project smoothly out of cash holdings. Put differently, when such an 
increase in cash flows or stock issues appear firms will draw down these 
financing sources to finance future R&D investment via cash holdings. Higher 
levels of cash holdings require reductions in cash flows, thus the more cash flow 
firms draw down for increasing the cash stock the more they are able to safely 
finance their investment. Thus, firms run down cash flows to expand R&D 
investment in response to positive productivity shocks. This explanation predicts 
a negative correlation between changes in cash flows and R&D (as it is in our 
data) because cash flows fall so that R&D can increase.  
 
H4: Other things equal, cash holdings are positively related with R&D investment 
given that cash is an effective hedging device. 
 
Stock issue is another source of income like cash flow relevant to R&D 
investment (see Brown and Petersen, 2009), hence its role in financing R&D 
investment should be meaningful, that is positive shock to stock issues should 
complement or substitute financing R&D investment via two channels, either by 
funding them directly or by building up cash holdings for future R&D investment, 
same as cash flow. Therefore, the relationship between stock issues and R&D 
investment is negative when firms smooth R&D investment with stock issues via 
building up cash holdings or positive when they finance R&D investment directly 
from positive shocks of equity issues. 
 
H5: Other things equal, stock issues have a positive impact on investment, given 
the development of equity market. 
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3.4 Methodology 
 
3.4.1 Cross-sectional estimation 
 
The analysis of this study begins with a focus on the question whether 
cash‎flow,‎investment‎opportunities‎and‎size‎impact‎firms’‎R&D‎investment.‎To‎
answer this question, firstly we estimate an OLS year by year cross sectional 
R&D investment model using past values of each of the firm characteristics to 
control for the problem of the endogeneity. Secondly, we estimate a three years 
average OLS cross sectional R&D investment model using the average values of 
R&D investment as well as each of the firm characteristics over three years in an 
attempt to mitigate problems that might arise due to short-term fluctuations or 
extreme values in one year. The R&D investment regression in both cases 
includes industry dummies that control for industry membership. Past values not 
only control for endogeneity problem as mentioned above but also reduces the 
likelihood of observed relations reflecting the effects of R&D investment on 
firm-specific factors (see Rajan and Zingales, 1995). However, this approach is 
unable to control for the potential biases that can be caused by the presence of 
unobserved firm-specific fixed effects. Therefore, panel data techniques are also 
utilized in the analysis.  
 
3.4.2 Dynamic panel data estimation 
 
This study employs panel data technique. The unquantifiable 
characteristics of firms, such as strategy, firm culture, and the propensity to 
innovate are strongly connected with R&D investment. This specificity should be 
addressed in the methodology. Unlike cross-sectional analysis, panel data 
methods control for individual heterogeneity. To eliminate the risk of obtaining 
biased results, firm-level heterogeneity are controlled for by modeling it as an 
individual effect, βi, which is then eliminated by taking the first differences of the 
variables. The time dummy variable, dt, another component of the error term, 
measures time-specific effects thus the impact of macroeconomic variables on 
R&D can be controlled for and uit is the random disturbance term. Hillier et al., 
(2011) states that from an economic perspective, the explanatory variables can 
144 
 
be affected by current and past realizations of R&D but must be uncorrelated with 
any future realization of the error term. In result, augmented models of this paper 
(equation 2 and 3) are estimated using an instrumental variable (IV hereafter) 
method to control for the endogeneity problem. The best option is generalized 
method of moments (GMM), because it embeds all other instrumental variables 
methods as special cases (Ogaki, 1993). Additionally, both augmented models 
control for dynamic effects by including a lag of the dependent variable, R&Di,t-1. 
Hsiao (1986) demonstrates that ordinary least squares (OLS) gives an estimation 
of the coefficient that is biased upward in the presence of individual 
heterogeneity. Moreover, Nickell (1981) presents that the within-groups estimator 
is seriously biased downward, and Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (1999) report 
that the first-differenced GMM estimator is subject to a weak instruments 
problem. In detail, the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator use lagged values of the 
dependent variable as instruments, and is an internally derived IV approach. 
However, the lagged values of the dependent variable are often weak 
instruments (Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). Modifying the 
test to include lagged values as well as lagged differences may improve the 
power of the instruments (known as system generalized method of moments, or 
system GMM).  
First differencing the model removes the individual effects (and the 
possibility of bias due to omitted variables). However, negative consequences 
can appear after employing only differenced values. In cases where the variable 
resembles a random walk or a random walk with drift (common in financial data), 
then the internal instruments derived from a differenced value will poorly 
represent the data (Bond 2002). In these cases, it is more appropriate to use a 
system of equations to estimate the model that includes both the original model 
and the differenced model in system GMM. Blundell and Bond (1998) improved 
on earlier versions of system GMM estimators by using additional moment 
conditions to improve the performance of the estimator when the autoregressive 
parameters‎ are‎ large.‎ Overall,‎ the‎ “system”‎ GMM‎ estimator‎ developed‎ for‎
dynamic panel models by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) jointly estimates a regression in differences with the regression in levels, 
using lagged levels as instruments for the regression in differences and lagged 
differences as instruments for the regression in levels. The systems estimator 
addresses the weak instrument problem that arises from using lagged levels of 
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persistent explanatory variables as instruments for the regression in differences, 
but it does require an additional moment restriction to hold in the data: differences 
of the right-hand side variables in the equation must not be correlated with the 
firm-specific effect (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
This work uses the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). However, since there is no clear rule to decide between the first 
differenced GMM and the system GMM, opposite to the OLS and within-groups 
estimators, this study firstly runs the analysis with Arellano-Bond (1991) 
technique. Because first difference GMM estimators can very easily create a very 
large instrument matrix, the number of lags in the instrument matrix is restricted 
to three. Year dummies are considered exogenous, and all other variables are 
considered endogenous. Both augmented models described in equations 2 and 3 
are estimated with robust errors in the Arellano-Bond models as the robust option 
produces standard errors that are asymptotically robust to panel 
heteroskedasticity. A one-period lagged dependent variable is included too. 
Arellano-Bond (1991) technique provides some doubtful results, e.g. coefficients 
of‎ Tobin’s‎Q‎ are‎ stubbornly‎ negative. Bond et al., (2001) assert that the first 
differenced GMM estimator is biased downward due to weak instruments, and 
the coefficient takes a value close to or below the within-groups estimator. Also 
Bond (2002) asserts that a within group estimator is often biased downwards in 
panel data with small time periods, whereas the OLS levels estimator is biased 
upwards in large samples and this can be used to estimate the possible range for 
a parameter. 
Next, the hypotheses are examined with the Blundell and Bond (1998) 
system GMM approach, where additional moment conditions are added to 
improve the reliability of the results under less than ideal error conditions and a 
consistent estimation of the coefficients in this dynamic panel specification are 
performed. The system GMM combines the moment conditions for the first 
difference model with level moments and has less bias if the series are close to a 
random walk. The key assumption is that uit are independent across firms.  
Implementation of the estimations is performed with Stata software. Cash 
flow, investment opportunities, cash holdings, stock and debt issues are likely to 
be endogenous due to measurement error and the potential for reverse causality, 
thus they are treated as such. One-step estimation and standard variance 
corrected‎errors‎are‎used.‎“Identifying‎instruments‎for‎endogenous‎regressors‎is‎
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never an obvious task, but the combination of some economic introspection and 
thorough testing of the validity and relevance of the selected set of instruments 
will help ensure the reliability of our GMM estimates. Past lags of the included 
variables will convey only negligible (if any) additional information to what is 
already contained in the right-hand side of equation (2), yet those same lags 
should be reasonably‎ correlated‎ with‎ the‎ included‎ regressors”‎ Almeida‎ and‎
Campello (2010).  
All financial variables are treated  as potentially endogenous and lagged 
levels dated t-3 and t-4 are used as instruments for the regression in differences, 
and lagged differences dated t-2 are employed for the regression in levels.29 
Given the improved performance associated with the Blundell-Bond estimator, 
these results are reported and discussed.  
All in all, by using the panel data methodology (specifically, the system 
GMM estimator), two important and well-known problems in the literature: 
individual factor heterogeneity and endogeneity are controlled for. Finally, 
potential misspecifications of the models are also checked. First, the Hansen 
J-statistic of overidentifying restrictions to test for the absence of correlation 
between the instruments and the error term is employed. This test is distributed 
as‎a‎χ2 with r-k degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of the validity of the 
r instruments, where k is the number of parameters. To assess instrument validity 
Arellano and Bond (1991) are followed, who report an AR2 test for second-order 
autocorrelation in the first-differenced residuals, which, if present, could render 
the GMM estimator inconsistent. Therefore, first, the AR1 statistic, and second, 
the AR2 statistic, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) are also used, to test 
for a presence of first serial correlation and a lack of second-order serial 
correlation in the first-difference residuals. As a result of the first-differenced 
transformation, the error term suffers from first-order serial correlation. However, 
no second-order serial correlation exists.  
The last approach presented in equation 3 and utilized in this study 
captures potential interaction effects that may be present. The nature of the 
relationship between financial variables and R&D investment may vary due to 
financial crisis. To explore that possibility, we firstly interact our proxy for financial 
crisis (financial crisis dummy) with each financial variable in the R&D investment 
                                            
29
 Exactly same set of instruments can be found in paper of Brown and Petersen (2011).   
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model. In this way, we test for the existence of both main effects (the impact 
financial variables on R&D investment) and conditional effects (the impact of 
financial crisis on the relationship between financial variables and R&D 
investment).  
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3.5 Data 
 
The initial sample of this document comprises all listed companies in the 
United States and the United Kingdom that are included on the Worldscope 
database for the years 1990-2010. However, observations from financial 
institutions and utilities firms are disregarded as well as data cleaning procedure 
are applied. Data selection criteria are similar to that of Almeida et al. (2004 or 
2010). Thus, from the raw data those firm-years for which the value of assets is 
less than $1 million and those displaying asset growths exceeding 100% are 
discarded.30 Next, in order to minimize the sampling of distressed firms the 
request that firm annual sales exceed $1 million is activated.  
Variable construction approach follows the study of Brown and Petersen 
(2009). However, unlike those authors, we do not trim any of the variables at their 
extreme percentiles. Instead, same as Almeida et al. studies, we set limits on 
variables’‎distributions on the basis of economic intuition. Therefore, firm years 
for which debt exceeds total assets (near-bankruptcy firms) and those whose 
Tobin’s‎ Q,‎ our‎ basic‎ proxy‎ for‎ investment‎ opportunities‎ is‎ either‎ negative‎ or‎
greater than 10 (see Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)) are dropped. The latter 
data cut-off is introduced to address problems in the measurement of investment 
opportunities in the raw data.31 Firm years for which research and development 
expenses exceeds total assets or for which capital expenditures or R&D 
expenses are negative are also removed. In order to apply GMM estimation 
method, it is required that firms enter the sample only if they appear for at least 
four consecutive years in the data, because GMM estimators rely on lagged 
values of regression variables as instruments. Finally, due to dynamic models all 
firms with average of R&D ratio over the years equal to zero are removed as well 
as firms with average of total investment ratio over the years equal zero are also 
                                            
30 The first screen eliminates from the sample those firms with severely limited access to the 
public markets; the augmented models of this work include the stock issue variable so it requires 
that the firm have active (albeit, potentially constrained) access to funds from the financial 
markets. This selection rule eliminates very small firms from the sample, for which linear 
investment models are likely inadequate (see Gilchrist and Himmelberg, (1995)). The second 
screen drops those firm-years reporting large jumps in their business fundamentals; these are 
typically indicative of major corporate events, such as e.g. mergers or reorganizations. 
31
 This cut-off for Q reduces the average Q on a small scale and it does not impose bounds on the 
empirical distribution of Q. 
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eliminated.32  The data are selected as an unbalanced panel in preference to a 
balanced panel approach, because the unbalanced panel database is free from 
problem of survivorship bias. The sample periods (1990–1999 and 2000-2010) 
are fairly long, and many companies delisted, merged, or were acquired during 
the 10 and 11-year period. Imposing a requirement that all firms must have the 
same number of observations would reduce the sample dramatically, hence the 
final sample cover firms that ceased to exist. Separate regression results for US 
and UK firms for four different subperiods: 1990–1999, 2000-2010 and 
2000-2007, 2008–2010 are reported. These time periods divide the overall 
sample firstly into two periods of approximately equal length – ten and eleven 
years, and secondly the second subperiod is divided into two smaller ones – eight 
and three years in order to find the effect of financial crisis on R&D investment.  
The subperiods samples are also split according to four main 
measurements: firms age, size, intensity of investing in R&D projects, and total 
assets growth.  
 
3.5.1 Financial constraints criteria  
 
Investigating the implications of this study models requires separating 
firms according to a priori measures of the financing frictions that they face. There 
is‎ a‎ broad‎ range‎ of‎ possible‎ firms’‎ divisions‎ into‎ “financially‎ constrained”‎ and‎
“financially‎unconstrained”‎categories.‎However,‎there‎are‎no‎strong‎priors‎in‎the‎
literature about which classification is best; hence this paper employs a variety of 
alternative schemes to partition the sample: firm age (young versus mature) and 
dividend payout ratio (low versus high dividend). Additionally, firms are also 
divided according average R&D investment intensity‎ measured‎ with‎ firm’s‎
average over time ratio of R&D expense over total assets (small versus high R&D 
intensity),‎firm’s‎average‎R&D investment variability over time, measured with the 
average‎standard‎deviation‎of‎ firm’s‎R&D expenditure over time (small versus 
high R&D expenses variability) and the industry they belong to (high-tech versus 
                                            
32  If firm reports over all their valid year observations considered in the sample, R&D ratio equal 
0, then this will disrupt the interferences related with speed of investment adjustment, because 
this firm R&D investment is not dynamic owing the fact that it does not change from one year to 
another, therefore these firms are dropped. This elimination criterion was also applied due to a 
large number of firms reporting 0 R&D investments over their period of existence, which were 
influencing the results beyond the econometric theory.   
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non high-tech industry). Firms division according to their age, the number of 
years since their first market capitalization appears in Worldscope, (however data 
on UK firms is available only since year 1980, so to keep consistency US data 
starts from the same year) is based on the argument that firm age is likely to be 
strongly correlated with asymmetric information problems and has been used as 
a proxy for the presence of financing frictions in a number of recent studies (e.g., 
Rauh, 2006; Fee et al., (2009) and Brown et al., 2009, 2011). Firms are classified 
as young if their first market capitalization after 1980 is reported by Worldscope 
below the sample median. Firms are not permitted to switch between young and 
mature within a given subperiod. The division of firms according to dividend 
payout ratio exercise the intuition of Fazzari et al. (1988), among many others, 
that financially constrained firms have significantly lower payout ratios, they pay 
little or no dividends to investors. Fama and French (2002) use payout ratios as a 
measure of difficulties firms may face in assessing the financial markets. The 
third‎firms’‎division‎based‎on‎R&D‎investment‎intensity‎refers to the fact that firms 
of small investment have typically great investment opportunities, thus they are 
classed as financially constrained because they are not able to fulfill all their 
growth possibilities due to their financial limits. This classification aims also to 
provide some deeper insight in the behavior of firms intensively investing in R&D 
projects with the background of firms investing in R&D activities not so 
intensively.33  The‎fourth‎firms’‎split‎leads‎to‎idea‎of‎firms‎consistently‎investing in 
R&D projects versus firms investing in R&D projects in a very variable manner. 
The latter type of firms is usually linked with lack of finances, therefore a firms 
invests in short term R&D projects rather than long term ones. Finally, firms are 
divided on the basis of industry they belong to: high tech versus non-high tech 
firms.    
 
3.5.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3.1 presents variables definitions.  
 
                                            
33
 Bond et al., 2003 measures R&D intensity by ratio of R&D investment to sales. They focus on 
industries‎with‎above‎median‎R&D‎intensity‎and‎label‎these‎‘high‎tech’‎industries.  
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Table 3.‎01 Variables Definitions 
Variable Definition 
TA Total Assets 
R&D The ratio of research and development expenditures to total assets 
INV The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets 
TINV Total Investment = The sum of R&D investment plus INV 
CF 
The ratio of net income before extraordinary items and preferred dividends 
plus depreciation, depletion and amortization to total assets 
GCF Gross Cash Flow=The sum of CF plus R&D 
Q 
The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity to book value of total asset 
CASH The ratio of total cash and short term investment to total assets 
STOCK 
The ratio of sale of common and preferred stock minus purchase of common 
and preferred stock to total assets 
DEBT 
The ratio of long term debt issuance minus long term debt reduction to total 
assets 
SIZE The logarithm of TA 
AGE Number of years firm is publicly listed since 1980  
DIV The ratio of total cash dividend to total assets 
S Sales=Net Sales or Revenues 
SG (%) The ratio of sales growth equal to ∆sales over 1-period lagged sales 
Notes: This table provides the definitions of the main variables used in our analysis. 
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Table 3.2 R&D Intensity by Firm Sector and Average Firm Ratio of R&D over Sales 
  1990-1999 2000-2010 2000-2007 2008-2010 
  Obs. R&D/TA R&D/TINV Obs. R&D/TA R&D/TINV Obs. R&D/TA R&D/TINV Obs. R&D/TA R&D/TINV 
Panel A (US) 
            
Total 9279 0.069 0.454 15725 0.089 0.581 11302 0.088 0.573 3734 0.094 0.606 
High-Tech 
            
Chemicals 655 0.036 0.321 781 0.036 0.401 573 0.035 0.399 178 0.038 0.405 
Drugs,Cosmetics 
& Health Care 
1132 0.103 0.59 2501 0.136 0.698 1744 0.125 0.684 612 0.158 0.728 
Electrical 281 0.049 0.425 585 0.062 0.537 421 0.062 0.527 140 0.058 0.566 
Elactronics 3309 0.112 0.615 6336 0.119 0.718 4593 0.121 0.716 1496 0.118 0.734 
Machinery & 
Equipment 
819 0.039 0.421 1008 0.046 0.522 763 0.046 0.511 218 0.045 0.556 
Total High-Tech 6196 0.090 0.545 11211 0.108 0.665 8094 0.106 0.658 2644 0.113 0.688 
Total Non 
High-Tech 
3083 0.027 0.274 4514 0.045 0.373 3208 0.043 0.359 1090 0.051 0.408 
Firm Mean of 
RD/Sale>Median 
4643 0.119 0.646 7863 0.153 0.789 5650 0.150 0.782 1869 0.164 0.816 
Firm Mean of 
RD/Sale<Median 
4636 0.019 0.264 7862 0.027 0.374 5652 0.027 0.365 1865 0.026 0.395 
Panel B (UK) 
            
Total 2256 0.034 0.289 2834 0.066 0.496 1924 0.065 0.489 720 0.064 0.505 
High-Tech 
            
Chemicals 170 0.017 0.195 165 0.024 0.367 111 0.023 0.351 41 0.027 0.452 
153 
 
Drugs,Cosmetics 
& Health Care 
175 0.071 0.397 282 0.092 0.586 189 0.087 0.592 72 0.094 0.554 
Electrical 88 0.022 0.272 73 0.032 0.448 45 0.025 0.454 21 0.052 0.472 
Elactronics 547 0.066 0.47 1009 0.104 0.688 669 0.111 0.685 266 0.091 0.692 
Machinery & 
Equipment 
244 0.021 0.286 209 0.033 0.367 154 0.038 0.391 47 0.015 0.281 
Total High-Tech 1224 0.048 0.371 1738 0.083 0.592 1168 0.086 0.591 447 0.077 0.592 
Total Non 
High-Tech 
1032 0.018 0.193 1096 0.040 0.345 756 0.034 0.334 273 0.045 0.363 
Firm Mean of 
RD/Sale>median 
1132 0.060 0.437 1416 0.118 0.719 961 0.115 0.706 360 0.118 0.745 
Firm Mean of 
RD/Sale<median 
1124 0.008 0.140 1418 0.015 0.275 963 0.016 0.274 360 0.012 0.266 
Notes: This table presents the averages for the R&D over TA and R&D over TINV ratios of the US and UK sample firms by firm sector and average firm ratio of R&D 
over sales over the period 1990-2010 and over financial crisis. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 3.1. 
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Table 3.2‎ summarizes‎ information‎ on‎ the‎ R&D‎ activity‎ of‎ the‎ firms’‎
samples. For the first subperiod: 1990-1999 of US firms out of 9,279 firms, 6,196 
belong to the high-tech sector, for the second subperiod: 2000-2010 of US firms 
out of 15,725 firms, 11,211, belong to the high-tech sector, for the first subperiod: 
1990-1999 of UK firms out of 2,256 firms, 1,224 belong to the high-tech 
sector,and for the second subperiod: 2000-2010 of UK firms out of 2,834 firms, 
1,738, belong to the high-tech sector. As expected, high-tech firms are more R&D 
intensive than non-high tech firms in all subperiods. The two most R&D intensive 
sectors are Drugs, Cosmetics and Health Care and Electronics. As expected, the 
percentage ratio of R&D expenditures over total investment expenditures (R&D + 
capital investments) for high-tech companies is nearly twice as high as for the 
non high-tech sector. The same two sectors mentioned above: Drugs, Cosmetics 
and Health Care and Electronics, seem to domineer the high tech firms with their 
percentage ratio of R&D expenditures over total investment expenditures. Over 
the subperiods distinguishing financial crisis phenomena: 2000-2007 and 
2008-2010, ratio of R&D over total assets has dropped slightly for both US high 
tech‎ and‎ non‎ high‎ tech‎ firms’‎ groups, increased for UK high tech firms and 
decreased for UK non high tech firms. The percentage ratio of R&D expenditures 
over total investment expenditures shows same trend for US firms, whereas it 
decreases for UK high tech firms by only 0.01% and declines for UK non high 
tech firms. This is consistent with the argument that R&D firms do not adjust 
instantly their R&D investment in effect of unfavourable changes in financial 
constraints and that financing R&D activities is planned well in advance, due to its 
specificity. Thus one can conclude that R&D investment is well hedged. To 
certain extent financial crisis stopped the growth of R&D investment, but it has 
not decreased it, this suggests that R&D investment is a sticky decision.  
Table 3.3, provides the summary statistics (mean and median) for US 
firms (Panel A), UK firms (Panel B) small versus large US firms (Panel C) and 
small versus large UK firms (Panel D). The sample summary statistics are based 
on annual firm observations. The analysis of this work is based on the differences 
between small and large firms and changes over time. As discussed previously, 
all finance and investment values are scaled by beginning-of-period total assets. 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
  1990-1999 2000-2010 2000-2007 2008-2010 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A (US) 
        
R&D 0.069 0.039 0.090 0.054 0.088 0.054 0.095 0.055 
R&D/TINV 0.455 0.441 0.581 0.645 0.573 0.627 0.606 0.684 
INV 0.060 0.050 0.040 0.028 0.041 0.030 0.036 0.025 
CF 0.062 0.098 -0.013 0.068 -0.009 0.069 -0.014 0.068 
Q 2.018 1.556 2.145 1.674 2.212 1.733 1.821 1.452 
CASH 0.158 0.089 0.257 0.190 0.250 0.182 0.265 0.205 
STOCK 0.026 0.001 0.034 0.002 0.037 0.003 0.008 0 
DEBT 0.003 0.000 0.000 0 0.001 0.000 -0.003 0 
SIZE 8.14 5.37 8.60 5.42 8.55 5.36 8.80 5.66 
AGE 19.228 18 15.997 14 16.532 15 15.633 14 
DIV 0.013 0 0.010 0 0.010 0 0.012 0 
Share obs negative CF 0.162 
 
0.302 
 
0.297 
 
0.303 
 
Share obs positive DIV 0.494 
 
0.318 
 
0.320 
 
0.330 
 
Observations 9279 
 
15725 
 
11302 
 
3734 
 
Firms 1360 
 
2020 
 
1705 
 
1393 
 
Panel B (UK) 
        R&D 0.034 0.016 0.067 0.031 0.066 0.032 0.065 0.028
R&D/TINV 0.289 0.233 0.497 0.507 0.490 0.499 0.505 0.525 
INV 0.064 0.056 0.039 0.030 0.041 0.033 0.033 0.023 
CF 0.095 0.108 0.018 0.082 0.015 0.082 0.042 0.084 
Q 1.839 1.526 1.890 1.513 1.935 1.551 1.632 1.339 
CASH 0.130 0.093 0.187 0.118 0.184 0.113 0.180 0.121 
STOCK 0.031 0.002 0.047 0.000 0.044 0.001 0.030 0 
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DEBT 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.004 0 
SIZE 7.558 5.210 8.122 4.557 8.007 4.684 8.310 4.472 
AGE 19.305 20 16.048 14 17.378 16 14.696 12 
DIV 0.031 0.029 0.023 0.015 0.024 0.017 0.023 0.012 
Share obs negative CF 0.087 
 
0.249 
 
0.250 
 
0.211 
 
Share obs positive DIV 0.910 
 
0.623 
 
0.649 
 
0.597 
 
Observations 2256 
 
2834 
 
1924 
 
720 
 
Firms 290 
 
382 
 
296 
 
263 
 
Panel C (US) 
          Small Large Small Large 
 
1990-1999 1990-1999 2000-2010 2000-2010 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
R&D 0.095 0.063 0.043 0.027 0.125 0.084 0.055 0.034 
R&D/TINV 0.561 0.610 0.349 0.325 0.679 0.788 0.484 0.494 
INV 0.054 0.042 0.066 0.059 0.036 0.023 0.044 0.034 
CF 0.021 0.082 0.103 0.107 -0.097 0.015 0.071 0.090 
Q 2.100 1.563 1.935 1.551 2.241 1.689 2.049 1.662 
CASH 0.211 0.139 0.106 0.060 0.311 0.259 0.203 0.141 
STOCK 0.051 0.003 0.000 0 0.071 0.005 -0.002 0.000 
DEBT -0.002 -0.001 0.008 0.000 -0.002 0 0.003 0.000 
SIZE 4.268 3.836 8.825 7.189 4.222 3.749 9.290 7.356 
AGE 16.657 17 21.799 22 13.338 13 18.655 17 
DIV 0.008 0 0.019 0.014 0.007 0 0.013 0.001 
Share obs negative CF 0.272 
 
0.051 
 
0.472 
 
0.133 
 
Share obs positive DIV 0.232 
 
0.757 
 
0.130 
 
0.507 
 
Observations 4640 
 
4639 
 
7861 
 
7864 
 
Firms 737 
 
623 
 
1075 
 
945 
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Panel D (UK) 
        
R&D 0.048 0.026 0.021 0.011 0.091 0.046 0.042 0.020 
R&D/TINV 0.359 0.329 0.220 0.180 0.597 0.667 0.396 0.356 
INV 0.064 0.053 0.063 0.058 0.036 0.024 0.043 0.035 
CF 0.087 0.111 0.103 0.106 -0.040 0.058 0.076 0.094 
Q 1.957 1.535 1.721 1.522 2.000 1.451 1.779 1.540 
CASH 0.135 0.079 0.125 0.100 0.237 0.169 0.137 0.094 
STOCK 0.046 0.001 0.017 0.002 0.084 0.000 0.010 0.000 
DEBT -0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 
SIZE 4.188 3.875 8.232 6.719 3.514 3.247 8.814 6.473 
AGE 16.632 16 21.969 22 11.923 10 20.209 22 
DIV 0.028 0.027 0.033 0.031 0.014 0 0.032 0.024 
Share obs negative CF 0.134 
 
0.041 
 
0.372 
 
0.124 
 
Share obs positive DIV 0.829 
 
0.992 
 
0.422 
 
0.820 
 
Observations 1126 
 
1130 
 
1423 
 
1411 
 
Firms 151   139   206   176   
Notes: This table shows US and UK firms’ sample characteristics over the period 1990-2010. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in 
table 3.1. 
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On average size is growing with time for all subsamples apart from small 
firms in both countries. The median of size is growing over time for US sample 
(apart from small firms) but decreasing over time for UK sample, which indicates 
that more very small firms are able to be publicly listed. In general, the ratio of 
R&D investment over total assets increases with time. Particularly, on average it 
nearly doubles in size for UK firms and still grows for US firms even over the 
financial crisis period (mean equal 0.088 for 2000-2007 subperiod and 0.095 for 
2008-2010), while it stays almost the same for UK firms (respectively 0.066 and 
0.065).  After dividing firms into small and large groups one can learn that the 
R&D expenses ratio increases substantially over time (approximately doubles in 
some cases) for both small and large firms groups and for both countries this 
paper consider. Namely, for US firms the ratio increases on average from 0.095 
(median 0.063) to 0.125 (median 0.084) in case of small firms and for large firms 
it raises on average from 0.043 (median 0.027) to 0.055 (median 0.034).  For UK 
firms the ratio increases on average from 0.048 (median 0.026) to 0.91 (median 
0.046) in case of small firms and for large firms it raises on average from 0.021 
(median 0.011) to 0.042 (median 0.020). All in all, R&D expenditure ratio is higher 
in its absolute value for small firms than for large ones but over time it increases 
more in small firms group for US firms (on average, 31 %) than in large firms 
group for US firms (on average, 28 %), while opposite occurs for UK firms (89% 
increase for small firms and 100% for large firms), and also US firms invest in 
R&D much more than UK firms. To confirm over time changes of R&D investment 
the percentage ratio of R&D expenditures over total investment expenditures 
(R&D + capital investments) has been employed again.  In contrary with R&D 
expenditures ratio, the capital expenditures ratio decreases with time and 
appears to be affected by financial crisis in the sense that it drops even more in 
the last subperiod in both countries. On average capital expenditure ratio is 
greater for large firms for both US subperiods and for the second UK subperiod. 
On average US / UK small firms drop their physical investment ratio by 33% / 
44% from first subperiod to the second one and US / UK large firms decline the 
same investment by 33% / 32% over the same time period. Overall, these 
statistics illustrate a dramatic change in the composition of investment for publicly 
traded manufacturing firms in both US and UK. 
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Turning to sources of finance, 34  on average cash flow has declined 
dramatically from 0.062 / 0.095 (median 0.098 / 0.108) in the first subperiod: 
1990-1999 to -0.013 / 0.018 (median 0.068 / 0.082) in the second subperiod: 
2000-2010 for respectively US / UK firms. Interestingly, while cash flow measure 
falls down even further over the financial crisis period for the US firms, cash flow 
measure for UK firms increases over the same time period: 0.015 for 2000-2007 
subperiod to 0.042 for 2008-2010 subperiod. However, the median level of cash 
flow stays nearly on the same level for second, third and fourth subperiods for US 
(0.068) and UK (0.082). Small and large firms differ a lot in their cash flow levels. 
As expected, large firms have much higher level of cash flow over the time and 
for‎ both‎ firms’‎ categories‎ the‎ level‎ of‎ cash‎ flows‎ (measured‎ by‎ its‎ mean‎ or‎
median) declines dramatically over time in both countries.  Also the share of 
observations with negative cash flow increased substantially - approximately 
doubled over the time or more than doubled especially for large firms in both 
countries. Cash holdings level has increased over the time for all subgroups apart 
from the UK sample over the financial crisis period, where cash holdings have 
dropped slightly. Cash savings level is much higher for small firms than for large 
firms. Equity issues has increased from first to second subperiod but it dropped 
critically in the fourth subperiod for the US and UK firms.  Small firms issue much 
more stock than large firms, also small firms increased their stock over the time, 
whereas large firms decreased it in both countries. Debt issues, however, 
declined over time for all subgroups apart from small US firms, for which on 
average debt issues stayed the same over time and also average values of debt 
issues became negative for the fourth US subperiod, the second to fourth UK 
subperiods, both subperiods of US and UK small firms and last subperiod of large 
UK firms. The negative debt issues indicate that firms were paying off their debt 
rather than issuing it. Debt issues are relatively unimportant for all firms in all 
periods; the only exception seems to exist in the large subgroup of US firms for 
the subperiod: 1990-1999, where on average stock issue level is equal to zero 
and debt issue level reaches its maximum of 0.008.  
                                            
34
 Brown and Petersen (2009) employs gross cash flow ratio, which is cash flow before total 
investment plus R&D. In the US R&D expenses have 100% tax allowance, while in the UK only 
R&D expenses on capital expenditures which typically consist of 10% of total R&D expenses 
have 100% tax allowance. UK government introduces some tax credits for R&D firms but they still 
are not comparable with US 100% R&D tax allowance, therefore this paper concentrates on the 
standard measure of cash flow.  
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Dividend payment decreases over time for all subperiods over time, e.g. 
for small UK firms it halves down over time. Dividend payment is much bigger for 
large‎firms‎than‎small‎ones.‎Firms’‎age‎has‎also‎dropped‎over‎time,‎implying‎that‎
more young firms appeared on the stock market. And finally proxy for investment 
opportunities has increased from first to second subperiod for all, small and large 
UK and US firms, but it dropped down over the financial crisis period. As 
expected,‎Tobin’s‎Q‎is‎greater‎for‎small‎than‎large‎firms’‎classes.‎ 
Summarizing, the descriptive statistics demonstrate that much has 
changed for publicly traded non financial firms. In the first place, median and 
mean cash flows have decreased critically. This fall appears to be mainly due to 
the substantial increase in the amount of small and young firms with persistent 
negative cash flows and the increase in R&D investment, which can be expensed 
for accounting purposes.35  In the second, physical investment has declined 
sharply and also its share in total investment has dropped too. In the third place, 
there has been an increase in the use of public equity issues. In the fourth place, 
the R&D ratio for small firms over the 1990-2010 period and for the full sample 
over the last decade has risen to the point that it is considerably larger than the 
capital investment ratio. As discussed in hypotheses 1 and 2, the sharp rise in the 
R&D investment and the sharp decline in the physical investment together with 
the sharp decline in the cash flows over time, implies that the ICFS for R&D 
should be negative and should have risen in its negativity while for physical 
investment should be positive and should have fallen, other things held constant. 
As discussed in hypotheses 3 and 4, the substantial rise in cash holdings for 
every subsample over time suggests the great reliability of R&D firms on cash 
holdings, which is consistent with hedging policy. Lastly as discussed in 
hypothesis 6, the increased use of equity finance for small firms (but not large 
firms) is consistent with improvements in capital markets in recent decades. 
 
3.5.3 Plots of yearly averages 
 
                                            
35 A large number of US and UK IPOs in recent decades has persistent negative cash flows, 
while historically IPOs were usually profitable firms (a listing requirement). Fama and French 
(2004)‎study‎ this‎ ‘‘weaker”‎quality‎of‎ IPOs‎and‎conclude‎that‎a‎rightward‎shift in the supply of 
public equity finance appears to have given unprofitable firms improved access to public equity 
finance. Also see Ritter and Welch (2002). 
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Yearly plots of average ratios for the positive R&D samples appear in Fig. 
3.1 A - US and B – UK firms.  
 
Figure 3.1 A: US Plots of the Yearly Averages of R&D, INV, CF, CASH, 
STOCK and DEBT 
 
 
Figure 3.1 B: UK Plots of the Yearly Averages of R&D, INV, CF, CASH, 
STOCK and DEBT 
 
 
 
-0.1 
-0.05 
0 
0.05 
0.1 
0.15 
0.2 
0.25 
0.3 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
R&D 
CE 
CF 
CASH 
STOCK 
DEBT 
-0.1 
-0.05 
0 
0.05 
0.1 
0.15 
0.2 
0.25 
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
R&D 
CE 
CF 
CASH 
STOCK 
DEBT 
162 
 
For both US and UK firms debt issues are small in all years, while cash 
holdings are the main source of finance in nearly all years (only in year 1990 cash 
flow is higher than cash holdings for UK sample). Cash flow is another source of 
finances for R&D investment, but it is negative in years 2001 till 2003 and 2007 till 
2009 for US firms and in years 2002 and 2003 for UK firms.  Stock issues are 
highly volatile in both UK and US samples. Cash holdings are also volatile, and 
the sharp swings in average cash holdings line up closely with the sharp swings 
in stock issues. However, cash holdings have a strong upright trend while stock 
issues trend seems to be levelled and also it is important to emphasise that the 
swings in stock issues are much bigger than the swings in cash holdings. Cash 
holdings seem to be behaving differently than the rest of financial variables. 
Without a doubt, cash holdings grow distinguishably over time like no other 
variable. To certain extent the trend line of cash holdings seems to reflect the 
R&D investment trend line, while the trend line of cash flow reminds the trend line 
of capital expenditures especially in the first subperiod of UK firms. The line of 
R&D expenses is pretty stable over time with a visible upward trend for US firms, 
while in case of UK firms there are two stages of R&D investment, namely it rises 
steadily up to year 2000, then shoots up until year 2003 and drops smoothly until 
2010. The physical investment lines are rather stable over time with downwards 
trends. An interesting fact is that the line of R&D investment crosses the line on 
capital investment in year 1992 for US sample and in year 2001 for UK sample. 
Particularly this means that up to these years firms were investing more in 
physical investment than in R&D investment and opposite total investment 
composition appears after these years. This indicates that UK firms’ total 
investment composition gets changed in favour of R&D investment about 10 
years after US firms’ total investment composition gets changed in favour of R&D 
investment.  US firms have all their investment and financing lines within wider 
range in comparison with UK firms, which is expectable after taking into account 
samples’‎ sizes.‎ In‎ other‎ words,‎ UK‎ firms’‎ plots‎ show‎ (consistent‎ with‎ the‎
summary statistics) that they have far smaller average R&D and capital 
investment, cash flow, cash savings, stock and debt issues compared to US 
firms. Thus, the plots for UK firms display less of the volatility than US firms. 
Finally, the plots demonstrate clearly‎firms’‎reaction‎to‎financial‎crisis‎event.‎In‎
effect‎of‎financial‎crisis‎US‎firms’‎cash‎flow‎falls‎down‎sharply,‎the‎average‎cash‎
flow plot of UK firms shows two dips in year 2007 and 2009. Firms of both 
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countries show decline in net debt issues, also net stock issues decrease 
severely reaching its dip in 2008 for US firms and in 2009 for UK firms. This is 
consistent with the argument that during financial crisis external finances become 
more costly. In year 2008 firms of both countries show a dip in average cash 
stock plots, which increase again afterwards. The US average plot of R&D 
expenses presents a small increase in year 2008 and then it falls again slightly, 
while the UK average plot of R&D expenditures demonstrate steady decrease 
with time. For both countries, capital expenditure plot declines over financial 
crisis period. All plots indicate that especially in case of US firms, cash holdings 
have been drawn down in order to fund firms R&D activities. This is consistent 
with greater accounting benefits for US firms investing heavily in R&D investment 
in comparison to UK firms. Put differently, US firms present a rise in investing in 
R&D projects despite the financial crisis, because they can set their R&D 
expenses against the tax duties in 100%, while UK firms are able to do so only in 
fraction. This is an evidence of effective incentive mechanism set by government.     
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3.6 Empirical results 
 
In what follows we first demonstrate the results for our cross-sectional 
regressions by focusing on the question of how R&D ICFS changes over time 
after controlling for the firm-specific determinants. In section 4.5.2 we also 
consider the differences in R&D ICFS by high tech industries over time. Section 
4.5.3 provides results on the dynamic panel data model. In this section, we also 
concentrate on the question of how capital market imperfections affect firms with 
respect to their R&D investment decisions. 
 
3.6.1 Cross-sectional regressions by year 
 
This section studies the ICFS across full sample period by estimating a 
cross-sectional‎regression‎of‎investment‎on‎cash‎flow,‎Tobin’s‎Q and size in each 
year separately for R&D investment and capital investment in line with equation 
1. The results are reported in Table 3.4.  
A declining pattern of the capital ICFS over time is easily noticeable for US 
firms and with some distortions for UK firms, while for R&D investment the 
increasing pattern but negative of R&D ICFS is found. In 1991 the R&D ICFS is 
-0.0297 but statistically insignificant for US firms and -0.0573 and insignificant for 
UK firms. In 2010, the R&D ICFS is -0.143 and statistically significant for US firms 
and -0.121 and statistically significant for UK firms. This negative R&D ICFS is 
significant for all years, except the first one, at minimum 10% level in case of US 
firms and for 13 years in case of UK firms.   
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Table 3.4 Cross-Sectional Regressions by Year 
DV: R&D CF   Q   SIZE   Obs. AR2 
Panel A (US) 
       1991 -0.030 (-0.98) 0.011*** (2.69) -0.002 (-1.48) 583 0.302 
1992 -0.069* (-1.81) 0.010*** (3.99) -0.002** (-2.11) 643 0.275 
1993 -0.121*** (-2.99) 0.011*** (4.43) -0.003** (-2.55) 709 0.293 
1994 -0.133*** (-3.12) 0.012*** (4.23) -0.003** (-2.56) 721 0.296 
1995 -0.121*** (-5.09) 0.014*** (5.20) -0.005*** (-5.03) 981 0.337 
1996 -0.118*** (-4.85) 0.014*** (7.50) -0.004*** (-5.32) 1101 0.366 
1997 -0.177*** (-7.06) 0.013*** (5.96) -0.005*** (-5.49) 1177 0.393 
1998 -0.214*** (-7.00) 0.010*** (3.68) -0.006*** (-5.26) 1086 0.410 
1999 -0.155*** (-3.56) 0.011*** (3.37) -0.010*** (-6.71) 918 0.339 
2000 -0.168*** (-3.58) 0.007*** (3.09) -0.006*** (-4.25) 567 0.384 
2001 -0.098*** (-6.30) 0.006*** (3.49) -0.009*** (-7.41) 1222 0.284 
2002 -0.076*** (-4.99) 0.014*** (5.36) -0.011*** (-9.47) 1362 0.315 
2003 -0.086*** (-6.93) 0.010*** (3.60) -0.010*** (-9.58) 1499 0.298 
2004 -0.153*** (-7.48) 0.011*** (5.18) -0.006*** (-6.67) 1480 0.316 
2005 -0.157*** (-6.28) 0.011*** (4.81) -0.006*** (-5.82) 1471 0.320 
2006 -0.097*** (-3.12) 0.011*** (4.73) -0.008*** (-6.55) 1485 0.280 
2007 -0.167*** (-6.61) 0.014*** (5.29) -0.005*** (-4.09) 1452 0.331 
2008 -0.142*** (-5.66) 0.014*** (5.91) -0.005*** (-4.23) 1393 0.273 
2009 -0.136*** (-7.05) 0.021*** (4.77) -0.007*** (-5.38) 1232 0.276 
2010 -0.143*** (-5.65) 0.020*** (4.65) -0.008*** (-5.75) 1109 0.318 
p-value 0.0035 
 
0.1153 
 
0.0002 
   DV: INV 
        Panel B (US) 
       1991 0.093*** (5.91) 0.004 (1.51) 0.002** (2.52) 583 0.210 
1992 0.095*** (5.74) 0.003** (2.42) 0.003*** (3.12) 643 0.145 
1993 0.083*** (4.88) 0.006*** (4.06) 0.001* (1.65) 709 0.141 
1994 0.077*** (6.56) 0.006*** (3.74) 0.000 (0.51) 721 0.122 
1995 0.065*** (6.49) 0.007*** (3.66) 0.001 (1.56) 981 0.119 
1996 0.045*** (3.71) 0.005*** (3.47) 0.003*** (4.51) 1101 0.0965 
1997 0.030*** (3.02) 0.007*** (5.46) 0.002*** (3.64) 1177 0.116 
1998 0.038*** (4.84) 0.003*** (2.66) 0.002** (2.47) 1086 0.108 
1999 0.035*** (4.32) 0.004*** (3.35) 0.000 (0.63) 918 0.0967 
2000 0.033*** (3.77) 0.005*** (3.46) 0.001 (0.99) 567 0.0964 
2001 0.013 (1.49) 0.006*** (5.89) 0.001 (1.18) 1222 0.0558 
2002 0.007* (1.87) 0.004*** (4.30) 0.001** (2.03) 1362 0.0975 
2003 0.012*** (4.99) 0.004*** (4.71) 0.001** (2.52) 1499 0.104 
2004 0.016 (1.62) 0.004*** (3.97) 0.001 (1.36) 1480 0.0823 
2005 0.019*** (4.05) 0.002** (2.58) 0.001** (2.28) 1471 0.0890 
2006 0.019*** (4.95) 0.002*** (3.11) 0.001 (1.19) 1485 0.140 
2007 0.020*** (3.02) 0.003*** (3.93) 0.001 (1.22) 1452 0.122 
2008 0.009 (1.58) 0.004*** (4.26) 0.001* (1.89) 1393 0.113 
2009 0.012*** (3.51) 0.004*** (2.66) 0.001 (1.29) 1232 0.151 
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2010 0.015*** (2.79) 0.003** (2.42) 0.001 (1.25) 1109 0.0919 
p-value 0.0000 
 
0.8670 
 
0.1497 
   DV: R&D 
        Panel C (UK) 
       1991 -0.057 (-0.33) 0.021* (1.66) -0.002 (-1.18) 174 0.264 
1992 -0.101 (-1.14) 0.019** (2.25) -0.001 (-0.91) 201 0.334 
1993 -0.011 (-0.33) 0.010*** (2.79) 0.000 (0.00) 220 0.243 
1994 -0.036 (-1.05) 0.018*** (3.49) -0.001 (-0.84) 241 0.347 
1995 -0.083 (-1.40) 0.020*** (6.02) -0.002 (-1.54) 250 0.351 
1996 -0.108*** (-2.70) 0.018*** (2.67) -0.002 (-1.37) 246 0.361 
1997 -0.182*** (-4.38) 0.023*** (4.73) -0.004* (-1.66) 242 0.431 
1998 -0.198*** (-2.77) 0.022*** (3.69) -0.005** (-2.40) 214 0.437 
1999 -0.133** (-2.19) 0.016* (1.88) -0.006** (-2.36) 178 0.300 
2000 -0.031 (-0.90) 0.008* (1.95) -0.005** (-2.63) 105 0.298 
2001 -0.048 (-1.00) 0.011*** (3.28) -0.006** (-2.54) 200 0.147 
2002 -0.119*** (-4.62) 0.022*** (4.31) -0.004* (-1.91) 242 0.428 
2003 -0.069** (-2.50) 0.033*** (2.94) -0.009*** (-3.52) 266 0.269 
2004 -0.064*** (-3.05) 0.022*** (4.61) -0.007*** (-3.12) 252 0.290 
2005 -0.082* (-1.94) 0.027*** (2.81) -0.006** (-2.58) 252 0.362 
2006 -0.098* (-1.78) 0.020*** (2.91) -0.005 (-1.61) 258 0.222 
2007 -0.159*** (-3.34) 0.020*** (3.29) -0.001 (-0.42) 262 0.295 
2008 -0.146* (-1.97) 0.015** (1.97) 0.000 (0.13) 263 0.174 
2009 -0.132** (-2.08) 0.014 (1.37) -0.004* (-1.87) 246 0.172 
2010 -0.121* (-1.89) 0.036** (2.20) -0.003 (-1.12) 211 0.170 
p-value 0.7068 
 
0.4316 
 
0.6683 
   DV: INV 
        Panel D (UK) 
       1991 -0.043 (-0.40) 0.044*** (2.92) -0.004* (-1.76) 174 0.262 
1992 0.169*** (3.82) 0.002 (0.42) -0.001 (-0.75) 201 0.236 
1993 0.145*** (3.54) 0.004 (0.93) -0.001 (-0.74) 220 0.182 
1994 0.083*** (2.76) 0.015*** (3.53) -0.002 (-1.60) 241 0.203 
1995 0.055* (1.66) 0.008** (2.18) -0.002* (-1.89) 250 0.106 
1996 0.052** (2.08) 0.011** (2.56) -0.000 (-0.16) 246 0.154 
1997 0.066*** (3.76) 0.005*** (3.31) 0.000 (0.40) 242 0.123 
1998 0.063*** (2.63) 0.007** (2.29) 0.001 (0.42) 214 0.153 
1999 0.060** (2.35) 0.005 (1.60) -0.000 (-0.29) 178 0.0206 
2000 0.145*** (3.52) 0.005* (1.81) -0.003 (-1.35) 105 0.141 
2001 0.027 (1.61) 0.001 (0.32) -0.000 (-0.29) 200 -0.0328 
2002 0.012** (2.47) 0.003** (2.29) 0.000 (0.54) 242 0.182 
2003 0.005 (1.56) 0.003 (1.53) 0.000 (0.12) 266 0.0963 
2004 0.013** (2.55) 0.004 (1.65) 0.002** (2.29) 252 0.102 
2005 0.041*** (2.98) 0.004* (1.78) 0.000 (0.03) 252 0.0638 
2006 0.052*** (3.19) 0.004*** (2.65) 0.001 (0.74) 258 0.157 
2007 0.017 (1.43) 0.003 (1.57) 0.000 (0.23) 262 0.111 
2008 0.027*** (3.98) 0.003* (1.91) 0.001 (1.30) 263 0.114 
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2009 0.032*** (3.04) 0.004** (2.06) -0.000 (-0.14) 246 0.0886 
2010 0.027** (2.45) 0.000 (0.10) 0.001 (0.71) 211 0.199 
p-value 0.4864 
 
0.0018 
 
0.0416 
   Notes: This table displays results from the year by year investment regressions in equation 1. 
Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 3.1. All regressions include 
industry dummies. P-values are for the null hypothesis that the coefficients are the same between 
the first (1991) and the last (2010) years. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we 
use consistent to heteroskedasticity standard errors.   
 
To better explain the R&D ICFS over time two groups of plots for full 
samples of US and UK firms were created and are demonstrated in Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.2 A: US Cross-Sectional Regressions by Year 1990-2010  
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 B: UK Cross-Sectional Regressions by Year 1990-2010 
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Both groups of plots show that the R&D ICFS for both countries are very 
volatile over the years and most importantly that their linear trends are 
downwards. Furthermore, for R&D investment, various OLS estimates show that, 
even after controlling for negative cash flows firms, there is still an downward 
negative R&D ICFS trend for US firms and for UK firms the R&D ICFS is 
interchangeably positive and negative but hardly ever significant (in the last 
year-financial crisis period, the R&D ICFS is strongly negative and significant). As 
expected the R&D ICFS is negative (and in most years significant) over time for 
negative cash flow firms for US.  
 
3.6.2 Baseline empirical findings 
 
In this section we consider the differences in R&D ICFS by high tech 
industries over time to show that the aggregate picture is not just a function of 
national high tech industry composition (as one may suspect), but mostly one of 
firm level differences in R&D spending.  
Table 3.5 presents the estimation results for the primary specification in 
Equation (2) for each of the five high tech industry groups: chemicals; drugs, 
cosmetics and health care; electrical; electronics and machinery & equipment. 
The model is estimated with OLS technique due to small number of firm-year 
observations for the UK sample in each high tech industry. Within each industry 
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group, the sample is divided into two consecutive subsample periods and the 
regression coefficients are estimated for each of them, of course separately for 
US‎and‎UK‎firms’‎samples.‎Time dummies are included but are not reported. The 
standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the firm level. The 
residuals (errors) are identically and independently distributed. 
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Table 3.5 Cash Flow Sensitivity of R&D Investment by Industry: 
Augmented Model (OLS) 
DV: R&D Chemicals 
Drugs, Cosmetics 
& Health Care 
Electrical Elactronics 
Machinery 
& 
Equipment 
Panel A (US) 1990-1999         
CF -0.210*** -0.191*** -0.120* -0.184*** -0.044 
 
(-3.35) (-5.72) (-1.87) (-11.17) (-1.53) 
      
Q 0.019*** 0.011*** 0.012* 0.011*** 0.013*** 
 
(4.51) (5.79) (1.89) (8.28) (4.71) 
      
SIZE -0.000 0.000 -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.002** 
 
(-0.45) (0.25) (-5.93) (-9.00) (-2.51) 
      
CASH 0.015 0.162*** 0.067** 0.100*** 0.063*** 
 
(0.69) (7.26) (2.08) (12.03) (3.13) 
      
STOCK 0.036 -0.023 0.011 -0.036*** 0.008 
 
(1.09) (-1.11) (0.40) (-2.73) (0.44) 
      
DEBT 0.011 -0.051* -0.035 -0.050* 0.006 
 
(0.67) (-1.74) (-1.12) (-1.95) (0.44) 
      
_cons 0.027*** 0.045*** 0.078*** 0.113*** 0.027*** 
 
(3.21) (4.35) (5.46) (15.78) (4.50) 
Obs. 566 956 241 2814 705 
AR2 0.444 0.447 0.395 0.325 0.0904 
      
Panel B (US) 2000-2010 
    
CF -0.041* -0.220*** -0.076*** -0.099*** -0.038 
 
(-1.85) (-7.89) (-3.14) (-8.52) (-1.62) 
      
Q 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.006** 
 
(3.33) (6.43) (3.76) (11.06) (2.37) 
      
SIZE -0.004*** 0.000 -0.010*** -0.013*** -0.004*** 
 
(-4.30) (0.10) (-7.81) (-18.01) (-3.16) 
      
CASH 0.077*** 0.209*** 0.104*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 
 
(3.85) (14.55) (5.65) (12.84) (4.63) 
      
STOCK -0.038 0.006 -0.059** -0.028** -0.020 
 
(-1.07) (0.27) (-2.46) (-2.24) (-0.85) 
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DEBT -0.031 -0.022 -0.041 -0.048*** 0.003 
 
(-1.55) (-0.88) (-0.96) (-3.28) (0.17) 
      
_cons 0.041*** 0.031** 0.063*** 0.134*** 0.047*** 
 
(4.06) (2.57) (5.06) (20.41) (4.39) 
Obs. 685 2160 509 5544 887 
AR2 0.257 0.482 0.424 0.256 0.107 
      
Panel C (UK) 1990-1999 
    
CF -0.059** -0.150** -0.000 -0.131*** -0.043* 
 
(-2.45) (-2.31) (-0.02) (-3.94) (-1.88) 
      
Q 0.005*** 0.021*** 0.002 0.016*** 0.012*** 
 
(2.91) (4.98) (0.69) (4.48) (5.45) 
      
SIZE -0.002*** 0.000 -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
 
(-3.87) (0.05) (-7.51) (-4.71) (-5.59) 
      
CASH -0.010 0.242*** 0.020 0.057*** 0.015 
 
(-0.93) (5.62) (0.75) (2.89) (1.25) 
      
STOCK 0.005 -0.022 -0.009 0.007 0.006 
 
(0.29) (-0.51) (-0.71) (0.24) (0.39) 
      
DEBT 0.002 0.159 -0.033* -0.018 0.006 
 
(0.16) (1.57) (-1.87) (-0.56) (0.51) 
      
_cons 0.029*** -0.014 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.050*** 
 
(4.79) (-0.75) (5.52) (4.99) (6.23) 
Obs. 148 152 76 475 215 
Adj.R2 0.0989 0.701 0.277 0.271 0.277 
      
Panel D (UK) 2000-2010 
    
CF -0.055*** -0.126*** -0.326*** -0.091*** -0.129*** 
 
(-2.89) (-6.06) (-4.78) (-5.23) (-3.86) 
      
Q 0.004* 0.018*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 
 
(1.83) (4.48) (3.28) (6.64) (5.81) 
      
SIZE -0.001** 0.005*** -0.015*** -0.006*** -0.007*** 
 
(-2.10) (2.64) (-5.70) (-3.33) (-4.08) 
      
CASH 0.003 0.230*** 0.094*** 0.077*** -0.011 
 
(0.24) (6.28) (3.40) (4.05) (-0.36) 
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STOCK 0.005 -0.072** -0.048** 0.020 0.038 
 
(0.29) (-2.27) (-2.18) (0.93) (0.65) 
      
DEBT -0.001 -0.079 0.026 0.020 -0.027 
 
(-0.07) (-1.59) (0.90) (0.53) (-0.61) 
      
_cons 0.027*** -0.010 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.026** 
 
(4.50) (-0.37) (3.45) (3.57) (2.40) 
Obs. 141 245 64 871 182 
Adj.R2 0.404 0.430 0.816 0.291 0.577 
Notes: This table presents the OLS estimation results of the R&D investment model in 
equation 2. The US and UK firms' samples are divided by industry. Analytical definitions 
for all the variables are provided in table 3.1. All regressions include industry and time 
dummies. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient 
is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to 
heteroskedasticity standard errors.   
 
 
For US firms in both subperiods the R&D ICFS is negative for all industries 
and statistically insignificant only for machinery & equipment. For UK firms in the 
first subperiod the R&D ICFS is negative and significant for four out of five 
industries. Electrical industry shows insignificant R&D ICFS. In the second 
subperiod, UK firms report negative and significant R&D ICFS over all five 
industries. The economic magnitude for ICFS is highest for UK electrical industry 
in the second subperiod: -0.326. That is: a one-dollar increase in cash flow 
decreases R&D investment by 32 cents. Put differently, in economic terms, this 
estimate suggests that for each dollar of internal cash flow shortfall (normalized 
by assets), a firm will spend up to 32 cents on new R&D activities. Overall for both 
countries the ICFS is negative in both subperiods, which is in line with this 
paper’s‎findings‎so‎far.‎ 
The next step of this section is estimating equation (2) over the entire 
sample (pooling together financially constrained and unconstrained firms). This is 
done in order to verify patterns of R&D investment cash flow sensitivity and that 
well documented patterns of physical investment cash flow sensitivity. The 
results are reported in table 3.6.  
The coefficient associated with CF displays the usual positive association 
between capital investment and profitability, and negative association between 
R&D investment and cash flow. The positive coefficients of cash flow in physical 
investment regression decreases in its magnitude over time and also the 
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negative coefficient of cash flow in R&D investment regression declines in its 
magnitude‎over‎time‎for‎both‎countries’‎samples.‎The‎coefficients‎on‎the‎control‎
variables conform to the previous literature. An increase in investment 
opportunities makes it more likely that both sets of firms: US and UK will invest in 
both R&D and capital investment, however firms are more likely to invest more in 
R&D than in capital investment as time goes by.  
To summarize,‎ this‎ simple‎ analysis‎ indicates‎ aligned‎ changes‎ in‎ firms’‎
total investment composition policies, respectively R&D investment is going up, 
and the physical investment is going down. Also, the R&D ICFS is negative with a 
downward trend but the impact of cash holdings on R&D investment substantially 
increases over time for both UK and US sample. Also the R&D ICFS sensitivity is 
higher in size for the US sample than UK one, while the capital ICFS is lower for 
the US sample than UK one.  
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Table 3.6 Cash Flow Sensitivity of R&D Investment: Augmented Model 
(OLS) 
  1990-1999 
 
2000-2010 
Dep. Var:  R&D INV 
 
R&D INV 
Panel A (US) 
     
CF -0.163*** 0.028*** 
 
-0.117*** 0.009*** 
 
(-12.21) (6.32) 
 
(-13.69) (5.95) 
      
Q 0.011*** 0.004*** 
 
0.011*** 0.003*** 
 
(12.32) (9.65) 
 
(12.81) (10.58) 
      
SIZE -0.003*** 0.002*** 
 
-0.007*** 0.001*** 
 
(-9.69) (8.36) 
 
(-16.81) (7.44) 
      
CASH 0.097*** -0.018*** 
 
0.127*** -0.019*** 
 
(14.63) (-5.49) 
 
(24.10) (-11.72) 
      
STOCK -0.011 0.031*** 
 
0.014 0.016*** 
 
(-1.23) (5.87) 
 
(1.64) (5.36) 
      
DEBT -0.020* 0.024*** 
 
-0.024** 0.017*** 
 
(-1.85) (3.74) 
 
(-2.41) (3.88) 
      
_cons 0.065*** 0.032*** 
 
0.075*** 0.023*** 
 
(18.41) (14.87) 
 
(18.71) (15.33) 
Obs. 7919 7919 
 
13705 13705 
Adj.R2 0.469 0.101 
 
0.396 0.111 
      
Panel B (UK) 
    
CF -0.131*** 0.062*** 
 
-0.106*** 0.013*** 
 
(-6.16) (5.23) 
 
(-7.79) (3.32) 
      
Q 0.017*** 0.007*** 
 
0.023*** 0.002*** 
 
(8.58) (5.83) 
 
(8.54) (3.30) 
      
SIZE -0.003*** -0.000 
 
-0.003*** 0.001*** 
 
(-6.37) (-1.20) 
 
(-3.99) (2.63) 
      
CASH 0.083*** -0.028*** 
 
0.104*** -0.013*** 
 
(5.38) (-3.71) 
 
(7.73) (-3.57) 
      
STOCK 0.009 0.013 
 
-0.004 0.010* 
 
(0.68) (1.28) 
 
(-0.22) (1.85) 
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DEBT 0.018 0.035*** 
 
0.002 0.008 
 
(0.82) (3.16) 
 
(0.11) (1.14) 
      
_cons 0.025*** 0.049*** 
 
0.025*** 0.022*** 
 
(5.34) (12.28) 
 
(3.20) (8.47) 
Obs. 1966 1966 
 
2452 2452 
Adj.R2 0.460 0.157 
 
0.393 0.136 
Notes: This table presents the OLS estimation results over time of the R&D investment 
model in equation 2. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 3.1. 
All regressions include industry and time dummies. T-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to heteroskedasticity standard errors. 
 
 
3.6.3 GMM results 
 
We now proceed to motivate the dynamic model, in order to identify an 
approach that allows firms to adjust towards the target R&D investment level with 
the possibility of delays following changes in firm-specific characteristics and/or 
random shocks. Table 3.7 reports the results obtained from estimating equation 
(2). Panel A provides estimates of the dynamic R&D regression for full samples of 
US and UK firms in the two sample periods. Panel B delivers estimates for young 
and mature firms, panel C for firms with low versus high dividend payout ratio, 
panel D for firms with the ratio of R&D expenses over total assets below the 
sample median versus above the sample median, panel E for firms with the 
average lower versus higher variability of R&D investment, and panel F for firms 
belonging to High tech industries versus firms belonging to Non high tech 
industries. In all specifications, all variables are treated as endogenous. Also, 
time dummies are included among the independent variables under all 
specifications but they are treated as exogenous.  
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Table 3.7 Cash Flow Sensitivity of R&D Investment: Augmented Regression Model (GMM) 
 
DV: R&D 1990-1999 2000-2010     1990-1999 2000-2010 
  Panel A US  - Full Sample 
   
UK - Full Sample 
  
 
  
   
  
  L.R&D 0.642*** 0.805*** 
  
0.844*** 0.772*** 
 
 
(10.47) (19.88) 
   
(11.39) (12.84) 
  CF -0.150*** -0.062*** 
  
-0.065*** -0.081*** 
 
 
(-5.42) (-2.87) 
   
(-2.93) (-6.05) 
  Q 0.008*** -0.001 
   
0.005* 0.008* 
  
 
(3.56) (-0.35) 
   
(1.84) (1.87) 
  SIZE -0.002 -0.002 
   
-0.002 0.004 
  
 
(-0.94) (-1.22) 
   
(-1.08) (1.36) 
  CASH 0.068*** 0.047*** 
  
0.052** 0.052** 
  
 
(3.86) (3.65) 
   
(2.52) (2.40) 
  STOCK -0.047** -0.008 
   
-0.022 -0.053** 
  
 
(-2.09) (-0.30) 
   
(-0.77) (-2.02) 
  DEBT 0.059 -0.036 
   
0.110* 0.013 
  
 
(1.11) (-0.89) 
   
(1.84) (0.24) 
  
          Obs. 7919 13705 
   
1966 2452 
  Firms 1360 2020 
   
290 382 
  AR1-p value 9.91e-12 3.40e-15 
   
0.000347 0.00000588 
 AR2-p value 0.641 0.541 
   
0.148 0.264 
  Hansen-p 
value 0.223 0.0446 
   
0.630 0.0391 
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  1990-1999 1990-1999 2000-2010 2000-2010 1990-1999 1990-1999 2000-2010 2000-2010 
DV: R&D Young  Mature Young  Mature   Young  Mature Young  Mature 
Panel B US 
    
UK 
   
          L.R&D 0.661*** 0.718*** 0.774*** 0.777*** 0.797*** 0.790*** 0.752*** 0.856*** 
 
(9.13) (9.79) (16.32) (17.71) 
 
(9.79) (15.08) (12.43) (9.72) 
CF -0.137*** -0.056* -0.074*** -0.102*** -0.082*** 0.018 -0.081*** -0.062*** 
 
(-4.46) (-1.82) (-3.34) (-4.58) 
 
(-2.99) (1.12) (-5.52) (-3.19) 
Q 0.012*** 0.000 0.002 0.004 
 
0.007*** 0.006*** 0.009** 0.004 
 
(3.28) (0.05) (0.58) (1.32) 
 
(2.66) (3.79) (2.01) (1.31) 
SIZE -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 
 
-0.003 -0.002** 0.007** -0.000 
 
(-0.89) (-0.40) (-1.19) (-0.03) 
 
(-1.14) (-1.98) (1.97) (-0.09) 
CASH 0.051** 0.077*** 0.045*** 0.026 
 
0.078*** -0.020 0.049** 0.043* 
 
(2.09) (4.06) (2.85) (1.60) 
 
(2.76) (-1.50) (2.23) (1.89) 
STOCK -0.040* -0.030 -0.047* 0.052 
 
-0.023 -0.041** -0.041 -0.047*** 
 
(-1.66) (-1.18) (-1.86) (1.45) 
 
(-0.83) (-2.23) (-1.64) (-4.06) 
DEBT -0.024 0.017 -0.009 -0.062 
 
0.097* 0.029 -0.013 0.006 
 
(-0.47) (0.56) (-0.17) (-1.20) 
 
(1.81) (1.04) (-0.26) (0.22) 
          Obs. 3803 4116 6995 6710 
 
1073 893 1227 1225 
Firms 842 518 1194 826 
 
180 110 227 155 
AR1-p value 5.76e-11 0.00196 1.09e-10 2.30e-09 
 
0.000583 0.0290 0.0000494 0.0297 
AR2-p value 0.749 0.396 0.0538 0.126 
 
0.177 0.185 0.105 0.0673 
Hansen-p 
value 0.501 0.118 0.0903 0.0147 
 
0.567 0.998 0.333 0.642 
DV: R&D Low DIV High DIV Low DIV High  DIV   Low DIV High DIV Low DIV High DIV 
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Panel C USA   
    
UK 
   
          L.R&D 0.588*** 0.838*** 0.810*** 0.758*** 0.725*** 0.928*** 0.743*** 0.810*** 
 
(8.84) (16.79) (18.75) (12.81) 
 
(10.35) (19.24) (12.25) (6.07) 
CF -0.164*** -0.038 -0.047** -0.096*** -0.081*** -0.017 -0.082*** -0.034 
 
(-5.72) (-0.95) (-2.22) (-4.11) 
 
(-2.90) (-0.84) (-5.55) (-1.05) 
Q 0.008*** 0.004** 0.002 -0.001 
 
0.006** 0.005 0.010** 0.007 
 
(2.72) (2.51) (0.65) (-0.22) 
 
(2.13) (1.64) (2.01) (1.36) 
SIZE -0.001 0.000 -0.005* 0.001 
 
-0.003 -0.001 0.008** -0.003 
 
(-0.19) (0.18) (-1.79) (0.81) 
 
(-0.77) (-1.13) (2.01) (-0.97) 
CASH 0.086*** 0.023 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.101*** 0.014 0.060** -0.004 
 
(3.95) (1.02) (3.35) (2.84) 
 
(2.92) (1.48) (2.56) (-0.26) 
STOCK -0.055** 0.025 -0.014 0.021 
 
-0.031 0.012 -0.050** -0.033 
 
(-2.41) (0.71) (-0.49) (0.68) 
 
(-1.04) (0.72) (-1.96) (-1.12) 
DEBT 0.077 -0.005 -0.041 -0.016 
 
0.153** -0.014 0.009 -0.013 
 
(1.33) (-0.12) (-0.87) (-0.40) 
 
(2.49) (-0.74) (0.20) (-0.27) 
          Obs. 3908 4011 7774 5931 
 
982 984 1209 1243 
Firms 740 620 1221 799 
 
150 140 207 175 
AR1-p value 2.18e-12 0.0165 9.88e-14 6.96e-08 
 
0.000541 0.0133 0.0000104 0.0956 
AR2-p value 0.645 0.953 0.640 0.685 
 
0.501 0.0275 0.392 0.218 
Hansen-p 
value 0.157 0.672 0.0859 0.319 
 
0.456 0.785 0.340 0.345 
DV: R&D Rdm<Median Rdm>Median Rdm<Median Rdm>Median Rdm<Median Rdm>Median Rdm<Median Rdm>Median 
Panel D US Rdm-mean of R&D 
  
UK 
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L.R&D 0.632*** 0.548*** 0.661*** 0.761*** 0.748*** 0.799*** 0.431*** 0.731*** 
 
(9.14) (8.14) (12.48) (16.91) 
 
(8.86) (12.50) (5.10) (11.46) 
CF 0.005 -0.172*** -0.016** -0.079*** -0.005 -0.071*** -0.005 -0.081*** 
 
(0.82) (-5.73) (-2.27) (-3.97) 
 
(-0.50) (-2.94) (-0.62) (-6.06) 
Q -0.000 0.007*** 0.000 0.001 
 
0.001 0.006** 0.003** 0.008* 
 
(-0.52) (2.71) (0.25) (0.36) 
 
(1.57) (2.12) (2.12) (1.76) 
SIZE -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 
 
-0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.006* 
 
(-1.28) (-0.57) (1.21) (-1.44) 
 
(-0.96) (-1.09) (-1.53) (1.82) 
CASH 0.003 0.073*** 0.015*** 0.050*** -0.001 0.055** 0.016** 0.054** 
 
(0.65) (3.44) (3.10) (2.97) 
 
(-0.27) (2.12) (2.04) (2.24) 
STOCK -0.006 -0.052** -0.022* -0.009 
 
0.003 -0.031 0.003 -0.044* 
 
(-0.69) (-2.15) (-1.82) (-0.33) 
 
(0.87) (-1.14) (0.35) (-1.84) 
DEBT 0.008 0.048 0.008 -0.057 
 
0.008 0.120 0.009 0.003 
 
(0.96) (0.74) (0.83) (-1.05) 
 
(1.63) (1.63) (1.01) (0.05) 
          Obs. 3985 3934 6846 6859 
 
982 984 1228 1224 
Firms 660 700 1009 1011 
 
146 144 188 194 
AR1-p value 4.39e-08 1.73e-09 5.39e-10 5.44e-14 
 
0.00525 0.000420 0.000251 0.0000164 
AR2-p value 0.851 0.624 0.0378 0.523 
 
0.117 0.138 0.0291 0.296 
Hansen-p 
value 0.109 0.255 0.0300 0.230 
 
0.484 0.515 0.362 0.561 
DV: R&D sd<Median sd>Median sd<Median sd>Median sd<Median sd>Median sd<Median sd>Median 
Panel E US sd-R&D standard deviation 
 
UK 
   
          L.R&D 0.955*** 0.604*** 0.906*** 0.790*** 0.894*** 0.808*** 0.842*** 0.741*** 
 
(38.29) (9.75) (46.76) (18.30) 
 
(31.06) (11.87) (19.97) (12.56) 
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CF -0.002 -0.155*** -0.008** -0.059*** -0.002 -0.070*** 0.008 -0.080*** 
 
(-0.29) (-5.18) (-2.05) (-2.67) 
 
(-0.50) (-2.98) (1.14) (-5.74) 
Q 0.000 0.007*** 0.000 0.001 
 
0.001* 0.006** 0.000 0.010** 
 
(0.06) (2.61) (0.14) (0.21) 
 
(1.76) (2.31) (0.05) (2.19) 
SIZE -0.000 -0.001 0.001** -0.005* 
 
-0.000 -0.003 -0.000 0.007** 
 
(-0.04) (-0.21) (2.35) (-1.83) 
 
(-0.30) (-1.17) (-0.48) (2.19) 
CASH 0.004 0.080*** 0.009*** 0.057*** 0.004* 0.060** 0.009** 0.045* 
 
(1.42) (4.10) (3.40) (3.18) 
 
(1.75) (2.11) (2.12) (1.95) 
STOCK 0.008 -0.050** -0.016*** -0.028 
 
-0.002 -0.031 0.000 -0.053** 
 
(1.24) (-2.07) (-2.83) (-0.91) 
 
(-0.86) (-1.15) (0.03) (-2.14) 
DEBT -0.003 0.062 -0.007 -0.027 
 
-0.004 0.122* 0.004 -0.021 
 
(-0.66) (1.00) (-1.07) (-0.54) 
 
(-1.27) (1.87) (0.63) (-0.40) 
          Obs. 3981 3938 6855 6850 
 
986 980 1236 1216 
Firms 663 697 997 1023 
 
146 144 186 196 
AR1-p value 4.62e-20 2.70e-10 1.18e-29 1.24e-14 
 
0.00000697 0.000297 2.89e-08 0.00000692 
AR2-p value 0.120 0.636 0.0168 0.514 
 
0.178 0.141 0.968 0.266 
Hansen-p 
value 0.0468 0.316 0.128 0.307 
 
0.639 0.443 0.188 0.480 
DV: R&D High-Tech 
Non 
High-Tech High-Tech Non High-Tech High-Tech 
Non 
High-Tech High-Tech 
Non 
High-Tech 
Panel F US 
    
UK 
   
          L.R&D 0.593*** 0.733*** 0.771*** 0.829*** 0.805*** 0.862*** 0.768*** 0.737*** 
 
(9.44) (8.31) (19.72) (10.22) 
 
(12.06) (12.67) (12.13) (11.14) 
CF -0.187*** -0.019 -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.082*** -0.007 -0.090*** -0.091*** 
 
(-6.36) (-1.24) (-2.62) (-3.80) 
 
(-3.11) (-1.19) (-6.81) (-2.97) 
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Q 0.007*** 0.002 0.000 0.003 
 
0.006* 0.004* 0.009** 0.006 
 
(3.21) (0.97) (0.07) (1.35) 
 
(1.90) (1.73) (2.04) (1.18) 
SIZE -0.000 -0.001 -0.005** 0.003* 
 
-0.002 -0.000 0.006* 0.002 
 
(-0.14) (-0.66) (-2.51) (1.66) 
 
(-0.51) (-0.25) (1.75) (1.20) 
CASH 0.070*** 0.024 0.044*** 0.043** 
 
0.045** -0.003 0.040* 0.058*** 
 
(3.68) (1.42) (3.07) (2.10) 
 
(2.17) (-0.34) (1.71) (3.26) 
STOCK -0.064*** 0.035* -0.034 -0.002 
 
-0.010 -0.022*** -0.038 -0.072** 
 
(-2.59) (1.66) (-1.34) (-0.04) 
 
(-0.32) (-2.61) (-1.58) (-2.44) 
DEBT 0.065 0.029 -0.043 -0.009 
 
0.140** 0.040* -0.021 -0.046 
 
(1.03) (1.17) (-0.88) (-0.17) 
 
(1.98) (1.70) (-0.40) (-1.25) 
          Obs. 5282 2637 9785 3920 
 
1066 900 1503 949 
Firms 914 446 1426 594 
 
158 132 235 147 
AR1-p value 6.45e-10 0.00181 2.92e-17 0.00889 
 
0.000615 0.00241 0.0000744 0.0112 
AR2-p value 0.852 0.158 0.383 0.522 
 
0.146 0.111 0.500 0.148 
Hansen-p 
value 0.163 0.417 0.171 0.148 
 
0.696 0.830 0.143 0.893 
Notes: This table presents the GMM estimation results over time of the investment model in equation 3. The estimations use pre-determined firms selection 
into two classes:  poor vs. intensive R&D investment firms (Panel E), high vs. low R&D investment variability (Panel F) and high tech vs. non high tech 
firms (Panel G). Constraint category assignments employ ex ante criteria based on firm age (Panel B), dividend (Panel C) and size (Panel D). Analytical 
definitions for all the variables are provided in table 3.1. All regressions include time dummies. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We 
report the Hansen test, which is a test of over-identifying restrictions. AR1 and AR2 are tests for the absence of first order and second order correlation in the 
residuals. These test statistics are asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.    
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The results reveal that the dynamic nature of our R&D investment model is 
not rejected. In all regressions the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is positive and significantly different from zero. The adjustment speed, 
given by 1 minus the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 
smaller than about 0.4, possibly providing evidence that firms adjust their R&D 
investment relatively slowly in an attempt to reach the target R&D investment 
ratio. This can lend support to the view that firms trade-off between costs of 
adjustment towards target R&D investment and costs of being off target. One 
possible explanation for the relatively low value of the adjustment coefficient 
might be that the costs of deviating from the target are not significant. However, 
the value of the adjustment coefficient may also be taken as a support to the view 
that the adjustment process is costly. Specifically, it may suggest that adjustment 
costs are higher resulting in lower speeds of adjustment. The lower speed of 
adjustment for R&D investment can be explained by either the fact that R&D 
investment has very low collateral value, and hence it struggles to rely on debt 
finances, or the fact that R&D investment has high adjustment costs in the sense 
that a large part of R&D expenditure is wages for highly qualified staff that cannot 
be hired or fired fast. Overall, the results lend strong support to the view that firms 
tend to trade-off between costs of speedy adjustment and costs of delay in 
achieving the target R&D investment ratio. 
The R&D ICFS estimates show the same patterns reported in Table 3.6, 
as controls for alternative internal and external funding sources are included. The 
cash flow sensitivity estimates are all negative and significant for the full samples 
of different subperiods, and for most of constrained and unconstrained firms. The 
results in panel B and C for both UK and US firms in both subperiods clearly 
suggest that a negative relation between internal funds and R&D expenditures 
holds for the subsample of firms that are most likely to face high financing costs, 
but it is insignificant for unconstrained firms. These findings are consistent to 
some extent with the theory of Fazzari et al. (1988) stating that unconstrained 
firms are not expected to be influenced by the adjustment costs argument. The 
second subperiod: 2000-2010 covers financial crisis period, which usually is 
expected to produce more pronounced effects. Furthermore, the negative and 
significant ICFS applies typically to firms with more intensive R&D investment, 
measured with ratio of R&D to assets. In panel E the variability of R&D expenses 
clearly divides firms of negative and significant ICFS and negative or even 
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positive and insignificant ICFS. The first one refers to firms with average R&D 
variability measure above the median level and of course the latter one to their 
counterparts. Similar trend can be observed in panel F especially over the first 
subperiod, where firms belonging to High tech industries show very negative 
R&D ICFS in contrast to their corresponding firms. In the second subperiod in 
both countries the R&D ICFS is negative and significant for both subgroups, but 
of course higher magnitude for High tech firms. In general, the ICFS is positive 
only in three subsamples, which are for the subsample of mature UK firms from 
the first subperiod and for the UK firms with small R&D variability from the second 
subperiod, and for US firms of small R&D investment intensity in the first 
subperiod, however, none of these coefficients are statistically significant. The 
coefficients for the other regressors present either statistically insignificant 
estimates (e.g., Net Debt issues) or significant estimates of the expected sign 
(e.g.,‎Tobin’s‎Q).‎The‎coefficients‎for‎Tobin’s Q are smaller for US firms than for 
UK ones and‎ they‎ decline‎ over‎ time.‎ In‎ terms‎ of‎ firms’‎ classifications,‎ the‎
coefficients‎ for‎ Tobin’s‎ Q‎ are‎ typically‎ greater‎ in‎ size‎ for‎ firms:‎ young,‎ low 
dividend paying, more intensively investing in R&D projects, with higher R&D 
variability and belonging to High tech industry.  Size coefficient is negative and 
significant for some subgroups, particularly UK firms, and positive and significant 
for some US subgroups, especially in the second subperiod.  Cash holdings 
influence on R&D investment in most cases is positive and significant, thus cash 
holdings seem to be the most important source of finances for R&D firms, 
however, its effect declines over time. In terms of constrained and unconstrained 
division according to e.g., dividend payout ratio, US low dividend payout firms 
show decreasing cash holdings coefficients over time, while the same 
coefficients increase over time for high dividend payout firms. The cash holdings 
coefficients decrease over time for all UK subgroups created on the basis of 
dividend payout ratio. The cash savings coefficients are higher for UK low 
dividend payout firms than US corresponding firms and higher for US high 
dividend payout firms than UK corresponding firms. Interestingly, cash holdings 
coefficients in the first subperiod is higher for high tech UK and US firms, while in 
the second subperiod it is higher for non high tech firms UK and US firms again.  
In the last three rows of Table 3.6 the diagnostic test statistics associated 
with the instrumental set are reported. P-values associated with direct tests for 
first-order (AR1) and second order (AR2) autocorrelation of the differenced 
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residuals‎as‎well‎as‎with‎Hansen’s‎(1982)‎test‎suggest‎that‎the‎instruments‎are‎
mainly valid and relevant for the estimated equations apart from the subsample of 
US mature firms in the first and second subperiod, where Hansen p-value equals 
respectively, 0.0931 and 0.0186, US firms with R&D variability over time below 
the sample median in the first subperiod,  US non high tech firms in the second 
subperiod and UK high tech firms in the second subperiod.  
Overall, the results in table 3.7 show a strong, negative relation between 
cash flow and R&D investment. These negative coefficients on cash flows 
together with positive coefficient on cash stock imply that firms rely on cash 
holdings to finance R&D investment, especially the UK firms, but this pattern 
seem to weaken with time. To certain extent, this supports the evidence provided 
by Brown and Petersen (2011) on the smoothing role of the R&D financing by 
cash holding. The pattern of other coefficients included in the model are as 
expected:‎ as‎ R&D‎ intensity‎ rises,‎ firms’‎ stock‎ and‎ debt‎ issues,‎ and more 
importantly cash flow level become increasingly volatile, firms hedge their R&D 
expenses with cash holdings. According to previous literature as well as 
descriptive statistics of this research the number of firms with persistently 
negative cash flows increases over time, however these firms can not be the only 
reason of negative R&D ICFS, which has been shown in Figure 3.2 and also in 
table 3.7. The R&D ICFS is negative over time and significant especially for 
financially constrained firms, however, the size of the cash flow coefficients 
declines over time and that suggest more complex explanation for negative R&D 
ICFS. The coefficients for financial variables of UK samples are much higher than 
for US samples. The more intensively a firm invests in R&D the more cash 
holdings play a stronger role on that investment and finally the more a firm 
changes its R&D investment the more it hires cash savings to do so. The more 
cash holdings affect positively R&D investment the more cash flow negatively 
influences R&D investment. Net stock issues affects negatively R&D investment, 
while net debt issues show positive effect on R&D investment,  however, the 
latter one is most of the time statistically insignificant. 
 
3.6.4 Financial crisis  
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Table 3.8 present the OLS results of equation 2 for full samples of US and 
UK firms during the pre crisis: 2000-2007 and crisis: 2008-2010 subperiods.  
 
Table 3.8 Cash Flow Sensitivity of R&D Investment Covering Financial 
Crisis Period: Baseline Model 
US 2000-2007 2008-2010 UK 2000-2007 2008-2010 
Dep Var:  R&D R&D   R&D R&D 
CF -0.114*** -0.147*** 
 
-0.097*** -0.118*** 
 
(-10.62) (-7.85) 
 
(-6.65) (-2.78) 
      Q 0.011*** 0.015*** 
 
0.024*** 0.020** 
 
(11.03) (6.06) 
 
(7.81) (2.44) 
      SIZE -0.008*** -0.004*** 
 
-0.005*** 0.001 
 
(-16.23) (-4.75) 
 
(-5.40) (0.78) 
      CASH 0.106*** 0.157*** 
 
0.068*** 0.203*** 
 
(18.42) (11.08) 
 
(4.57) (5.01) 
 
     STOCK 0.014 0.025 
 
0.005 0.038 
 
(1.30) (0.88) 
 
(0.30) (0.51) 
 
     DEBT -0.011 -0.042 
 
-0.013 -0.014 
 
(-0.99) (-1.54) 
 
(-0.63) (-0.23) 
      Obs. 9597 2341 
 
1628 457 
Adj.R2 0.395 0.412 
 
0.441 0.333 
Notes: This table presents the OLS estimation results of the R&D investment model in 
equation 2. The US and UK samples are divided into two partitions: pre-crisis period 
(2000-2007) and post crisis period (2008-2010). Analytical definitions for all the 
variables are provided in table 3.1. All regressions include industry and time dummies. 
T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to 
heteroskedasticity standard errors.   
 
Given the significant wedge expected between the cost of internal and 
external finance in the financial crisis period, R&D investment ratios of firms are 
predicted to display a greater sensitivity to cash flow in the crisis period 
regardless of the classification variable. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) claim 
adverse macroeconomic shocks not only interfere with the central function of 
financial markets but also exacerbate adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. As a result, during a financial crisis the hedging role of cash should be 
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more popular because of the ability of firms to raise external finance is much 
smaller, due to an increasing wedge between the cost of internal and external 
funds. Therefore, during financial crisis periods, financially constrained firms 
should save a higher proportion of their cash flows,‎whilst‎unconstrained‎firm’s‎
cash flow policies should not show any systematic changes. Financial crisis 
works as exogenous shock affecting both the size of current cash flows as well as 
the relative attractiveness of current investment against the future one. A‎firms’‎
viability, profitability and cash flow as well as prevalently reduced the expected 
return on investment opportunities are clearly affected by exogenous shocks 
coming from economic and financial crises. Hall and Lerner (2010) and Islam and 
Mozumdar (2007) argue that in the presence of market imperfections, external 
funds may not provide a perfect substitute for internal funds, given that the 
premium for external financing will be higher. Financial crisis should increase the 
marginal cost of external finance, leading to a rise in the ICFS. In the presence of 
financial crisis cash flows, cash holdings and stock issues are more likely to affect 
R&D in a more pronounced manner than before.  
The ICFS is negative as before for all subgroups and it increases in its 
negative magnitude during crisis period. This is consistent with the conjecture 
that cash flows are more binding on investment at times when capital market 
imperfections are likely to be more severe, which is expected to be the case 
during a financial crisis period (Arslan et al., 2006). As‎ expected‎ Tobin’s‎ Q‎
coefficients are positive and statistically significant for all subgroups and their 
magnitude increases (decreases) in the crisis subperiods for US (UK) firms. Size 
variable has negative and significant impact on R&D investment in both US 
subperiods and first UK subperiod suggesting that R&D investment increases 
with decline of‎firms’‎size,‎however‎this‎trend‎falls‎down‎under‎the‎influence‎of‎
financial crisis. The coefficients of cash holdings definitely increase over the crisis 
period and they are lower in the UK in case of first pre-crisis subperiod but higher 
for UK during the crisis period. Stock issues are positive in all subperiods but 
statistically insignificant. In contrast, debt issues are negative and statistically 
significant for the US firm during the crisis period.  In terms of countries 
comparison UK firms show greater coefficients than US firms during crisis period 
in‎ case‎ of‎ cash‎ holdings,‎ Tobin’s‎ Q‎ and‎ stock‎ issues.‎ Overall, the empirical 
findings presented in Table 3.8 support our expectations regarding the 
relationship between cash holdings and R&D investment. We find that the 
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hypothesized positive and statistically significant impact of cash savings on R&D 
investment is observed to be 1.5 and over 3 times greater during the crisis period 
for US and UK firms respectively. This is consistent with the conjecture that firms 
focus more on cash holdings at times when capital market imperfections are 
likely to be more severe, which is expected to be the case during a financial crisis 
period. Importantly the negative relationship between cash flow and R&D 
investment becomes even more negative during financial crisis period. This is in 
line with the expectation because during financial crisis firms should display lower 
cash flows but R&D investment is not likely to change a lot due to its high 
adjustment costs.  
Table 3.9 reports the GMM system results of regression 3 for full samples 
(models 1 and 3) and results for partial equation 3 (models 2 and 4)– including 
only the interaction between financial crisis dummy and cash holdings.  
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Table 3.9 Cash Flow Sensitivity of R&D Investment: Augmented 
Regression Model Including Financial Crisis Dummy 
DV: R&D US (2000-2010) 
 
UK (2000-2010) 
L.R&D 0.827*** 0.816*** 
 
0.778*** 0.772*** 
 
(22.03) (20.48) 
 
(12.77) (12.85) 
      CF -0.057*** -0.061*** 
 
-0.084*** -0.081*** 
 
(-3.17) (-2.92) 
 
(-5.77) (-5.97) 
      Q -0.000 -0.000 
 
0.007 0.008* 
 
(-0.18) (-0.19) 
 
(1.42) (1.84) 
      SIZE -0.000 -0.002 
 
0.003 0.004 
 
(-0.07) (-1.30) 
 
(1.57) (1.33) 
      CASH 0.052*** 0.048*** 
 
0.054*** 0.053*** 
 
(4.66) (4.02) 
 
(2.80) (2.72) 
      STOCK -0.018 -0.018 
 
-0.033 -0.053** 
 
(-0.66) (-0.71) 
 
(-1.20) (-2.03) 
      DEBT -0.008 -0.046 
 
0.032 0.013 
 
(-0.17) (-1.14) 
 
(0.59) (0.23) 
      CRISIS 0.008 0.005 
 
0.008 0.001 
 
(0.94) (1.50) 
 
(0.61) (0.24) 
      CASH*CRISIS -0.036** -0.025** 
 
0.017 0.005 
 
(-2.56) (-2.03) 
 
(0.70) (0.24) 
      CF*CRISIS -0.007 
  
0.028 
 
 
(-0.35) 
  
(0.71) 
 
      Q*CRISIS 0.003 
  
-0.003 
 
 
(1.11) 
  
(-0.40) 
 
      SIZE*CRISIS -0.001 
  
-0.001 
 
 
(-1.32) 
  
(-0.63) 
 
      STOCK*CRISIS -0.053 
  
-0.072 
 
 
(-1.21) 
  
(-0.83) 
 
      DEBT*CRISIS -0.175* 
  
-0.063 
 
 
(-1.82) 
  
(-0.44) 
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      _cons 0.006 0.022* 
 
-0.021 -0.028 
 
(0.76) (1.78) 
 
(-1.51) (-1.46) 
      Obs. 13705 13705 
 
2452 2452 
Firms 2020 2020 
 
382 382 
AR1-p value 6.20e-15 8.76e-15 
 
0.00000773 0.00000571 
AR2-p value 0.601 0.624 
 
0.250 0.264 
Hansen-p value 0.116 0.0397 
 
0.0582 0.0355 
Notes: This table presents the GMM estimation results over time of the investment model 
in equation 4. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 3.1. All 
regressions include time dummies. T-statistic values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 0.1%, 1% and 5% respectively. For the 
estimation we use asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity. We report the 
Hansen test, which is a test of over-identifying restrictions. AR1 and AR2 are tests for the 
absence of first order and second order correlation in the residuals. These test statistics are 
asymptotically distributed as N (0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. 
 
The interaction term in equation 3 tests whether R&D investment is more 
sensitive to each particular independent variable included in the model during the 
financial crisis period. The coefficient on the cash flow is negative and significant 
but the interaction term of cash flow and financial crisis dummy is positive but 
insignificant in each subsample. Also the model described by equation 3 
examines how firms R&D investment‎was‎ reallocated‎depending‎on‎ the‎ firms’‎
cash holding, stock and debt issues ratios. Put differently, the model also checks 
if‎ the‎ firms’ cash holding, stock and debt issues ratios have an impact on the 
allocation of R&D investment during the crisis period. The coefficients on cash 
holdings are positive and significant for both countries, however when cash 
holdings are interacted with the dummy variable the results vary. The interaction 
term is negative and significant for both cases of US firms and positive but 
insignificant for both cases of UK firms. In a typical US firm, the estimated 
coefficient implies that a one percentage point higher cash savings rate is 
associated with a 0.03 percentage point lower rate of R&D expense. The 
coefficient on the financial crisis dummy is positive for US and UK firms but 
insignificant in all subsamples. The stock and debt issue variables (again 
multiplied by the crisis dummy) resulted with negative coefficients but 
insignificant in three models apart from the debt issue in model (1). Due to 
financial crisis US firms decreased their cash savings level, while UK firms 
possibly increased it. Debt and stock issues declined during financial crisis. The 
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estimated‎coefficients‎of‎Tobin’s‎Q‎variable‎interacted‎with‎financial‎crisis‎dummy‎
are statistically insignificant in all subsamples and even negative for UK firms. 
Hence, there is no evidence that investment opportunities were treated in a 
differential way in terms of investing in R&D projects after the financial crisis. 
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3.7 Robustness checks 
 
To ensure the validity of our results a set of alternative specifications have 
been explored. To see if the negative R&D ICFS and the positive and significant 
relationship between R&D investment and cash holdings persist over time we 
change‎our‎models’‎specifications.‎The‎GMM‎results‎are‎hardly‎affected‎ if‎ the‎
dynamic investment term is excluded from the regression. The model in equation 
(2) was augmented with one-year lagged capital expenditure variable for US 
sample. The overall interpretation presented above remains largely unchanged. 
Capital expenditures coefficients show in most cases positive effect on R&D 
investment.  
In order to estimate the extent to which the results are sensitive to the way 
in which cash flow is measured, this study re-estimates its main empirical 
specification in equation (2) using Brown and Petersen (2009 or 2011) cash flow 
measure which adds back on the R&D expenses to the cash flow measure. This 
important robustness check provides broadly the same results.  This cash flow 
measure which adds back on the R&D expenses to the cash flow measure is 
adequate for US firms but not for UK firms due to accounting reasons. Both cash 
flow‎measure‎and‎R&D‎expenses‎measure‎come‎from‎the‎same‎firms’‎Income‎
Statements. However, R&D expenses in US can be 100% amortized against tax 
payments while in UK firms may only amortize 100% of capital expenditures 
linked with R&D investment.  
To check whether the earlier findings hold across different sub-samples of 
the data and the extent to which firm-specific characteristics affect the R&D ICFS 
we‎apply‎to‎the‎data‎alternative‎sample‎splits,‎such‎as‎firms’‎size‎(small‎versus 
large),‎average‎R&D‎investment‎intensity‎measured‎with‎firm’s‎average‎over‎time‎
ratio‎ of‎ R&D‎ expense‎ over‎ sales‎ (small‎ versus‎ high‎ R&D‎ intensity),‎ firm’s‎
average over time total assets growth (slow versus fast total assets growth), size 
matched with age (small and young versus large and mature), dividend payments 
(no dividend versus positive dividend payout ratio), sales growth (low growth 
versus high growth), sales growth matched with size (large and low growth 
versus large and high growth as well as small and low growth versus small and 
high growth), sales growth matched with age (mature and low growth versus 
mature and high growth as well as young and low growth versus young and high 
growth), sales growth matched with size and age (large, mature and low growth 
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versus large, mature and high growth as well as small, young and low growth 
versus small, young and high growth)‎and‎Tobin’s‎q‎(high‎Tobin’s‎q‎versus‎ low 
Tobin’s‎q).‎Moreover,‎firms‎are‎also‎categorized‎according‎the‎sign‎of‎cash‎flow 
(negative versus positive sum of cash flow over years for each firm) as well as the 
median of cash flow (low versus high sum of cash flow over years for each firm). 
Most importantly, the R&D ICFS for most of subsamples is negative. The sample 
division according to the sign of the sum of cash flows 36  over a firm year 
observations also presents the negative R&D ICFS for both subgroups: positive 
and‎negative‎cash‎flow‎firms‎(where‎applicable‎due‎to‎subsamples’‎size).‎This‎
indicates that the negative ICFS is not only due to firms persistently reporting 
negative cash flow firms over years of their existence. Therefore, the negative 
ICFS can be also interpreted as positive R&D firms in US and UK finance their 
R&D expenses through different channels of finances than cash flows. The most 
likely channel of R&D investment financing is cash savings, because typically 
when the ICFS is negative and statistically indistinguishable from zero, the cash 
holdings coefficients are greater and statistically significant. To make sure that 
this‎ interpretation‎ is‎appropriate‎ for‎ this‎paper’s‎ sample‎ the‎ sample‎ has‎been‎
divided‎according‎the‎median‎of‎firms’‎cash‎flow‎sum.‎The‎ICFS‎is‎negative‎in‎
both US subperiods, whereas in both UK subperiods ICFS is negative for firms 
with cash flow sum below the sample median and positive for counterpart firms. 
These findings suggest that US firms do not tie their R&D investment and cash 
flow‎as‎its‎financing‎source‎in‎contrary‎to‎UK‎high‎cash‎flow‎sums’‎firms.‎‎ 
Another important check pertains to the GMM estimation technique that 
the analysis utilizes. Specifically, in order to make sure that the set of instruments 
we employed in this chapter is the correct one, we employ instruments t-2 to t-3 
instead of t-3 to t-4 to estimate GMM dynamic models. The results are 
quantitatively very similar to those reported in Table 3.6, however the Hansen 
and AR1 and AR2 test are not so reliable suggesting instrument t-2 to be a weak 
one.  
The robustness tests we have conducted above provide further support for 
our earlier findings. Specifically, the R&D ICFS is negative over time and cash 
holding affect positively R&D investment.  Overall, our conclusions about the 
                                            
36
 The firm cash flow sum variable is calculated in the same way as in Brown et al. (2009). 
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changes in cash-flow sensitivities across time periods are robust to whether we 
include or exclude negative cash-flow observations. 
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3.8 Conclusions 
 
This chapter investigates the changes in the R&D investment – cash flow 
relationship of non-financial US and UK firms over the period 1990-2010. We 
examine the role of liquidity and external finance in R&D investment – cash flow 
regressions by estimating a dynamic investment model that includes measures of 
cash holdings and stock and debt issues. Also, we compare the corporate R&D 
investment behaviour among a priori financially constrained firms relative to a 
matched sample of financially unconstrained firms. Furthermore, we examine the 
relationship between finance and R&D over time covering financial crisis period. 
Finally, the impact of R&D investment variability on the R&D investment cash 
flow sensitivity is examined over time in this paper.  
The descriptive statistics of this paper demonstrate that great deals of 
changes are noticeable for publicly traded manufacturing firms over the last 21 
years. Cash flows have decreased critically, greatly because off the substantial 
increase in the amount of small and young firms with persistently negative cash 
flows, R&D investment has increased sharply, physical investment has declined 
and the uses of public equity issues as well as of cash stocks have increased. All 
these changes are reflected in the following‎models’‎estimations.‎ 
This paper shows that the ICFS for R&D investment is negative and that it 
increases in its negative magnitude, while the ICFS for physical investment is 
positive but it decreases in size over time. These trends do not change a great 
deal even after controlling for negative cash flow firms. We conclude that the 
increase in the negative relationship between R&D investment and cash flow is 
robust to various model specifications. 
The simplest explanation of this phenomenon is that the more cash flow 
firms produce, the less they spend on their R&D activities, put differently more 
profitable firms invest less in R&D investment or R&D investment is attracted 
more by firms that show lower profitability. However, alternative explanation of 
this effect can be that firms continue investing in spite of experiencing a shortage 
of internal liquidity, which indicates that firms finance their R&D investment with 
other funds, and this explanation seems to be more aligned with the results of this 
paper. 
The estimated results highlight that firms engaged in investing in R&D 
projects seem to plan its investment well in advance and make sure that they 
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have enough funds before they activate the project, especially in the case of 
financially constrained, thus e.g., firms with high R&D expenses variability show 
significantly negative cash flow coefficients as well as significantly positive cash 
stock coefficients and both coefficients are greater in size than those of 
counterparts firms.  In general, financially constrained firms show more negative 
ICFS and at the same time more positive cash holdings coefficients. All the ICFS 
are negative and robust to various model specifications. GMM results show that 
the financially unconstrained adjust their R&D investment faster than financially 
constrained firms. As expected, the coefficient of the lagged R&D investment is 
positive and significant at the 1% level in all subsamples. The adjustment 
coefficient is relatively small (it is lower than 0.4 in all cases) and even smaller 
during financial crisis period, possibly providing evidence that the dynamics 
implied by our models are not rejected and firms adjust their R&D expenditures 
ratios relatively slowly in an attempt to have their target R&D investment ratios. 
One possible explanation for this adjustment speed could be that the costs 
deviating from the target debt ratio are not so significant and firms' R&D 
investment ratios are persistent over time. Overall the adjustment coefficient is 
rather close to 0, especially during financial crisis period suggesting that the costs 
of‎adjustment‎are‎much‎bigger‎than‎the‎costs‎of‎disequilibrium‎in‎firms’‎trade-off 
analysis between two different types of costs: costs of making adjustment to their 
target ratios and costs of being in disequilibrium (being off target).  
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Chapter 4 
 
Determinants of R&D Investment over Total Investment Ratio, Evidence 
from US and UK Firms 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The theoretical and empirical corporate finance literature shows that the 
firm's financial position is important for its capital investment and research and 
development (R&D henceforth) investment decisions under imperfect financial 
markets (see Hubbard (1998) for a survey). The evidence provided in two 
previous chapters of this thesis also confirms that financial constraints and the 
firms' real activity are indeed interrelated. Overall, empirical studies of the firms’ 
physical and R&D investment robustly indicates that changes in net worth and 
subsequently in the firms' investment decisions evolve from information problems 
in the financial markets. Among other things both agency problems and adverse 
selection are important in determining the extent to which firms are subject to 
capital market imperfections. 
In the presence of market imperfections, such as asymmetric information, 
it is argued that there is no perfect substitution between internal and external 
funds. Firms that are affected by informational frictions and agency conflicts will 
have limited access to external finance and insufficient internal funds, and 
consequently will fail to undertake profitable investment opportunities in some 
states of the world. These types of firms are classed as financially constrained 
and their investment is subject to the availability of internal funds.  
The hypothesis that the sensitivity of investment expenditures to the 
availability of internal funds is higher for financially constrained firms than for 
unconstrained firms has been explored broadly. To test this hypothesis, several 
firm characteristics such as e.g., size, dividend and age have been presented to 
identify financially constrained firms. Furthermore, to proxy for internal funds, the 
firms’‎ cash‎ flow‎ has‎ been‎ employed‎ in‎ order‎ to‎ investigate‎ whether‎ the‎
investment – cash flow sensitivity is an effective measure of financial 
constraints.37 
This chapter studies how the R&D investment-total investment ratio 
(R&D/TINV) should react to variations in net worth for firms that deal with 
financial constraints. Bear in mind that total investment is a sum of R&D 
investment and capital investment. To the author’s‎knowledge‎there‎is‎no‎other‎
                                            
37 There is conflicting evidence on whether investment-cash flow sensitivity has a positive 
relationship (FHP) or negative/non-linear relationship (KZ and other papers) with the financial 
constraints that a firm faces. 
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study investigating the impact of capital market imperfections on the R&D/TINV 
ratio. Our approach tests how sensitive the R&D/TINV ratio is to firm-specific 
characteristics, and how capital market imperfections can impact the firms' 
decisions on the R&D/TINV ratio. Therefore, the main objective of this study is to 
analyze how sensitive the R&D/TINV ratio is for financially constrained high-tech 
firms.  
A great deal of research considers the implications of investment policies 
from the perspective that there are firms which are subject to market frictions and 
hence are constrained in accessing external capital. While we acknowledge the 
importance of similar firms’ characteristics in determining investment, we 
explicitly examine the investment implications by considering firms both in crisis 
and non-crisis‎ periods.‎ This‎ enables‎ us‎ to‎ examine‎ the‎ firms’‎ investment‎
behavior to some extent independently of the effects of capital markets 
imperfections, though we do not rule out the role of market imperfections in 
determining the firms’‎investment‎decisions‎in‎the‎first‎place.‎ 
Our paper contributes to the literature on several grounds. First, we study 
the association between the R&D/TINV ratio and firm-specific indicators. 
Financial status is a vague term for describing firms' net worth and the literature 
has employed a number of balance sheet indicators to measure the financial 
healthiness of firms (see Benito (2005); Benito and Hernando (2007)). We 
examine the responsiveness of the R&D/TINV ratio to variations in firm-specific 
characteristics, such as cash flow, cash holding, leverage and equity issues.  
Second, we analyze the behavior of constrained and unconstrained firms 
regarding their decisions on the R&D/TINV ratio. Provided that a firm's choice to 
invest in capital and R&D projects may reveal its financial position, financial 
characteristics become a key factor. Thus, it is particularly important to detect the 
sensitivity of the R&D/TINV ratio to firm-specific characteristics for constrained 
and unconstrained firms. 
Third, this study explores the impact of financial characteristics on the 
R&D/TINV ratio. A number of recent studies (for example, Brown and Petersen 
(2009)) have employed external finances (debt and equity issues) to analyze the 
effects of a change in external finance policy on a firms' investment behavior. But 
not many studies have included cash holding, leverage and equity issues 
variables in the same model. Cash holdings and cash flow represent together the 
internal finances, while leverage and stock issues demonstrate the external 
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finances that firms use to finance their investment. Including them together in one 
model allows us to control for both types of finances at the same time and also 
shed some light on which type of finances play a stronger/weaker role in 
financing investment.   
Finally, we use rich financial dataset to examine the cash flow sensitivity of 
the R&D/TINV ratio for a sample of US and UK38 non-financial firms over the 
period 2000–2011. This data facilitates us with the comparisons of the US 
against UK firms, the pre-crisis against crisis period, as well as an over time 
analysis. To our knowledge, this is the first study to present evidence of a link 
between the R&D/TINV and firm-specific characteristics under the presence of 
capital market imperfections. 
The empirical analysis of this paper provides a set of interesting results. 
Our major finding is that a firm’s‎ industry plays a distinguishing role for the 
sensitivity of R&D/TINV ratio, especially under the presence of capital market 
imperfections. It seems that the group of unconstrained non high-tech‎ firms’‎
R&D/TINV ratio exhibits the greatest sensitivity to cash flow changes 
independently from the time period we measure it. Our analysis also reveals that 
financially unconstrained firms, identified by using firm characteristics such as 
size, dividend payouts and age, generally exhibit greater investment–cash flow 
sensitivity than constrained firms, especially in the crisis period. Also, it seems 
that the reliance of both financially constrained and unconstrained firms on 
internal finance increases during the financial crisis. Finally, our results 
demonstrate that in the pre-crisis‎period‎financially‎constrained‎firms’‎R&D/TINV‎
ratio seems to be negatively related to cash flow and positively related to cash 
flow in the crisis period.  
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 describes the 
motivation of the study. Section 3 illustrates a preliminary data analysis and 
presents our classification schemes. In section 4 we present our baseline 
                                            
38
 The R&D investment market is well developed especially in the US. The UK is particularly 
interesting because like the US it has a market-based financial system, but with lower R&D 
investment intensity. The characteristics of R&D investment such as e.g. higher risk, greater 
asymmetric information costs or lack of collateral value, suggest that R&D investment policy even 
in these 2 developed markets relies on the availability of internal funds. Thus discovering the 
relation between R&D/TINV and cash flow sensitivity in the US and UK is essential. To sum up, 
the advanced US and UK R&D investment markets provide us with an ideal environment to 
investigate the relation between R&D/TINV and its determinants. 
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specifications and our econometric methodology. In section 5 we discuss the 
estimation results, and Section 6 offers our conclusions. 
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4.2 Motivation 
 
In this paper, our motivation originates from the simple theoretical 
argument. We assert that as long as firms invest simultaneously in two types of 
investment (capital and R&D) and there is some substitutability between them39, 
the two decisions need to be studied together. We take into account the following 
example. Consider two firms: firm 1 and firm 2 that vary in their ability to raise 
external funds. Suppose that both firms encounter a permanent increase in the 
demand for their product. Firm 1, which is less likely to be financially constrained, 
operates at full capacity and increases both investments by utilizing both external 
finance and internal funds. Thus, we expect that the firm-level R&D/TINV ratio to 
remain constant. On the other hand, firm 2, which is more likely to be financially 
constrained, might not be able to raise enough external finances for the R&D 
investment and might satisfy partially the demand by increasing the capital 
investment. Constrained firms by definition cannot invest optimally in R&D 
activities, due to the high adjustment costs, lack of collateral value and high risk. 
However, their capital investment may also be far from the optimal level, because 
of lumpiness characteristic to their physical investment and the cost of capital. 
Overall, based on R&D investment features (e.g., the high cost of adjustment) 
and prior literature claiming that firms are likely to smooth their R&D investment 
with cash holdings (Brown and Petersen, 2011), we hypothesize that firms are 
more likely to increase their capital investment rather than R&D investment due 
to the effect of cash flow innovations, ceteris paribus. Therefore we predict a 
decline in the R&D/TINV ratio for the financially constrained firms. A research that 
is concern with the effects of financial factors on both capital and R&D 
investments’‎ decisions‎ would‎ be‎ able‎ to‎ make‎ the‎ above‎ distinction. How 
constrained firms allocate their finances across R&D investment and total 
investment to reach a target R&D/TINV ratio when decisions on both investments 
will have to be taken simultaneously rather than independently. 
  
                                            
39
 Please see Table 4.3 presenting the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables used in our 
analysis. The correlation coefficient between R&D and physical investments is equal to -0.11 and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, confirming the substitutability between these investments.  
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4.3 Data analysis and classification schemes 
 
This section demonstrates a graphical and descriptive analysis of the 
data. The data is portrayed in simple graphical form to show variation in the 
cross-sectional distributions of outcomes and how this has changed over time. 
This gives a foundation to our more advanced examination of how the R&D/TINV 
ratio, of various firm categories, acts in response to financial constraints.  
 
4.3.1 Data description and graphical analysis  
 
We obtain our datasets from the Worldscope database. We employ 
non-financial US and UK publicly listed firms. The panel datasets for this study 
have been created as follows. First, financial and utility firms were excluded from 
the samples. Second, similar to e.g., Brown and Petersen (2010) the aerospace 
industry is excluded from both samples. Third, from the raw data those firm-years 
for which the value of total assets is below $10 million are discarded. Fourth, the 
dataset was cleared from outliers by excluding the values of each variable that lie 
outside the 1st and the 99th percentile range. Fifth, all missing firm-year 
observations for any variable in the model during the sample periods were 
dropped. These criteria have provided us with a total of 4,076 US firms, which 
represent 22,828 firm-year observations and a total of 665 UK firms, which 
represent 3,382 firm-year observations for the years 2000-2011 respectively.  
The core of this document is the firms' financial decisions on the 
R&D/TINV ratio. A discussion on the R&D investment and the total investment 
which are employed to form the R&D/TINV ratio is of particular interest here. 
Firms' simultaneous decisions on R&D and the total investments, and the 
substitutability of the two investments generate a motive to take into account their 
evolution across time. Hence, it is crucial to reveal that any changes in the 
R&D/TINV ratio are not driven by changes in either R&D investment (R&D) or 
total investment (TINV). Firstly, we illustrate the INV, R&D and TINV changes for 
US and UK over our sample period.  
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Figure 4.1 US Plots of the Yearly Averages of R&D, INV and TINV 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 UK Plots of the Yearly Averages of R&D, INV and TINV 
 
 
 
Comparing Figures 4.1 and 4.2 for US and UK firms respectively, we 
observe that both R&D and TINV follow the same pattern over time. They both 
display a growing trend, although INV is rising with more fluctuations than R&D 
investment. This implies that firms are more likely to alter physical investment 
than R&D investment, which is in line with previous findings in the literature (see 
Brown and Petersen, 2011). In other words, Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show that firms 
conduct their capital investment with a greater variability than R&D investment. 
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To summarize, these figures depict that both R&D and TINV change over time 
providing as a result rationalization for their joint inspection.  
The last year 2011 in the sample is incomplete in terms of number of firm 
year observation. Worldscope – the database we use in this chapter is still 
collecting the data for this year, hence the results might look so different for US 
and UK.   
 
Figure 4.3 US Plots of the Yearly Averages of R&D/TA, INV/TA and 
R&D/TINV 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 UK Plots of the Yearly Averages of R&D/TA, INV/TA and 
R&D/TINV 
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Figures 4.3 and 4.4 illustrate INV/TA, R&D/TA and R&D/TINV changes for 
US and UK over our sample period. We observe that the ratio of R&D investment 
over total assets is higher than the ratio of physical investment over total assets 
over time in both countries. The ratios of R&D investment over TINV in US and 
UK follows a similar pattern over time. They both display a growing trend with a 
dip in year 2008. However, the UK pattern of R&D/TINV changes is within an 
approximate 30 to 50% range while the US one is within an approximate 35 to 
45% range. This together with Figures 4.1 and 4.2 implies that the UK firms 
conduct their physical investment with a higher variability than the US firms.   
 
Table 4.1 Variables Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
TINV The sum of R&D investment plus INV 
R&D/TINV The ratio of research and development expenses to total investment 
R&D/TA The ratio of research and development expenses to total assets 
INV/TA The ratio of capital expenditures to total assets 
CF 
The ratio of net income before extraordinary items and preferred dividends 
plus depreciation plus R&D expenses, deplation and amortization to total 
assets 
Q 
The ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus 
the market value of equity to book value of total asset 
CASH The ratio of total cash and short term investment to total assets 
LEV The ratio of total debt to total assets 
SIZE The logarithm of total assets 
DIV The ratio of total cash dividend to total assets 
AGE Number of years firm is publicly listed since 1980  
STOCK 
The ratio of sale of common and preferred stock minus purchase of 
common and preferred stock to total assets 
Notes: This table provides the definitions of the main variables used in our analysis. 
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
2000-2011 Mean St. Dev. min p25 p50 p75 max Obs. 
Panel A (US) 
        
R&D/TINV 0.405 0.357 0 0 0.386 0.757 0.999 22828 
R&D/TA 0.056 0.084 0 0 0.022 0.079 0.584 22828 
INV/TA 0.044 0.044 0.000 0.016 0.030 0.056 0.307 22828 
CF 0.076 0.172 -1.023 0.037 0.101 0.165 0.481 22828 
Q 1.982 1.352 0.479 1.128 1.550 2.340 9.881 22828 
CASH 0.222 0.221 0.001 0.047 0.143 0.337 0.919 22828 
LEV 0.195 0.198 0 0.010 0.154 0.309 1.063 22828 
STOCK 0.035 0.138 -0.227 -0.003 0.001 0.015 0.919 22828 
SIZE 5.992 2.207 2.303 4.257 5.784 7.527 13.590 22828 
DIV 0.011 0.050 0 0 0 0.010 3.730 22828 
AGE 15.158 8.566 1 8 13 20 32 22828 
DEBT 0.002 0.099 -1.960 -0.018 -1E-05 0.004 2.202 22828 
STD/TA 0.047 0.092 0 0 1E-02 0.052 1.047 22828 
Panel B (UK) 
       R&D/TINV 0.437 0.326 0 0.123 0.418 0.741 0.998 3382
R&D/TA 0.052 0.079 0 0.004 0.022 0.064 0.553 3382 
INV/TA 0.038 0.032 0.000 0.014 0.029 0.051 0.189 3382 
CF 0.083 0.158 -0.723 0.038 0.102 0.164 0.541 3382 
Q 1.799 1.215 0.512 1.050 1.441 2.092 10.850 3382 
CASH 0.179 0.195 0 0.047 0.108 0.244 0.922 3382 
LEV 0.156 0.147 0 0.015 0.131 0.252 0.678 3382 
STOCK 0.060 0.163 -0.129 0 0.001 0.011 1.008 3382 
SIZE 5.213 2.117 2.303 3.509 4.797 6.495 12.524 3382 
DIV 0.021 0.048 0 0 0.013 0.030 1.629 3382 
AGE 16.274 9.010 1 8 15 24 32 3382 
DEBT -0.002 0.083 -0.965 -0.019 0.000 0.007 0.579 3382 
STD/TA 0.055 0.079 0 0.002 0.025 0.075 0.678 3382 
Notes: This table shows US and UK firms’ sample characteristics over the period 
2000-2011. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1‎provides‎ the‎variables’‎definitions,‎while‎ table‎4.2 reports the 
summary statistics. Descriptive statistics in table 4.2 present that the average US 
R&D and physical investment rates are both higher than the UK ones. The 
average rates of growth opportunities, cash holdings, leverage and size of the US 
firms are all greater than the for the UK firms. The average rates of cash flows are 
greater in UK firms. UK firms also pay on average higher dividends than US firms 
and also average UK firm issues more stock than an average US firm. The 
average‎UK‎firm’s‎age‎is‎older‎than‎the‎average‎US‎firm‎by‎1‎year.‎‎ 
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Table 4.3 The Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 
INV/TA R&D/TA R&D/TINV CF Q CASH LEV STOCK 
INV/TA 1 
       R&D/TA -0.114* 1 
      R&D/TINV -0.368* 0.714* 1 
     CF 0.092* -0.031* 0.034* 1 
    Q 0.052* 0.259* 0.218* 0.149* 1 
   CASH -0.162* 0.499* 0.492* -0.007 0.351* 1 
  LEV 0.062* -0.226* -0.297* -0.173* -0.190* -0.416* 1 
 STOCK 0.012 0.258* 0.166* -0.266* 0.260* 0.309* -0.108* 1 
Notes: The statistics reported are the Pearson correlation coefficients between all variables used in the analysis. Analytical definitions for all the variables 
are provided in table 4.1. * indicate correlation coefficient is significant at the 1% levels.  
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4.3.2 Sample separation criteria 
 
To show how firms react to capital market imperfections, we firstly divide 
them in accordance with whether they are more or less likely to encounter 
financial constraints. Following the majority of the relevant literature we pick up 
three very popular measures of financial constraints, these are: size measured 
with natural logarithm of total assets, dividend payout ratio measured as dividend 
payout over total assets and age measure as the number of years a firm is 
tracked by Worldscope since year 1980. We split each sample in two ways. 
Firstly‎we‎calculate‎the‎average‎of‎each‎firm’s‎size,‎dividend‎and‎age‎over‎years.‎
On‎ the‎ basis‎ of‎ the‎median‎ of‎ this‎ average‎ of‎ firms’‎ size,‎ dividend‎ and‎ age 
measures over time we classify firms as financial constrained and unconstrained.  
Secondly we compare firms above with those below the median of their size, 
dividend and age measures. Firms are not allowed to switch across firm 
categories over time.  
The literature contains a long list of scholars who used the size variable as 
a proxy for capital market access for firms (see e.g., (Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995)). 
Rahaman (2011) argues that firm size is predominantly identified by the extant 
industrial economics literature as one of the sources of heterogeneity in a firm’s 
growth. The most important issue here is that smaller companies are more likely 
to be financially constrained as they are subject to higher asymmetric information 
and agency problems, and hence, have difficulties in obtaining external finance. 
One of the characteristic and cause identified for the smaller companies is that 
they struggle to raise outside finance and are enforced to depend on internal 
finance only therefore their growth is constrained. During financial crisis periods 
when financial systems do not work correctly this characteristic will be further 
sharpened. 
In terms of the second measure of financial constraints, we follow FHP 
(1988) theory that dividend paying, as against to non-dividend paying companies, 
are less likely to be financially constrained since they are able to shorten or stop 
dividends whenever their ability to access external financing becomes conflicting 
or impossible. Yet, this variable should be considered with caution due to the fact 
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that cutting dividends for the sake of liquidity can also have opposite signaling 
impacts‎for‎the‎firm’s‎stock‎in‎the‎market‎(e.g.‎Healy‎and‎Palepu,‎1988). 
In the last scheme firms are grouped according to their age in order to 
measure the importance of a track record. An old established firm is more likely to 
have better access in the capital market compared to a young and growing firm. 
Hence, it is more likely that young firm faces problems of asymmetric information. 
This classification criterion has been employed by Brown and Petersen (2009) 
amongst others. 
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4.4 Methodology  
 
This section depicts the empirical approach and introduces the baseline 
models. To detect the sensitivity of the R&D/TINV ratio to cash flows (while 
controlling for growth opportunities) over time (year by year) the following static 
linear model is estimated. 
 
R&D/TINVi,t = α0 + α1CFi,t + α2Qi,t + εi,t,     (1) 
 
Equation 1 is estimated with OLS technique and industry dummies are 
also included in the analysis. To investigate the sensitivity of the R&D/TINV ratio 
to more firm-specific characteristics we estimate the following static linear model.  
 
R&D/TINVi,t = α0 + α1CFi,t +‎ α2Qi,t +‎ α3CASHi,t−1 +‎ α4LEVi,t−1  
α5STOCKi,t−1 +‎εi,t          (2) 
 
where we also include industry- and year-dummies. Equation 2 is 
estimated with OLS technique in which independent variables, such as cash, 
leverage and stock issues are lagged one year to break their correlation link with 
cash flow. These variables are the potential substitutors for cash flow outflows. 
Firms can decide to allocate their positive cash flow shocks into either higher 
cash reserves, the reduction of their debt level, or to the purchase their stock 
(Dasgupta et. al., 2011). 
In this paper we incorporate in our models the set of financial variables 
that is consistent with the existing empirical literature. Specifically, we control for 
pre-existing stocks of cash holdings because a firm can use these alternative 
components of internal wealth to accommodate shocks to cash flows or to 
finance their investment. Hubbard‎(1998)‎states‎that‎“it‎is‎important‎to‎consider 
investment and financial policy jointly; firms may, for example, accumulate 
liquidity‎as‎a‎buffer‎against‎future‎constraints.”‎Cash holdings are employed in the 
analysis because usually together with investment they account for a substantial 
portion of cash flow use. Consequently in a firm’s‎ financial‎ policy‎ investment,‎
cash and debt may compete against each other. Firms classified as financially 
constrained tend to hold more cash and this is consistent with the hypothesis that 
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financially constrained firms significantly benefit from cash savings. Moreover, 
Brown and Petersen (2011) find that firms most likely to face financing frictions 
rely extensively on cash holdings to smooth R&D. Thus controlling for cash 
holdings is important in the investigation of R&D/TINV ratio over time. We should 
expect cash holdings to be a significant indicator for constrained firms' R&D/TINV 
ratio. 
We also employ leverage as‎a‎measure‎of‎firms'‎“tightness"‎of‎the‎firm's 
balance sheet (Sharpe (1994), Guariglia (1999), Vermeulen (2002)). Lang et al., 
(1996) assert that leverage may impact investment in a number of ways. The 
amount of cash that can be employed for investment may be reduced thanks to 
leverage. Excess leverage may also impair a firm’s‎ ability‎ to‎ raise‎ additional‎
capital. Myers (1977) claims that the managers of firms with a great leverage 
level may forgo positive NPV projects because some or all of the benefits from 
the investment may be transferred to debt-holders, ie the underinvestment effect. 
According to Jensen (1986) and Stulz (1990) high leverage in low-growth firms 
discourages management from undertaking unprofitable investments. A negative 
relationship between leverage and investment is predicted by these theories.  
Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001) find that firms with relatively high 
leverage ratios are reluctant to issue debt since excessive leverage increases the 
probability of financial distress. Nevertheless, for a certain category of firms, high 
leverage may also be understood as high capacity of debt and lower financial 
constraints Hovakimian (2009).  
Similar‎to‎research‎of‎Brown‎and‎Petersen‎(2009),‎a‎firm’s‎net‎new‎funds‎
from stock issues enter as an additional determinant of the R&D/TINV ratio. A 
far-reaching body of the literature reveals the importance of stock issues for 
investment. Brown et al., (2007) study the effect of cash flow and external equity 
on aggregate R&D investment and they provide support for the view that supply 
shifts in equity finance are important factors driving economic growth. R&D 
investment‎is‎considered‎in‎the‎literature‎as‎it‎is‎likely‎to‎be‎an‎“equity-dependent”‎
investment. Firm mainly oriented in investing in R&D are well known to employ 
little debt. Among other numerous explanations, Cornell and Shapiro (1988) 
explain this by the poor collateral value of R&D and the aspect that using debt 
finance may evolve troubles of financial distress that can be especially 
dangerous for R&D-intensive firms. In effect, for small firms, especially those with 
low or negative cash flow, investing in R&D can leave them relying strongly on 
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access to financial sources raised from public equity.  There are at least two 
reasons to directly incorporate stock issues when testing for financing constraints 
on R&D/TINV ratio. Firstly, firms rely heavily on stock issues in the years 
immediately following their IPO (e.g., Rajan and Zingales (1998)), which is also a 
time period of low (or negative) cash flows and high R&D intensity. This negative 
correlation between stock issues and cash flow should lead to a downward bias 
in the estimated R&D-cash flow sensitivity in regressions that omit stock issues. 
Second, including stock issues in the R&D regression permits tests of whether 
variation in access to external finance matters for the R&D/TINV ratio, as it 
should in a world of imperfect access to external finance (Brown et al., 2011). 
Finally we include cash flow in our models. Previous studies demonstrate 
that the activities of more constrained firms depend on the internal finances such 
as cash flow (Fazzari et al., (1988); Benito and Hernando (2007)). Recent 
evidence indicates that only financially constrained firms should exhibit a 
propensity to save cash (Almeida et al., (2004)). In this paper, we might expect 
cash flow to be less significant for financially unconstrained firms' R&D/TINV 
ratio, and in contrast, constrained firms should be willing to retain cash flow thus, 
implying its significance on a firm' decisions with respect to the R&D/TINV ratio. 
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4.5 Results 
 
Table 4.4 Year by Year Estimations (OLS) 
DV: R&D/TINV           
Year CF   Q   Obs. Adj. R2 
Panel A (US) 
      
2000 -0.0873** (-2.53) 0.0121*** (3.30) 2010 0.535 
2001 -0.172*** (-5.17) 0.0238*** (5.39) 2020 0.500 
2002 -0.143*** (-4.41) 0.0270*** (4.81) 1969 0.542 
2003 -0.0711 (-1.53) 0.0287*** (6.09) 1855 0.542 
2004 -0.0559 (-1.28) 0.0343*** (7.39) 1923 0.524 
2005 -0.0581 (-1.44) 0.0266*** (5.54) 1968 0.498 
2006 -0.0762* (-1.70) 0.0325*** (6.69) 1988 0.479 
2007 -0.0171 (-0.40) 0.0233*** (4.50) 2176 0.467 
2008 0.00129 (0.03) 0.0374*** (4.81) 1910 0.491 
2009 0.0389 (0.91) 0.0344*** (4.99) 1938 0.483 
2010 0.115** (2.51) 0.0378*** (7.06) 2050 0.476 
2011 0.267*** (2.64) 0.0233** (2.28) 1021 0.484 
p-value 0.0008 
 
0.2957 
   
Panel B (UK) 
     2000 0.0791 (0.57) 0.0449*** (4.38) 272 0.363 
2001 0.0259 (0.24) 0.0442*** (4.38) 298 0.391 
2002 -0.0414 (-0.45) 0.0486** (2.56) 279 0.365 
2003 0.0635 (0.58) 0.0580*** (2.82) 268 0.363 
2004 0.143 (1.12) 0.0338*** (2.87) 270 0.366 
2005 -0.149 (-1.19) 0.0217 (1.24) 291 0.267 
2006 0.0836 (0.75) 0.0351** (2.38) 331 0.283 
2007 -0.0515 (-0.49) 0.0480** (2.54) 323 0.295 
2008 0.103 (0.88) 0.103*** (6.83) 318 0.304 
2009 0.178 (1.45) 0.101*** (6.27) 296 0.391 
2010 0.0897 (0.67) 0.0560*** (2.84) 300 0.290 
2011 0.121 (0.69) 0.0500*** (3.46) 136 0.375 
p-value 0.8441 
 
0.7615 
   
Notes: This table displays results from the year by year R&D investment rate regressions 
in equation 1. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 4.1. All 
regressions include industry dummies. P-values are for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients are the same between the first (2000) and the last (2011) years. T-statistic 
values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to heteroskedasticity 
standard errors.   
 
Given the significant wedge expected between the cost of internal and 
external finance in the financial crisis period, R&DTINV ratios of firms are 
predicted to display a greater sensitivity to cash flow in the crisis period 
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regardless of the classification variable. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) claim 
adverse macroeconomic shocks not only interfere with the central function of 
financial markets but also exacerbate adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. As a result, during a financial crisis the hedging role of cash should be 
more popular because of the ability of firms to raise external finance is much 
smaller, due to an increasing wedge between the cost of internal and external 
funds. Therefore, during financial crisis periods, financially constrained firms 
should‎save‎a‎higher‎proportion‎of‎their‎cash‎flows,‎whilst‎unconstrained‎firm’s‎
cash flow policies should not show any systematic changes. Financial crisis 
works as exogenous shock affecting both the size of current cash flows as well as 
the relative attractiveness of current investment against the future one. A‎firms’‎
viability, profitability and cash flow as well as prevalently reduced the expected 
return on investment opportunities are clearly affected by exogenous shocks 
coming from economic and financial crises. Hall and Lerner (2010) and Islam and 
Mozumdar (2007) argue that in the presence of market imperfections, external 
funds may not provide a perfect substitute for internal funds, given that the 
premium for external financing will be higher. Financial crisis should increase the 
marginal cost of external finance, leading to a rise in the ICFS. In the presence of 
financial crisis cash flows, cash holdings and stock issues are more likely to affect 
R&DTINV in a more pronounced manner than before.  
Table 4.4 presents the results of our baseline regression, where R&DTINV 
is regressed on cash flow and growth opportunities in each year. Our main 
concern here is the relationship between investment and cash flow. For US firms 
we find negative R&DTINV-cash flow sensitivity up to year 2007 (the pre-crisis 
period) and positive since year 2008 onwards (the crisis period). This is 
consistent with the conjecture that cash flows are more binding on investment at 
times when capital market imperfections are likely to be more severe, which is 
expected to be the case during a financial crisis period (Arslan et al., 2006). For 
UK firms the R&DTINV-cash flow sensitivity is statistically insignificant in all 
years. The sign change from negative to positive also appears in year 2007 but 
with lower consistency.  
Table 4.5 reports the results of our augmented regression in equation 2. 
Firstly, we consider the full sample. Secondly, we split firms into high-tech and 
non high-tech industries. Lastly, we split firms into financially constrained and 
unconstrained categories with respect to their size, dividend payments and age.  
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The results are reported for two periods, 2000-2007 (pre-crisis) and 
2008–2011 (crisis period). Given the significant wedge expected between the 
cost of internal and external finance in the financial crisis period, R&DTINV ratios 
of firms are predicted to display a greater sensitivity to cash flow in the crisis 
period regardless of the classification variable. To estimate our model we use an 
ordinary least squares approach with robust standard errors to allow for 
heteroscedasticity across firms. The residuals (errors) are identically and 
independently distributed. Also, we control for industry-specific effects and 
time-specific effects by including industry and time dummies in our empirical 
specification (industry and time specific intercepts are not reported for brevity). 
Starting with the case of all firms (specification 1), we find that the 
hypothesized negative and statistically significant impact of cash flow on 
corporate R&DTINV is observed only in panel A (US firms) during the pre-crisis 
period. The corresponding coefficient for the UK firms is positive but insignificant. 
During the crisis period the corresponding coefficient for both US and UK firms is 
positive and significant. This is consistent with the conjecture that cash flows are 
more binding on investment at times when the capital market imperfections are 
likely to be more severe and this is to be expected during a financial crisis period.  
Moving to the role that the industry of the firm play on the relationship 
between cash flow and R&DTINV, our results suggest that the hypothesized 
negative and significant R&DTINV–cash flow sensitivities are supported only in 
the pre-crisis period by the US non high-tech firms. The corresponding coefficient 
for the UK firms is positive but insignificant. During the crisis period the 
corresponding coefficient for both US and UK firms is positive and significant only 
for the US firms. It is also worth noting that the corresponding coefficient is 
greater for non high-tech than high-tech firms in every subsample. This suggests 
that for non high-tech firms cash flow finances are of a greater importance than 
for high-tech firms.    
Next, we consider the role that financial constraints play on the 
relationship between cash flow and R&DTINV. Our results indicate that the 
hypothesized negative and significant R&DTINV–cash flow sensitivities of 
financially constrained firms are supported only in the pre-crisis period by the US 
subsample. When we split the US firms on the basis of their size, dividend 
payouts and age, the constrained firms display negative and statistically 
significant sensitivities, while the unconstrained firms show positive and 
216 
 
significant sensitivities for the pre-crisis period. Whilst contract to this a significant 
positive cash flow effect is observed under all classification for the crisis period 
with greater coefficients for the US unconstrained firms. The UK firms are 
inconsistent with expectations and show positive cash flow effects in almost all 
subsamples and the cash flow coefficients are greater in size for unconstrained 
than constrained firms and during the crisis period.  
Finally, we provide evidence of a positive and significant impact of growth 
opportunities on the corporate R&DTINV ratio of US and UK firms in most of 
subsamples, in general this impact is greater in size for constrained firms. We 
also observe positive and significant cash holdings coefficients and in general 
these are greater in size for constrained firms.  In contrast, the leverage 
coefficients are negative and significant in most of subsamples. The stock issues 
coefficients throughout are positive or negative but most of the time insignificant. 
They are only significant for US firms during the pre-crisis period.  
Briefly, our first set of results show that R&DTINV ratios of financially 
unconstrained firms are more sensitive to the availability of internal funds and the 
sensitivity is stronger during the financial crisis period. The result regarding the 
main interest of this paper, though, refers to the impact of high-tech industry on 
R&D/TINV-cash flow sensitivity of firms. After classifying firms into high-tech and 
non high-tech categories, we find evidence that R&D/TINV ratio of non high-tech 
firms is more sensitive to internal funds. This is consistent with the argument that 
high-tech firms usually have greater financial flexibility to exploit investment 
opportunities when they arise. Our empirical findings significantly support this 
argument, especially during the crisis period when the fluctuations in cash flow 
are likely to be large and the cost of external finance is significantly high.  
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Table 4.5 The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Investment During the Pre-Crisis and the Crisis Periods across Different Subgroups of 
Firms: Augmented Regression Mode 
DV: R&D/TINV CF 
 
Q 
 
CASH 
 
LEV 
 
STOCK 
 
Constant 
 
Adj.R2 Obs. 
Panel A (US): Pre-crisis period (2000-2007) 
1. ALL FIRMS -0.038** (-2.06) 0.011*** (5.32) 0.367*** (25.12) -0.100*** (-7.44) 0.014 (0.72) 0.323*** (38.17) 0.570 11533 
2. INDUSTRY 
              HIGH-TECH -0.014 (-0.65) 0.006** (2.26) 0.338*** (21.25) -0.141*** (-6.71) -0.018 (-0.87) 0.520*** (43.64) 0.250 6346 
NON HIGH-TECH -0.090** (-2.52) 0.021*** (5.35) 0.416*** (13.27) -0.051*** (-2.94) 0.123*** (3.05) 0.077*** (6.48) 0.261 5187 
3.SIZE 
              CONSTRAINED -0.036* (-1.66) 0.020*** (7.13) 0.341*** (17.91) -0.081*** (-3.50) -0.001 (-0.05) 0.358*** (26.97) 0.512 5438 
UNCONSTRAINED 0.115*** (3.42) -0.003 (-0.93) 0.389*** (16.84) -0.081*** (-5.19) -0.107*** (-2.98) 0.281*** (27.46) 0.619 6095 
4.DIVIDEND 
              CONSTRAINED -0.052** (-2.55) 0.013*** (4.88) 0.396*** (23.32) -0.106*** (-5.67) -0.041* (-1.88) 0.396*** (33.24) 0.557 6030 
UNCONSTRAINED 0.102*** (2.69) 0.010*** (2.62) 0.190*** (6.45) -0.105*** (-5.52) 0.045 (1.06) 0.248*** (21.18) 0.502 5503 
5. AGE 
              CONSTRAINED -0.085*** (-3.53) 0.017*** (5.31) 0.440*** (20.14) -0.130*** (-5.93) -0.053** (-2.20) 0.289*** (20.77) 0.531 4997 
UNCONSTRAINED 0.089*** (2.81) 0.004 (1.24) 0.302*** (15.00) -0.025 (-1.41) 0.122*** (3.10) 0.325*** (30.44) 0.618 5924 
 Panel A (US): Crisis period (2008-2011) 
1. ALL FIRMS 0.120*** (3.31) 0.017*** (3.74) 0.377*** (14.11) -0.098*** (-4.09) 0.046 (0.85) 0.294*** (22.25) 0.542 4035 
2. INDUSTRY 
              HIGH-TECH 0.118*** (2.59) 0.010* (1.83) 0.358*** (11.61) -0.143*** (-3.53) -0.025 (-0.37) 0.500*** (26.90) 0.220 2123 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.122** (2.09) 0.026*** (3.38) 0.397*** (7.73) -0.061** (-2.10) 0.169* (1.95) 0.066*** (3.49) 0.269 1912 
3.SIZE 
              CONSTRAINED 0.080* (1.80) 0.014** (2.42) 0.369*** (10.47) -0.086** (-1.98) 0.070 (1.10) 0.342*** (16.67) 0.477 1874 
UNCONSTRAINED 0.290*** (4.69) 0.014* (1.90) 0.369*** (9.10) -0.071*** (-2.65) -0.133 (-1.19) 0.240*** (14.24) 0.610 2161 
218 
 
4.DIVIDEND 
              CONSTRAINED 0.113*** (2.71) 0.022*** (4.17) 0.388*** (12.22) -0.118*** (-3.60) 0.046 (0.75) 0.345*** (18.44) 0.524 2184 
UNCONSTRAINED 0.256*** (3.36) 0.004 (0.47) 0.261*** (4.96) -0.074** (-2.20) -0.131 (-1.08) 0.248*** (13.32) 0.518 1851 
5. AGE 
              CONSTRAINED 0.097* (1.94) 0.021*** (3.50) 0.422*** (10.61) -0.139*** (-3.67) 0.036 (0.56) 0.250*** (12.13) 0.512 1732 
UNCONSTRAINED 0.168*** (3.15) 0.014** (2.05) 0.309*** (8.23) -0.048 (-1.60) 0.084 (0.72) 0.318*** (18.18) 0.589 2066 
 Panel B (UK): Pre-crisis period (2000-2007) 
1. ALL FIRMS 0.049 (1.03) 0.024*** (3.40) 0.420*** (10.55) -0.234*** (-4.40) 0.004 (0.07) 0.336*** (14.13) 0.461 1648 
2. INDUSTRY 
              HIGH-TECH 0.015 (0.28) 0.021*** (2.73) 0.383*** (8.75) -0.127* (-1.85) -0.011 (-0.21) 0.447*** (14.95) 0.285 935 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.163 (1.64) 0.035** (2.33) 0.469*** (5.91) -0.368*** (-4.49) 0.045 (0.41) 0.183*** (4.51) 0.402 713 
3.SIZE 
              CONSTRAINED 0.042 (0.68) 0.019** (2.12) 0.433*** (7.83) -0.235** (-2.31) -0.007 (-0.13) 0.419*** (11.21) 0.288 750 
UNCONSTRAINED 0.070 (0.91) 0.028** (2.58) 0.400*** (6.20) -0.166*** (-2.65) 0.002 (0.03) 0.249*** (8.08) 0.529 898 
4.DIVIDEND 
              CONSTRAINED 0.112** (2.02) 0.035*** (3.72) 0.358*** (7.60) -0.224** (-2.52) -0.131** (-2.45) 0.431*** (12.28) 0.421 747 
UNCONSTRAINED 0.432*** (3.51) 0.017 (1.57) 0.357*** (4.49) -0.102 (-1.54) 0.149 (1.45) 0.192*** (5.94) 0.431 901 
5. AGE 
              CONSTRAINED 0.148** (2.45) 0.015 (1.64) 0.393*** (7.27) -0.375*** (-3.57) -0.052 (-0.92) 0.459*** (12.24) 0.361 693 
UNCONSTRAINED -0.098 (-1.17) 0.033*** (3.40) 0.361*** (5.35) -0.162*** (-2.70) 0.111 (1.30) 0.263*** (7.93) 0.488 906 
 Panel B (UK): Crisis period (2008-2011) 
1. ALL FIRMS 0.231** (2.24) 0.030*** (2.76) 0.465*** (6.75) -0.255*** (-2.99) 0.081 (0.85) 0.334*** (9.07) 0.457 631 
2. INDUSTRY 
              HIGH-TECH 0.125 (1.13) 0.029** (2.29) 0.448*** (5.75) -0.025 (-0.21) 0.046 (0.41) 0.381*** (8.03) 0.343 346 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.322 (1.54) 0.034* (1.72) 0.509*** (3.63) -0.444*** (-3.88) 0.063 (0.38) 0.279*** (5.18) 0.399 285 
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3.SIZE 
              CONSTRAINED 0.267** (2.23) 0.039*** (2.98) 0.437*** (4.43) 0.041 (0.27) 0.083 (0.74) 0.307*** (6.45) 0.384 289 
UNCONSTRAINED 0.325 (1.19) 0.007 (0.28) 0.442*** (4.10) -0.332*** (-2.89) -0.250 (-1.15) 0.370*** (6.13) 0.521 342 
4.DIVIDEND 
              CONSTRAINED 0.145 (1.13) 0.030* (1.90) 0.595*** (6.41) -0.367*** (-2.75) -0.030 (-0.28) 0.396*** (7.06) 0.455 286 
UNCONSTRAINED 0.886*** (4.86) 0.009 (0.50) 0.201* (1.84) -0.069 (-0.62) -0.195 (-0.78) 0.246*** (4.93) 0.516 345 
5. AGE 
              CONSTRAINED 0.162 (1.46) 0.037*** (2.95) 0.434*** (4.83) -0.503*** (-3.80) -0.033 (-0.31) 0.387*** (7.06) 0.455 284 
UNCONSTRAINED 0.681** (2.55) -0.037 (-1.40) 0.300* (1.92) -0.076 (-0.65) 0.146 (0.33) 0.358*** (7.18) 0.457 316 
Notes: This table presents the OLS estimation results of the R&D investment model in equation 2. The US and UK samples are divided into two partitions: pre-crisis period (2000-2007) 
and post crisis period (2008-2011). The estimations use pre-determined firms selection into two categories. Constraint category assignments employ ex ante criteria based on firm size, 
dividend payout and age. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 4.1. All regressions include industry and time dummies. T-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to heteroskedasticity standard errors. 
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So far we have mainly investigated the role of a firms’‎ industry‎ in‎
determining the R&D/TINV ratio of firms. However, a firms’‎ industry‎may‎also‎
have a significant effect on the relationship between financial constraints and 
R&D/TINV ratio–cash flow sensitivity. High-tech firms are mainly focused on R&D 
investment and given that constrained firms will smooth R&D investment with 
cash holdings (Brown and Petersen, 2011), the sensitivity of R&D/TINV ratio of 
financially constrained firms to cash flow should be reduced for high-tech firms. 
That is, the benefit from increased cash flows will be higher for financially 
constrained non high-tech firms than for financially constrained high-tech firms. 
For example, high-tech unconstrained firms that pay dividends to their 
shareholders are more likely to benefit from large cash flow increases for R&D 
investment rate purposes. On the contrary, high-tech financially constrained firms 
with restricted access to external finance are more likely to rely primarily on 
accumulated cash reserves to finance the R&D investment rate. Consequently, 
we hypothesise that the sensitivity of the R&D/TINV ratio of financially 
constrained firms to changes in their cash flows should be more significant for 
non high-tech firms. As for high-tech firms, the impact of financial constraints on 
R&D/TINV ratio, should be either significantly reduced or become insignificant.  
In Table 4.6 we empirically test such a hypothesis by investigating the 
R&D/TINV ratio of firms in the pre-crisis and financial crisis periods. Initially, we 
split the sample into financially constrained and unconstrained groups and each 
of these group is further divided into high-tech and non high-tech categories of 
firms. The empirical results support our expectations. Starting with the results of 
high-tech firms, the coefficient of cash flow for all US high-tech firms in the 
pre-crisis period is negative but insignificant. In the crisis period the 
corresponding coefficients are positive and significant. However for the UK 
sample the coefficient of cash flow for all high- tech firms is positive and 
insignificant in both periods and greater in size during the crisis period. 
Furthermore, the same results are observed when we split firms into constrained 
and unconstrained groups using size, dividend payouts and age.  
In line with our a priori prediction, we find that the effect of cash flow on 
R&D/TINV is negative and significant for all US constrained, and positive and 
significant for all unconstrained non high-tech firms in the pre-crisis period. In the 
crisis period the corresponding coefficients are positive and insignificant for all 
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US constrained non high-tech firms and positive and significant for all US 
unconstrained non high tech firms.  
For UK firms in the pre-crisis period the effect of cash flow on R&D/TINV is 
positive (apart from constrained non high-tech firms in the pre-crisis period) and 
significant only for all unconstrained non high-tech firms and constrained non 
high-tech firms only under the age criteria. For UK firms in the crisis period the 
corresponding coefficients are positive for all groups and significant only for 
constrained non high-tech firms only under the size and age criteria.  
Where non high-tech firms are unconstrained, and are known for not 
having difficulties in accessing external finance, they seem to be relying highly on 
their internally generated funds to finance R&D investment rate. Finally, in line 
with our earlier findings, the results point to a positive and significant relationship 
between growth opportunities, cash holdings and R&D/TINV ratio and negative 
and significant relation between leverage and R&D/TINV ratio. The stock issue 
coefficients are insignificant (apart from one specification).  
Overall, the evidence reported in this table supports the view that it does 
matter which the industry a firm belongs to. High-tech firms seem to act differently 
from non high-tech firms both during an economic expansion and during an 
economic recession. Moreover, it seems that the positive cash flow shocks are 
most valuable for the R&D investment rate of financially unconstrained non 
high-tech firms.  
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Table 4.6 The Cash Flow Sensitivity of Investment During the Pre-Crisis and the Crisis Periods across High-Tech and Non 
High-Tech Subgroups of Firms: Augmented Regression Mode 
DV: R&D/TINV CF 
 
Q 
 
CASH 
 
LEV 
 
STOCK 
 
Constant 
 
Adj.R2 Obs. 
Panel A (US): Pre-crisis period (2000-2007) 
1.SIZE 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH -0.020 (-0.94) 0.006** (2.38) 0.339*** (21.19) -0.135*** (-6.20) -0.019 (-0.88) 0.532*** (43.05) 0.204 5959 
NON HIGH-TECH -0.146*** (-3.30) 0.029*** (5.50) 0.451*** (10.61) -0.076** (-2.42) 0.061 (1.22) 0.075*** (3.69) 0.282 2087 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH -0.013 (-0.64) 0.004 (1.49) 0.344*** (21.59) -0.129*** (-6.10) -0.022 (-1.03) 0.526*** (43.80) 0.237 6224 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.209*** (3.74) 0.002 (0.28) 0.305*** (6.53) -0.022 (-1.06) 0.028 (0.46) 0.077*** (5.66) 0.265 3100 
2.DIVIDEND 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH -0.018 (-0.86) 0.006** (2.29) 0.343*** (21.45) -0.133*** (-6.18) -0.018 (-0.87) 0.532*** (43.00) 0.208 5932 
NON HIGH-TECH -0.154*** (-3.33) 0.018*** (3.28) 0.653*** (15.51) -0.028 (-1.00) 0.003 (0.06) 0.046** (2.34) 0.357 2052 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH -0.016 (-0.77) 0.004* (1.68) 0.342*** (21.44) -0.129*** (-6.04) -0.021 (-0.99) 0.525*** (43.75) 0.235 6251 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.129** (2.37) 0.016*** (3.07) 0.105** (2.35) -0.067*** (-3.12) 0.077 (1.04) 0.098*** (7.17) 0.200 3135 
5. AGE 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH -0.015 (-0.72) 0.005** (2.06) 0.341*** (21.32) -0.139*** (-6.47) -0.021 (-0.99) 0.529*** (43.08) 0.223 6029 
NON HIGH-TECH -0.147*** (-3.37) 0.025*** (4.71) 0.595*** (14.85) -0.060** (-2.26) -0.005 (-0.10) 0.036** (1.97) 0.318 2296 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH -0.014 (-0.69) 0.004 (1.45) 0.345*** (21.65) -0.116*** (-5.37) -0.020 (-0.95) 0.529*** (43.70) 0.218 6130 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.141** (2.42) 0.019*** (3.28) 0.034 (0.81) -0.016 (-0.65) 0.296** (2.55) 0.102*** (6.63) 0.264 2651 
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Panel A (US): Crisis period (2008-2011) 
1.SIZE 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.115** (2.50) 0.010* (1.82) 0.359*** (11.58) -0.136*** (-3.24) -0.029 (-0.43) 0.512*** (26.90) 0.177 1998 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.065 (0.88) 0.023** (2.09) 0.438*** (6.21) -0.012 (-0.21) 0.212** (2.00) 0.072** (2.25) 0.243 780 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.132*** (2.85) 0.010* (1.79) 0.362*** (11.80) -0.127*** (-3.08) -0.020 (-0.30) 0.498*** (26.59) 0.220 2067 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.308*** (3.94) 0.019* (1.73) 0.349*** (4.82) -0.074** (-2.45) 0.036 (0.24) 0.063*** (2.88) 0.339 1132 
2.DIVIDEND 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.114** (2.48) 0.010* (1.82) 0.372*** (12.19) -0.133*** (-3.23) -0.036 (-0.53) 0.506*** (26.71) 0.183 1995 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.070 (0.94) 0.025** (2.14) 0.443*** (6.25) -0.077* (-1.72) 0.148 (1.40) 0.089*** (2.82) 0.276 854 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.133*** (2.86) 0.010* (1.80) 0.348*** (11.18) -0.131*** (-3.14) -0.012 (-0.17) 0.504*** (26.72) 0.213 2070 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.274*** (3.21) 0.020* (1.91) 0.303*** (3.98) -0.046 (-1.20) 0.058 (0.40) 0.055** (2.47) 0.262 1058 
5. AGE 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.112** (2.43) 0.010* (1.85) 0.356*** (11.46) -0.132*** (-3.17) -0.028 (-0.42) 0.510*** (26.91) 0.194 2006 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.072 (0.99) 0.022** (2.26) 0.473*** (7.07) -0.041 (-0.96) 0.111 (1.09) 0.039 (1.42) 0.261 916 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.133*** (2.88) 0.009* (1.68) 0.366*** (11.91) -0.124*** (-2.97) -0.015 (-0.22) 0.500*** (26.48) 0.199 2042 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.279*** (2.81) 0.040** (2.51) 0.229*** (3.02) -0.072* (-1.77) 0.209 (1.31) 0.079*** (2.84) 0.292 902 
 Panel B (UK): Pre-crisis period (2000-2007) 
1.SIZE 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.016 (0.31) 0.021*** (2.82) 0.383*** (8.61) -0.130* (-1.78) -0.016 (-0.30) 0.456*** (14.77) 0.254 885 
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NON HIGH-TECH -0.006 (-0.05) 0.018 (0.82) 0.434*** (3.74) -0.528*** (-3.77) -0.018 (-0.14) 0.332*** (4.77) 0.287 245 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.024 (0.45) 0.020** (2.53) 0.391*** (8.83) -0.117 (-1.65) -0.021 (-0.40) 0.449*** (14.60) 0.288 903 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.585*** (3.77) 0.056*** (2.83) 0.451*** (3.57) -0.209** (-2.00) 0.123 (0.68) 0.026 (0.52) 0.390 468 
2.DIVIDEND 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.026 (0.49) 0.021*** (2.77) 0.379*** (8.50) -0.143* (-1.94) -0.016 (-0.30) 0.463*** (14.68) 0.252 860 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.125 (1.02) 0.033 (1.64) 0.512*** (5.25) -0.363** (-2.46) -0.108 (-0.91) 0.249*** (3.74) 0.451 272 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.016 (0.31) 0.018** (2.39) 0.386*** (8.80) -0.122* (-1.76) -0.018 (-0.33) 0.449*** (15.01) 0.285 928 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.787*** (4.73) 0.018 (0.85) 0.177 (1.14) -0.209* (-1.90) -0.038 (-0.19) 0.089* (1.69) 0.270 441 
5. AGE 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.021 (0.40) 0.021*** (2.67) 0.383*** (8.58) -0.135* (-1.83) -0.017 (-0.31) 0.460*** (14.72) 0.253 864 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.236* (1.88) 0.025 (1.43) 0.446*** (4.19) -0.649*** (-3.96) -0.087 (-0.71) 0.334*** (4.85) 0.447 252 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.018 (0.34) 0.019** (2.43) 0.382*** (8.62) -0.135* (-1.91) -0.017 (-0.31) 0.455*** (14.88) 0.274 914 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.342* (1.78) 0.039 (1.51) 0.142 (0.89) -0.299*** (-2.82) -0.115 (-0.59) 0.128** (2.21) 0.255 430 
 Panel B (UK): Crisis period (2008-2011) 
1.SIZE 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.131 (1.17) 0.029** (2.18) 0.447*** (5.62) -0.038 (-0.30) 0.054 (0.48) 0.390*** (7.97) 0.331 332 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.517* (1.81) 0.051* (1.95) 0.343 (1.26) -0.242 (-0.90) 0.212 (0.76) 0.218*** (3.37) 0.406 106 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.170 (1.47) 0.024* (1.84) 0.407*** (4.95) -0.063 (-0.49) 0.148 (1.31) 0.407*** (8.21) 0.320 326 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.651 (1.59) -0.048 (-0.84) 0.451** (2.16) -0.365** (-2.57) -0.314 (-1.12) 0.376*** (3.68) 0.417 179 
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2.DIVIDEND 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.165 (1.43) 0.028** (2.13) 0.409*** (5.01) -0.120 (-0.92) 0.116 (1.03) 0.415*** (8.17) 0.312 321 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.330 (1.32) 0.026 (0.82) 0.792*** (4.96) -0.378** (-2.03) -0.201 (-1.03) 0.341*** (3.92) 0.496 134 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.149 (1.31) 0.026** (1.99) 0.425*** (5.18) 0.001 (0.00) 0.084 (0.74) 0.387*** (8.03) 0.341 337 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.253 (0.82) 0.088*** (2.83) -0.105 (-0.40) -0.468*** (-3.02) 0.496 (1.55) 0.178** (2.40) 0.326 151 
5. AGE 
              CONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.134 (1.20) 0.031** (2.36) 0.438*** (5.52) -0.073 (-0.57) 0.066 (0.60) 0.391*** (8.05) 0.340 330 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.476* (1.95) 0.036 (1.51) 0.390* (1.71) -0.720*** (-3.74) 0.026 (0.12) 0.350*** (4.14) 0.428 122 
UNCONSTRAINED 
              HIGH-TECH 0.170 (1.46) 0.023* (1.75) 0.415*** (5.05) -0.051 (-0.39) 0.148 (1.31) 0.408*** (8.15) 0.316 328 
NON HIGH-TECH 0.490 (1.03) -0.087 (-1.36) 0.342 (1.37) -0.356** (-2.18) -0.773 (-1.62) 0.444*** (4.99) 0.376 154 
Notes: This table presents the OLS estimation results of the R&D investment model in equation 2. The US and UK samples are divided into two partitions: pre-crisis period (2000-2007) 
and post crisis period (2008-2011). The estimations use pre-determined firms selection into two categories. Constraint category assignments employ ex ante criteria based on firm size, 
dividend payout and age. Analytical definitions for all the variables are provided in table 4.1. All regressions include industry and time dummies. T-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to heteroskedasticity standard errors. 
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In Table 4.7 we report new regression results using alternative definitions 
for R&D investment rate and for the contrary ratio, which is capital investment 
rate. In the first two specifications we present results for the R&D/TINV ratio and 
for the contrary ratio of INV/TINV. The next two specifications display results for 
alternative definition of the dependent variable, which is the natural logarithm of 
the ratio of R&D investment over physical investment and its inverse ratio. 
Further, we demonstrate results for the natural logarithm of the ratio of R&D 
investment growth from one year to another over the corresponding growth of 
capital investment and its inverse ratio. Lastly we report results for the natural 
logarithm of the ratio of R&D investment growth from one year to another over the 
corresponding growth of total investment and its inverse ratio. Note that the 
number of firm year-observations has declined when the growth specification is 
included. In general, in both panels, patterns of growth opportunities, cash 
holding, leverage and stock issues coefficients are similar quantitatively to the 
previous results (apart from the last four specifications, where the signs of these 
variables are opposite).  That is, growth opportunities and cash remain positive 
and cash seems to be the main firm characteristic significantly affecting the R&D 
investment rate. Leverage remains negative and significant, while stock issues 
do not exert significant influence on the dependent variable. However, the cash 
flow relationship is insignificant in all US specifications except for the 3rd and 4th 
ones. However in all UK specifications the cash flow relationship is significant 
except for the 3rd and 4th ones. Overall, the results suggest that for specifications 
with growth variables the coefficients are opposite to that with absolute values 
variables. Also the results indicate that the 3rd and 4th specifications show 
greatest in size coefficients. Lastly ratios of R&D investment are clearly 
interchangeable with ratios of capital investment in the sense that the coefficients 
size is the same, only the sign is changing (the exceptions here are the last two 
specifications).  
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Table 4.7 Alternative Definitions of the Dependent Variable 
 
Dep. Var. R&D/TINV INV/TINV ln(R&D/INV) ln(INV/R&D) ln(GR&D/GINV) ln(GINV/GR&D) ln(GR&D/GTINV) ln(GINV/GTINV) 
G=Growth 
       Panel A (US): (2000-2011) 
      CF 0.007 -0.007 -0.864*** 0.864*** -0.171 0.171 -0.022 0.131** 
 
(0.46) (-0.46) (-9.79) (9.79) (-1.62) (1.62) (-0.38) (2.27) 
         Q 0.012*** -0.012*** 0.027** -0.027** -0.008 0.008 0.000 -0.001 
 
(6.68) (-6.68) (2.43) (-2.43) (-0.54) (0.54) (0.02) (-0.15) 
         CASH 0.375*** -0.375*** 2.173*** -2.173*** -0.376*** 0.376*** 0.163*** 0.554*** 
 
(30.77) (-30.77) (31.87) (-31.87) (-3.91) (3.91) (3.02) (10.85) 
         LEV -0.097*** 0.097*** -0.608*** 0.608*** 0.182 -0.182 0.027 -0.103*** 
 
(-8.74) (8.74) (-6.88) (6.88) (1.64) (-1.64) (0.36) (-2.76) 
         STOCK 0.019 -0.019 -0.093 0.093 0.081 -0.081 -0.006 -0.071 
 
(1.07) (-1.07) (-0.89) (0.89) (0.63) (-0.63) (-0.08) (-0.99) 
         Constant 0.322*** 0.678*** -0.058 0.058 -0.843*** 0.843*** -0.333*** 0.268*** 
 
(35.05) (73.74) (-0.98) (0.98) (-10.51) (10.51) (-6.21) (8.31) 
         Adj.R2 0.561 0.561 0.450 0.450 0.021 0.021 0.007 0.118 
Obs. 17197 17197 12502 12502 7626 7626 9605 15169 
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Panel B (UK): (2000-2011) 
      CF 0.110*** -0.110*** 0.208 -0.208 -0.521* 0.521* -0.383** 0.138 
 
(2.65) (-2.65) (0.83) (-0.83) (-1.71) (1.71) (-2.10) (0.78) 
         Q 0.030*** -0.030*** 0.141*** -0.141*** 0.015 -0.015 0.042 0.039 
 
(5.43) (-5.43) (4.15) (-4.15) (0.29) (-0.29) (1.44) (1.22) 
         CASH 0.426*** -0.426*** 2.698*** -2.698*** -0.418 0.418 0.014 0.666*** 
 
(13.14) (-13.14) (12.76) (-12.76) (-1.48) (1.48) (0.09) (3.59) 
         LEV -0.242*** 0.242*** -1.665*** 1.665*** 0.476 -0.476 0.108 -0.232 
 
(-5.63) (5.63) (-5.70) (5.70) (1.29) (-1.29) (0.41) (-1.50) 
STOCK 0.000 -0.000 0.252 -0.252 -0.034 0.034 -0.031 -0.075 
         
 
(0.01) (-0.01) (1.00) (-1.00) (-0.10) (0.10) (-0.17) (-0.38) 
         Constant 0.369*** 0.631*** -0.599*** 0.599*** -0.843*** 0.843*** -0.178 0.496*** 
 
(13.39) (22.91) (-3.33) (3.33) (-3.72) (3.72) (-1.15) (4.70) 
         Adj.R2 0.455 0.455 0.481 0.481 0.040 0.040 0.022 0.048 
Obs. 2536 2536 2347 2347 1310 1310 1702 2136 
Notes: This table presents the OLS estimation results of the R&D investment model in equation 2. The estimations use alternative definitions of dependent variable. 
Analytical definitions for all the independent variables are provided in table 4.1. All regressions include industry and time dummies. T-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For the estimation we use consistent to heteroskedasticity standard 
errors. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we analyze how sensitive the R&D/TINV ratio is to 
fluctuations in net worth and other firm-specific characteristics across different 
subgroups of firms during the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. By combining the 
literature on corporate R&D investment with the literature on capital investment, 
we are able to shed more light on the total investment policy of firms in the US 
and UK markets. Moreover, by investigating how sensitive the R&D/TINV ratio is 
for financially constrained high-tech firms especially during a financial crisis 
period, we are also able to investigate important aspects of high-tech‎ firms’‎
behaviour, which has been explored partially in the literature.  
This paper is motivated by the fact that no attention has been devoted to 
the sensitivity of the R&D/TINV ratio to financial factors which is somewhat 
surprising given that changes in R&D investment and fixed investment arise, to 
some extent, due to information problems in the financial markets. We consider 
the effects of financial factors on both R&D and capital investment decisions in 
order to examine how constrained and unconstrained firms allocate their funds 
on R&D and capital when decisions on both inputs have to be taken 
simultaneously.  
The paper has found evidence that a firms' net worth and its R&D/TINV 
ratio are interrelated. According to our results the R&D/TINV ratio tends to be 
more responsive to changes in firm-specific indicators. Further, when firms are 
classified on the basis of their different characteristics we show that financially 
unconstrained firms face a greater sensitivity of the R&D/TINV ratio in contrast 
with the constrained firms especially in the crisis period. However, in the 
pre-crisis‎ period‎ financially‎ constrained‎ firms’‎ R&D/TINV‎ ratio‎ seems‎ to‎ be‎
negatively related with cash flow and positively related with cash flow in the crisis 
period. This indicate that in the pre-crisis period when the expected wedge 
between the cost of internal and external finance is lower, constrained firms 
increase their capital investment when cash flow increases, while in the crisis 
period when the expected wedge between the cost of internal and external 
finance is greater financially constrained firms increase their R&D investment 
when cash flow increase. After dividing firms into constrained high-tech and non 
high-tech and unconstrained high-tech and non high-tech groups we find that the 
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group of unconstrained non-high‎ tech‎ firms’‎ R&D/TINV‎ ratio‎ exhibit‎ greatest‎
sensitivity to cash flow changes independently from the time period we measure 
it. This finding is in line with the argument of Brown and Petersen (2011) that 
firms intensively investing in R&D projects are more likely to smooth their R&D 
investment by building up cash savings rather than relying on fluctuating cash 
flows. In summary, the results strongly suggest that capital market imperfections 
are the most important consideration in shaping the sensitivity of the R&D/TINV 
ratio across different firm classes. Our findings also reveal that the impact of 
financial constraints on R&D/TINV‎ ratio‎ also‎ depends‎ on‎ the‎ firm’s‎ industry.‎
Finally,‎we‎find‎that‎in‎general‎the‎R&D/TINV‎ratio‎of‎US‎firms’‎is‎more‎responsive‎
to changing conditions than that of UK firms. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions 
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The aim of this thesis has been to provide additional insights into the 
understanding of a number of issues relating to the impact of market 
imperfections on corporate investment and financial decisions. The investment 
cash flow sensitivity (ICFS henceforth) has been debated for a long time. As the 
literature has shown, the nature of the investment-cash flow relationship is, at 
best, not completely clear. The motivation of this thesis stems from the lack of 
consensus on the role of the ICFS. In addition, there is no study in the literature 
exploring physical and R&D investment simultaneously. Effectively, this thesis 
tries to expand the status quo and to contribute current literature.  
The three analytical studies in this thesis analyze corporate financial and 
investment decisions over time under the assumption of an imperfect market. 
The three different but related subjects under our study are 1) the relationship 
between internal cash flow and capital expenditure decisions, 2) the relationship 
between internal cash flow and R&D investment  decisions and 3) the 
determinants of the R&D/TINV ratio.  
 
There are two schools of thought in the literature on the issue of the ICFS 
of firms with different levels of financial constraints. The first one originated by 
Fazzari et al. (1988) (FHP) finds a greater ICFS for firms which are a priori more 
likely to confront binding financing constraints while another group initiated by 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ) displays a greater ICFS for counterpart firms. 
Chapter 2 is motivated by this disagreement in the literature. Our analysis 
provides a partial explanation for this puzzle by taking into account a very large 
and heterogeneous sample of non-financial UK listed firms over the period 1980 
to 2009 and showing that the FHP or KZ results may appear depending on the 
sample selection in terms of types of firms accepted in the sample as well as the 
time period the sample comes from. The sample selection criteria apply to the 
problem of data mining, e.g. most of the evidence provided to support FHP 
hypothesis is build on samples of very large firms, therefore this may lead to very 
quick and easy explanation, while this phenomenon is more complex. In 
particular, this study finds that one can set together selected results to be either 
consistent with the conclusions of Fazzari et al. (1988) or Kaplan and Zingales 
(1997), subject to financial constraints measure, time period considered, or 
selected sample.  
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However, taking into account firms most likely to be financially constrained 
but not financially distressed (on average firms classified as very constrained 
according to e.g., size show negative cash flows, especially over the last decade, 
while firms classified as financially unconstrained show positive cash flows) we 
find that our results are more in line with the FHP argument (a greater ICFS for 
financially constrained firms) than with the KZ argument (a greater ICFS for 
financially unconstrained firms). Especially the investigation of financial crisis 
time versus booming time provides an additional evidence for the FHP argument. 
Also, after splitting firms into four different subsamples according to firstly size 
and then a combined measure of size, age and sales growth, we find that the last 
combined measure controls better for ICFS size changes, namely the ICFS 
increases monotonically in size from the sample of very constrained firms to 
lightly constrained firms in every subperiod. 
Nonetheless,‎the‎detailed‎division‎of‎large‎firms’‎sample‎helps‎to‎explain‎
the previous opposing empirical results in the literature and will further our 
understanding of the relationship between internal funds and the investment 
behaviours of firms and help solve the long lasting puzzle. 
Further, Chapter 2 reveals that the ICFS for physical investment has 
declined sharply over the entire sample period, even after controlling for negative 
cash flow firms, the role of cash holdings and debt financing or after splitting the 
sample into two or four contrasting groups according to various measures like 
age, size, sale growth or dividend payments. This decline cannot be explained on 
the basis of measurement error alone. This work substantially contributes to the 
existing body of knowledge, by extending and complementing existing US 
evidence (e.g., Brown and Petersen, 2009) on the evolution of ICFS. 
The decline of ICFS over time may indicate either some gradual changes 
in the capital market influencing investment decisions over recent thirty years40 or 
that ICFS sensitivity is an incorrect measure of financial constraints as claimed by 
Chen and Chen (2012). Intuitively we reject the claim made by Chen and Chen 
on the basis that diminishing ICFS may stem from unspecified mechanisms or 
simply from error in capturing financial constraints or in the measurement of 
investment opportunities.  
                                            
40
 Brown and Petersen (2009) explain the decrease of ICFS over time with the rising importance 
of public equity as a source of funds.  
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The above findings have implications for an important literature on the role 
of the cash flow for corporate investment. Dasgupta et al., (2011) find that firms 
stage their response to increases in cash flow, delaying investment while building 
up cash stocks and reducing leverage. They find that although, in the long run, 
investment exhibits substantial sensitivity to cash flows, investment does not 
absorb the entire cash flow shock. In fact, the tighter the financial constraints, the 
smaller the fraction of cash flow absorbed by investment and the more by 
leverage reduction. The descriptive statistics of chapter 2 demonstrate that a 
great number of changes are apparent for UK firms over the last 30 years. Cash 
flows have decreased critically, mostly due to the substantial increase in the 
proportion of small and young firms with persistently negative cash flows. 
Physical investment has also declined and the uses of total debt as well as of 
cash holding have increased. More leveraged firms have higher obligations in 
term of interest payments, hence higher debt level will absorb greater share of 
cash flows. We also know from the descriptive statistics in chapter 2 that on 
average firms save double amount of cash in the period 2000 to 2009 to what 
they were saving in the period 1980 to 1989. This may imply that firms devote 
greater chunk of cash flows to build up cash reserves over time. Hence we can 
expect smaller fraction of cash flow available for investment over time and 
consequently decreasing ICFS over time.  
 
Chapter 3 investigates corporate R&D investment behaviour in the US and 
UK using data from the period 1990-2010. The descriptive statistics of this paper 
demonstrate that a great number of changes are apparent for publicly traded 
manufacturing firms over the last 21 years. On average, cash flows ratio has 
decreased critically, mostly due to the substantial increase in the amount of small 
and young firms with persistently negative cash flows, R&D investment ratio has 
increased sharply, physical investment ratio has declined and ratios of the uses 
of public equity issues as well as of cash stocks have increased over time.  
The findings of this chapter also indicate that R&D investment is an 
important proportion of the overall corporate investment spending for a significant 
share of publicly traded firms. According to the sample of this research the share 
of R&D investment in total investment, measured as the sum of physical and 
R&D investments, is higher than the share of capital investment for US firms 
since year 1992 and for UK firms since year 2001. 
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The main finding of chapter 3 is the persistently negative relationship 
between cash flow and R&D investment. In particular, this study shows that the 
ICFS for R&D investment is negative and that it increases in the degree of 
negativity, while conversely the ICFS for physical investment is positive but the 
degree of positivity decreases over time. These trends do not change much even 
after controlling for negative cash flow firms. We conclude that the increase in the 
negative relationship between R&D investment and cash flow over time is robust 
to various model specifications. This finding suggests that despite experiencing a 
shortage of internal liquidity firms continue investing, which indicates that firms 
finance their R&D investment with other funds.  
Chen and Chen (2012) study the evolution of ICFS over the period 1967 to 
2009 and find that ICFS has declined over time and has completely disappeared 
in recent years, even during the 2007–2009 credit crunch. They conclude that 
ICFS is not a good measure of financial constraints, and that future empirical 
work should not use this variable as a valid proxy for financial constraints. They 
assert that if one believes that financial constraints have not completely 
disappeared, then ICFS cannot be a good measure of financial constraints. We 
find negative R&D ICFS, which also contradicts the theory of financial 
constraints. However, bearing in mind that physical and R&D investments greatly 
differ owing to their characteristics, we conclude that ICFS may not work for R&D 
investment as a measure of financial constraints.      
The estimated results of chapter 3 also highlight that firms who are 
investing in R&D projects seem to plan the investment well in advance and make 
sure that they have enough funds before they start the R&D investment project, 
especially in the case of financially constrained firms. In general, financially 
constrained R&D firms seem to save up cash stock out of cash flow innovations 
or stock issues in order to finance their R&D investment, while unconstrained 
R&D‎firms’‎behaviour‎is‎not‎significantly‎related‎with‎cash‎holdings.‎This‎finding‎is‎
in line with the study of Brown and Petersen (2011) who find that firms who are 
most likely to face financing frictions rely extensively on cash holdings to smooth 
R&D, while firms less likely to face financing frictions appear to smooth R&D 
investment without the use of costly cash holdings.  
The financial crisis is well distinguished by the results of chapter 3. We find 
that R&D ICFS is negative before and during the crisis period and it is increasing 
in its negativity during the crisis especially for US sample. Interestingly for the US 
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sample the cash holdings coefficients over the boom period is higher than UK 
ones, while over the crisis period the same coefficients are higher for the UK 
firms’‎sample‎than‎the‎US‎one.‎Also‎UK‎firms‎show‎higher‎coefficients‎for‎growth‎
opportunities over the boom and crisis periods than US firms. Overall, when the 
financial crisis period is considered the ICFS is still even more negative and 
significant, whereas cash holdings coefficients are more positive and significant 
according to the OLS regression. In line with GMM results cash holding of the full 
sample‎of‎US‎firms’‎impacts‎R&D‎investment‎negatively‎during‎the‎crisis.‎ 
The GMM results of chapter 3 report that the financially unconstrained 
firms adjust their R&D investment faster than financially constrained firms. The 
adjustment coefficient is relatively small (it is lower than 0.5 in all cases) and even 
smaller during the financial crisis period, possibly providing evidence that the 
dynamics implied by our models are not rejected and firms adjust their R&D 
expenditures ratios relatively slowly in an attempt to have their target R&D 
investment ratios. One possible explanation for this adjustment speed could be 
that the costs deviating from the target R&D investment ratio are not so 
significant and firms' R&D investment ratios are persistent over time. Overall the 
adjustment coefficient is close to 0, especially during the financial crisis period 
suggesting that the costs of adjustment are much greater than the costs of 
disequilibrium‎in‎the‎firms’‎trade-off analysis between the two different types of 
costs: the costs of making adjustment to their target ratios and the costs of being 
in disequilibrium (being off target).  
In terms of comparison between the US and UK firms, one can learn from 
the results that the coefficients for UK firms are much greater than for US firms, 
implying a stronger dependence by R&D investment on financial variables in the 
UK than in the US market. This implies that the UK firms who are actively 
engaged in R&D investment projects are more financially constrained than US 
firms. This conclusion is supported by the evidence that the cash holdings 
coefficients for UK firms are in general higher than for US firms. This explains 
why UK firms invest in RD activities around half as much as US firms. However 
this subject could be better understood after incorporating the tax system effects 
in the model of US and UK firms, which remains a recommendation for future 
research. 
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Chapter 4 analyses how sensitive the R&D/TINV ratio is to fluctuations in 
the net worth and other firm-specific characteristics across different subgroups of 
firms during the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. This study considers the effects 
of financial factors on both R&D and capital investment decisions in order to 
examine how constrained and unconstrained firms allocate their funds on R&D 
and capital when decisions regarding both inputs have to be taken 
simultaneously.  
In chapter 4 we find that a firms' net worth and its R&D/TINV ratio are 
interrelated. The year by year analysis shows that the R&D/TINV ratio - cash flow 
sensitivity is negative over time until year 2007 and since year 2008 it becomes 
increasingly positive. This implies that taking into account both capital and R&D 
investments simultaneously better reflects the real investment decisions firms 
make. During booming period the external financing sources are broadly 
available and less costly, while during financial crisis external finances shrink in 
size and turn to be costly for firms, hence during financial crisis firms are more 
likely to employ internal than external finances, and this is what we observe in 
chapter 4.  
According to our results in chapter 4 the R&D/TINV ratio tends to be more 
responsive to changes in firm-specific indicators. Further, when firms are 
classified on the basis of their different characteristics we show that financially 
unconstrained firms face a greater sensitivity of the R&D/TINV ratio in contrast 
with the constrained firms especially in the crisis period. However, in the 
pre-crisis period the R&D/TINV‎ratio‎of‎financially‎constrained‎firms’‎seems‎to‎be‎
negatively related with cash flow and in the crisis period positively related with 
cash flow. This indicates that in the pre-crisis period when the expected wedge 
between the cost of internal and external finance is lower, constrained firms 
increase their capital investment when cash flow increases. However during the 
crisis period when the expected wedge between the cost of internal and external 
finance is greater financially constrained firms increase their R&D investment 
when cash flow increases. After dividing the firms into constrained high-tech and 
non high-tech and unconstrained high-tech and non high-tech groups we find that 
the group of unconstrained non-high‎tech‎firms’‎R&D/TINV‎ratio‎exhibit greatest 
sensitivity to cash flow changes independently from the time period we measure 
it. This finding is in line with the argument of Brown and Petersen (2011) that 
firms intensively investing in R&D projects are more likely to smooth their R&D 
238 
 
investment by building up cash savings rather than relying on fluctuating cash 
flows. In summary, the results strongly suggest that capital market imperfections 
are the most important consideration in shaping the sensitivity of the R&D/TINV 
ratio across different firm classes. Our findings also reveal that the impact of 
financial‎ constraints‎ on‎ R&D/TINV‎ ratio‎ also‎ depends‎ on‎ the‎ firm’s‎ industry.‎
Finally,‎we‎find‎that‎in‎general‎the‎R&D/TINV‎ratio‎of‎US‎firms’‎is‎more‎responsive‎
to changing conditions than that of UK firms. 
 
Overall, the results show that capital and R&D investment has been 
affected by financial constraints. In agreement with previous literature this thesis 
implies‎ that‎ when‎ operating‎ in‎ a‎market‎ with‎ a‎ variety‎ of‎ distortions,‎ a‎ firm’s 
investment decision-making process is much more difficult than it is in a market 
free of frictions. Further, this study shows the vast range of differences between 
the US and UK R&D firms. The most outstanding one is that US firms appear to 
be much more advanced in their R&D investing processes.   
Brown and Petersen (2009) argue that the changes in the physical and 
R&D ICFS over time are due to the development of equity markets and the 
changes in the total investment compositions. Our results in this thesis confirm 
Brown‎and‎Petersen’s‎findings‎and‎also‎extend‎the‎topic‎by‎highlighting‎various‎
issues. We warn about the data selection process which may result in biased or 
confounding outcomes.  We also emphasize the role of negative cash flow firms 
in contrast with majority of the existing literature. Empirical studies that ignore 
negative cash flows firm-year observations are unlikely to unravel the true nature 
of the relationship between investment and firm specific characteristics, 
especially the ICFS.   
The new insights provided by our empirical analysis of the R&D/TINV ratio 
suggests new avenues for future research on the relationship between 
R&D/TINV ratio, other firm specific characteristics and internal corporate 
governance devices. One such avenue relates to the determinants of the speed 
of adjustment towards the equilibrium level of R&D/TINV ratio. Another avenue of 
future research is to focus on the interaction between the financial status of firms 
and corporate governance measures in determining R&D/TINV ratio.  
Evidently, this research comes with a number of limitations that should be 
kept in mind. Every model specification in this research was estimated using an 
augmented Q model of investment because this is clearly the specification most 
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commonly applied in the literature. However, recent literature experiments with 
different investment specifications such as sales accelerator models (Hoshi et al., 
1991; Kadapakkam et al., 1998), or dynamic neoclassical investment models 
(Bond et al., 2003; Guariglia, 2008), or specifications that engage in different 
controls for the investment opportunities bias (Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; 
Guariglia and Carpenter, 2008). It would be interesting to see whether the results 
hold for these alternative specifications that have been suggested in the previous 
literature. Another limitation of the thesis is that we have taken into account only 
publicly traded UK and US firms that are principally both large and mature. We 
hope that future work will examine these issues using data from smaller or 
younger companies, or where differences between more innovative and less 
innovative firms may be even more significant. 
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